Philippines: Sovereignty or security?

Philippines: Sovereignty or security?

Amando Doronila, Philippine Daily Inquirer, Asia News Network,
Manila

The participations of about 600 American troops in joint
military exercises with Philippine forces in Mindanao constitutes
the largest deployment of U.S. forces in the U.S.-led war on
terrorism after Afghanistan. The deployment makes the Philippines
the new theater of the war targeting the al-Qaeda terrorist
network.

The form assumed by the U.S. deployment in the Philippines is
less explicit than in Afghanistan. In the Philippines, the U.S.
is inserting its military presence through the mechanism of the
joint exercise called "Balikatan," authorized by the Visiting
Forces Agreement (VFA). The purpose, however, of the exercises is
to train Filipino troops to fight effectively terrorist
organizations linked to the al-Qaeda -- in our case the Abu
Sayyaf -- with sophisticated U.S. military equipment and the
expertise of its troops.

The exercises, which envisage the presence of U.S. troops in
combat areas in Mindanao, are set against the background of
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's policy supporting the U.S.
military campaign against terrorists, and opening the Philippines
to longer and wider U.S. military presence than is contemplated
by the VFA. The joint exercises are planned to last between six
months and a year, and represent the biggest concentration of
U.S. forces on Philippine soil since the withdrawal of U.S.
military bases here in 1992.

Since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on the U.S., the texture
of Philippine-U.S. military cooperation have drastically altered,
stretching the limits of the VFA and even the Mutual Defense
Treaty of 1951. These agreements form the framework in which
cooperation would be carried out for the mutual security of the
Philippines and the United States.

The large and long-term deployment of U.S. forces within the
framework of joint military exercises have rekindled sensitive
nationalist and constitutional issues involving Philippine
sovereignty. These issues are acquiring a highly emotional
content.

The issues include: Do the exercises constitute the return of
permanent basing of U.S. forces, in violation of the
constitutional ban? Are the U.S. forces going to engage in combat
missions together with the Philippine forces against the Abu
Sayyaf? More basically, is their deployment an infringement of
national sovereignty or does it enhance Philippine national
security and the capability of our armed forces to fight
terrorist forces and other rebellions? The last-mentioned issue
has something to do with striking a balance between sovereignty
and security.

This article merely crystallizes and defines the issues.

First, these military exercises are different from those in
the past and their function and scope were not foreshadowed by
the VFA signed in 1998. The joint exercises contemplated a
duration of a few weeks -- not six months to a year.

The reason for the short duration is that the pre-Sept. 11
exercises were planned on hypothetical situations. "Balikatan"
brings the exercises into the heart of the combat zone against
the Abu Sayyaf. This is one reason why "Balikatan" cannot be put
in a time frame and seems open-ended. The war against the Abu
Sayyaf is not hypothetical, and Mindanao is an actual war zone.

Since the exercises are intended to upgrade the fighting
skills and use of weapons of Filipino forces, and are also tied
to the policy objective of crushing the Abu Sayyaf as part of the
al-Qaeda network (as well as rescuing the American couple held
hostage by the Abu Sayyaf), first, although Filipino and U.S.
officials have asserted that the U.S. troops will not be deployed
in combat missions, they may accompany Filipino troops in combat
zones and, that if U.S. troops are fired upon, they can react in
self defense -- meaning, shoot the enemy. With this possibility,
the thin line between being advisers and engagement as combat
troops can easily disappear.

Six months to one year are a long time for military exercises,
and deployment of forces for such duration mocks the word
"exercises" and colors them as actual military combat operations.
There is a big risk. If in six months or one year the Abu Sayyaf
is not crushed, such a failure is likely to reflect on the
ability of both Filipino and U.S. forces to destroy the Abu
Sayyaf and can invite the deployment of larger foreign forces in
the operations.

The extension of the war on terrorism in the Philippines or
the opening of a new front in that war is based on the doctrine
that was successful in demolishing the Taliban regime. Pentagon
and U.S. state department authorities call it a "proxy" war in
which countries, where there are terrorist networks, are
encouraged to fight terrorism with the assistance of U.S. weapons
and troops. This worked successfully in Afghanistan where the
U.S. used the Northern Alliance as a proxy which, of course, was
heavily backed by the power of U.S. bombings on Taliban
strongholds.

The possibility of the return of permanent U.S. bases is
remote and strategic thinking in Washington does not favor bases
which are expensive to maintain and which create nationalist
political issues. Long-term presence of troops does not
constitute permanent basing, but nationalists raise the issue of
sovereignty.

The government argues that the exercises stand on firm legal
framework and the deployment of U.S. forces in combat zones does
not violate the Constitution. But the larger question is whether
sovereignty is a real issue. This question is linked to enhancing
national security, and if the Republic does not have the capacity
to quell rebellions and assert its sovereignty in Abu Sayyaf
areas, what sovereignty do we have?