Piercing distrust with new defense white paper

By M. Riefqi Muna

JAKARTA (JP): Much has been happening in Indonesian defense circles in the last three months: the release of the second Defense White Paper (DWP); the opening of the country's largest military training center, in Lampung; the plan for a joint military project with Australia in the natural gas-rich Natuna Islands; a major reshuffle of senior Armed Forces personnel and finally the acquisition of Russian SU-30 fighters and MI 17 helicopters.

Each of these events has its own significance for the maintenance of a dynamic Indonesian Armed Forces. But as a whole they may be construed as being part of a regional arms build-up.

This article will look at the extent to which Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) can be promoted, despite the existence of these military dynamics.

The acquisition of a modern war-machine often raises concerns in neighboring countries. As a result it is not easy for countries to improve their military power without considering the possible reactions from outside.

In security circles, this situation is called the security dilemma. It is quite rational for states to assume the worst and impute aggressive intentions to a neighboring country which acquires modern weaponry, even if only for defensive purposes.

These countries often follow suit, leading to feelings of insecurity and the possibility of further military spending by the first country.

Hence, by initially trying to enhance its own security a country may set in motion a process that ironically results in it feeling less secure.

In a different context, the security dilemma merely refers to the security problem faced by all states in a world without a central authority or lacking a common governmental ideology.

In this context, the difficulty lies in determining the security posture of a state, whether it is offensive or defensive.

In this sense, of course, interpreting the military posture of any state should be based on considerations of its strategic culture, which is made up of its geopolitical reality, political and military culture, military doctrine, forces structure.

Without real understanding of such concerns, false conclusions regarding a country's military policies are highly likely. In Indonesia's case it must be remembered that the country is a vast archipelago in dire need of adequate military hardware to guard its territorial integrity and unity.

However the acquisition of the Sukhois still leaves Indonesia's Armed Forces technically far below ideal strength, especially the Navy and Air Force. But little more could be bought due to financial constraints.

And even what was bought will attract attention from our neighbors.

How can we minimize the distrust or eliminate the security dilemma and anarchy brought on by these developments?

The answer is simple. The DWP demonstrates the reality of Indonesia's motives, that the acquisition of modern warfare technology is a basic need and should not be linked to any arms build-up.

The extent of arms spending in ASEAN countries and the Asia- Pacific region is still not at a level where an arms race could be said to be starting. It is only the replacement of out-dated technology.

The publication of the DWP is a significant step to promote CBMs in the region, as has been agreed by the member countries of the ASEAN Regional Forum. The ARF also promotes the regional arms register in the context of the United Nations requirement on arms registers.

Indonesia's second DWP, titled The Policy of the State Defense and Security of the Republic of Indonesia 1997 is an alternative answer. The 64-page paper provides comprehensive information on Indonesia's Armed Forces.

It is also important because it reduces any possible misunderstanding of Indonesia's military program. The current publication is a great improvement on the previous, 1995, DWP in the variety of information it gives.

Unlike Australia and Japan, which publish white papers on defense both regularly and in more detail, it has not been a tradition for the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) to do so. Seen in this context, the DWP must be significant progress.

According to a United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research report, CBMs help one side interpret correctly the actions of the other in a pre-crisis situation through an exchange of reliable and uninterrupted information of each others' intention.

CBMs is still a developing concept and there are various proposals on its method and areas. Some prefer the term of CSBM (Confidence and Security Building Measures). At the 1995 ARF meeting in Brunei, Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans proposed the use of TBM (Trust Building Measures) instead of CBMs or SCBMs. And there is also a proposal to use the term CSSBMs (Confidence Security and Stability Building Measures).

These competing names are not significant, but the essence is more importance. CBMs at least urge the promotion of transparency and predictability of states' military activities. In such a context producing the Defense White Paper is just a basic information on military forces. There is also a requirement to implement CBMs in areas of military activity such as communications, notification and maneuver observer conduct.

However, despite the fact that there are still a lot of aspects that have still to be fulfilled to promote CBMs in the region, the publication of the DWP is a significant contribution by Indonesia to promote peace and stability in the region.

By understanding the DWP, misjudgment of the possible Indonesia's external military intentions can be eliminated. However, the establishment of military facilities in the natural gas-rich Natuna islands may prompt other parties to act similarly, which in turn could make the South China Sea a potential flash-point for a future conflict.

The writer is a researcher at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, Jakarta.