Philippines: Sovereignty or security?

Amando Doronila, Philippine Daily Inquirer, Asia News Network, Manila

The participations of about 600 American troops in joint military exercises with Philippine forces in Mindanao constitutes the largest deployment of U.S. forces in the U.S.-led war on terrorism after Afghanistan. The deployment makes the Philippines the new theater of the war targeting the al-Qaeda terrorist network.

The form assumed by the U.S. deployment in the Philippines is less explicit than in Afghanistan. In the Philippines, the U.S. is inserting its military presence through the mechanism of the joint exercise called "Balikatan," authorized by the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The purpose, however, of the exercises is to train Filipino troops to fight effectively terrorist organizations linked to the al-Qaeda -- in our case the Abu Sayyaf -- with sophisticated U.S. military equipment and the expertise of its troops.

The exercises, which envisage the presence of U.S. troops in combat areas in Mindanao, are set against the background of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's policy supporting the U.S. military campaign against terrorists, and opening the Philippines to longer and wider U.S. military presence than is contemplated by the VFA. The joint exercises are planned to last between six months and a year, and represent the biggest concentration of U.S. forces on Philippine soil since the withdrawal of U.S. military bases here in 1992.

Since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on the U.S., the texture of Philippine-U.S. military cooperation have drastically altered, stretching the limits of the VFA and even the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951. These agreements form the framework in which cooperation would be carried out for the mutual security of the Philippines and the United States.

The large and long-term deployment of U.S. forces within the framework of joint military exercises have rekindled sensitive nationalist and constitutional issues involving Philippine sovereignty. These issues are acquiring a highly emotional content.

The issues include: Do the exercises constitute the return of permanent basing of U.S. forces, in violation of the constitutional ban? Are the U.S. forces going to engage in combat missions together with the Philippine forces against the Abu Sayyaf? More basically, is their deployment an infringement of national sovereignty or does it enhance Philippine national security and the capability of our armed forces to fight terrorist forces and other rebellions? The last-mentioned issue has something to do with striking a balance between sovereignty and security.

This article merely crystallizes and defines the issues.

First, these military exercises are different from those in the past and their function and scope were not foreshadowed by the VFA signed in 1998. The joint exercises contemplated a duration of a few weeks -- not six months to a year.

The reason for the short duration is that the pre-Sept. 11 exercises were planned on hypothetical situations. "Balikatan" brings the exercises into the heart of the combat zone against the Abu Sayyaf. This is one reason why "Balikatan" cannot be put in a time frame and seems open-ended. The war against the Abu Sayyaf is not hypothetical, and Mindanao is an actual war zone.

Since the exercises are intended to upgrade the fighting skills and use of weapons of Filipino forces, and are also tied to the policy objective of crushing the Abu Sayyaf as part of the al-Qaeda network (as well as rescuing the American couple held hostage by the Abu Sayyaf), first, although Filipino and U.S. officials have asserted that the U.S. troops will not be deployed in combat missions, they may accompany Filipino troops in combat zones and, that if U.S. troops are fired upon, they can react in self defense -- meaning, shoot the enemy. With this possibility, the thin line between being advisers and engagement as combat troops can easily disappear.

Six months to one year are a long time for military exercises, and deployment of forces for such duration mocks the word "exercises" and colors them as actual military combat operations. There is a big risk. If in six months or one year the Abu Sayyaf is not crushed, such a failure is likely to reflect on the ability of both Filipino and U.S. forces to destroy the Abu Sayyaf and can invite the deployment of larger foreign forces in the operations.

The extension of the war on terrorism in the Philippines or the opening of a new front in that war is based on the doctrine that was successful in demolishing the Taliban regime. Pentagon and U.S. state department authorities call it a "proxy" war in which countries, where there are terrorist networks, are encouraged to fight terrorism with the assistance of U.S. weapons and troops. This worked successfully in Afghanistan where the U.S. used the Northern Alliance as a proxy which, of course, was heavily backed by the power of U.S. bombings on Taliban strongholds.

The possibility of the return of permanent U.S. bases is remote and strategic thinking in Washington does not favor bases which are expensive to maintain and which create nationalist political issues. Long-term presence of troops does not constitute permanent basing, but nationalists raise the issue of sovereignty.

The government argues that the exercises stand on firm legal framework and the deployment of U.S. forces in combat zones does not violate the Constitution. But the larger question is whether sovereignty is a real issue. This question is linked to enhancing national security, and if the Republic does not have the capacity to quell rebellions and assert its sovereignty in Abu Sayyaf areas, what sovereignty do we have?