Piercing distrust with new defense white paper

Piercing distrust with new defense white paper

By M. Riefqi Muna

JAKARTA (JP): Much has been happening in Indonesian defense
circles in the last three months: the release of the second
Defense White Paper (DWP); the opening of the country's largest
military training center, in Lampung; the plan for a joint
military project with Australia in the natural gas-rich Natuna
Islands; a major reshuffle of senior Armed Forces personnel and
finally the acquisition of Russian SU-30 fighters and MI 17
helicopters.

Each of these events has its own significance for the
maintenance of a dynamic Indonesian Armed Forces. But as a whole
they may be construed as being part of a regional arms build-up.

This article will look at the extent to which Confidence
Building Measures (CBMs) can be promoted, despite
the existence of these military dynamics.

The acquisition of a modern war-machine often raises concerns
in neighboring countries. As a result it is not easy for
countries to improve their military power without considering the
possible reactions from outside.

In security circles, this situation is called the security
dilemma. It is quite rational for states to assume the worst and
impute aggressive intentions to a neighboring country which
acquires modern weaponry, even if only for defensive purposes.

These countries often follow suit, leading to feelings of
insecurity and the possibility of further military spending by
the first country.

Hence, by initially trying to enhance its own security a
country may set in motion a process that ironically results in it
feeling less secure.

In a different context, the security dilemma merely refers to
the security problem faced by all states in a world without a
central authority or lacking a common governmental ideology.

In this context, the difficulty lies in determining the
security posture of a state, whether it is offensive or
defensive.

In this sense, of course, interpreting the military posture of
any state should be based on considerations of its strategic
culture, which is made up of its geopolitical reality, political
and military culture, military doctrine, forces structure.

Without real understanding of such concerns, false conclusions
regarding a country's military policies are highly likely. In
Indonesia's case it must be remembered that the country is a vast
archipelago in dire need of adequate military hardware to guard
its territorial integrity and unity.

However the acquisition of the Sukhois still leaves
Indonesia's Armed Forces technically far below ideal strength,
especially the Navy and Air Force. But little more could be
bought due to financial constraints.

And even what was bought will attract attention from our
neighbors.

How can we minimize the distrust or eliminate the security
dilemma and anarchy brought on by these developments?

The answer is simple. The DWP demonstrates the reality of
Indonesia's motives, that the acquisition of modern warfare
technology is a basic need and should not be linked to any arms
build-up.

The extent of arms spending in ASEAN countries and the Asia-
Pacific region is still not at a level where an arms race could
be said to be starting. It is only the replacement of out-dated
technology.

The publication of the DWP is a significant step to promote
CBMs in the region, as has been agreed by the member countries of
the ASEAN Regional Forum. The ARF also promotes the regional arms
register in the context of the United Nations requirement on arms
registers.

Indonesia's second DWP, titled The Policy of the State Defense
and Security of the Republic of Indonesia 1997 is an alternative
answer. The 64-page paper provides comprehensive information on
Indonesia's Armed Forces.

It is also important because it reduces any possible
misunderstanding of Indonesia's military program. The current
publication is a great improvement on the previous, 1995, DWP in
the variety of information it gives.

Unlike Australia and Japan, which publish white papers on
defense both regularly and in more detail, it has not been a
tradition for the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) to do so. Seen
in this context, the DWP must be significant progress.

According to a United Nations Institute for Disarmament
Research report, CBMs help one side interpret correctly the
actions of the other in a pre-crisis situation through an
exchange of reliable and uninterrupted information of each
others' intention.

CBMs is still a developing concept and there are various
proposals on its method and areas. Some prefer the term of CSBM
(Confidence and Security Building Measures). At the 1995 ARF
meeting in Brunei, Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans
proposed the use of TBM (Trust Building Measures) instead of CBMs
or SCBMs. And there is also a proposal to use the term CSSBMs
(Confidence Security and Stability Building Measures).

These competing names are not significant, but the essence is
more importance. CBMs at least urge the promotion of transparency
and predictability of states' military activities. In such a
context producing the Defense White Paper is just a basic
information on military forces. There is also a requirement to
implement CBMs in areas of military activity such as
communications, notification and maneuver observer conduct.

However, despite the fact that there are still a lot of
aspects that have still to be fulfilled to promote CBMs in the
region, the publication of the DWP is a significant contribution
by Indonesia to promote peace and stability in the region.

By understanding the DWP, misjudgment of the possible
Indonesia's external military intentions can be eliminated.
However, the establishment of military facilities in the natural
gas-rich Natuna islands may prompt other parties to act
similarly, which in turn could make the South China Sea a
potential flash-point for a future conflict.

The writer is a researcher at the Indonesian Institute of
Sciences, Jakarta.