People power will drive U.S. bases out

By Eiichi Furukawa

TOKYO (JP): In 1992 when the U.S. forces were withdrawing from the Philippines naval base in Subic, it was argued this would bring instability to the country as well as to the region, and would adversely affect the country's economy.

During negotiations to extend the lease agreement, the U.S. chief negotiator even said that if the U.S. bases were obliged to withdraw "relations with the U.S. would finish". "U.S. and allies are angry, no investment any more," he cried.

An agreement to extend the lease for 10 years was rejected by the Philippine Senate 12 to 11. A two-third majority of 16 votes was required for approval.

However, on Nov. 25 last year, President Clinton visited Subic to attend the APEC economic leaders meeting. He saw that the country's security, both internal and external, had greatly improved and its economy was growing.

Foreign investment had increased dramatically. The Philippines boasted that their country had become a tiger and was no longer a "sickman" of Asia. Clinton praised the Philippines achievement and announced a US$500 million American investment plan.

The day Clinton visited Subic was, by no coincidence or deliberate plan of the Philippine government, the fourth anniversary of the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Subic. Thus it proved that the withdrawal of American bases was good for the country.

In Japan, the government of Prime Minister Hashimoto pledged to maintain 47,000 U.S. troops in Japan as part of the 100,000 U.S. forces in East Asia. This was stated in the joint security declaration issued by Hashimoto and Clinton on April 17 last year in Tokyo.

However, the Tokyo government faced strong opposition from the local government and people of Okinawa. Led by Governor Masahide Ohta, they demanded complete withdrawal of all U.S. bases in Okinawa by 2015. At a non-binding official poll conducted by the Okinawa government, the proposal to dismantle U.S. bases was overwhelmingly supported. The immediate target was to remove the helicopter airport and other facilities of the U.S. marine corps in Okinawa whose strength is 21,000.

But there are three problems in assessing the security situation in East Asia as stated in the Hashimoto and Clinton declaration.

The joint declaration was based on the East Asia Strategic Report (EASR) published by the U.S. Defense Department on Feb. 27, 1995. It listed the following five situations of instability and uncertainty: (1) North Korea, (2) Cambodia, (3) Territorial disputes (or the South Sea question), (4) Taiwan, (5) Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

However, these situations changed after the publication of the EASR and before the issue of the Japan-U.S. joint security declaration of April 17, 1996.

The Cambodian situation no longer required outside military intervention. The question of proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles had no relevance to U.S. bases in Okinawa.

The Chinese and Philippine governments reached an agreement regarding the territorial disputes of the South China Sea on Aug. 11, 1995. They agreed to solve the question by peaceful means and in accordance with international law, including the United Nations convention on the Law of the Sea.

In September, both Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord and Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye declared that the explosive situation of the South China Sea had been defused, and hence concern over the issue should be buried. In December the same year, China and Vietnam shared a similar sentiment.

In respect of Taiwan, the U.S. government reiterated that it would not act against the one China policy, and in October 1995, the U.S. government declared that it would pursue a comprehensive engagement policy on China. This would substantially lower the level of military alertness on China regarding security, instability and uncertainty.

What is more important is that the countries concerned have the ability to solve territorial disputes or potential regional conflict. In this regard, ASEAN has demonstrated in its 30 year history that they have such an ability. Japan, China and South Korea also gained a high level of experience in solving disputes. Therefore, permanent U.S. bases are no longer necessary in Okinawa if not in all of Japan.

Despite changes in the assessment of the situation in East Asia, the Japan-U.S. joint declaration was issued in April last year with the same assumption of the EASR which was already out of date at the time.

By that time, the bases of the U.S. marine corps in Okinawa were an essential part of the American presence in East Asia.

One of the main purposes of Hashimoto's trip to five ASEAN countries in January was to convince ASEAN leaders of and confirm the importance of continued American presence in Asia.

But Hashimoto received a cool response from all ASEAN leaders, except Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong of Singapore. Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir opposed the Japan-U.S. security treaty, arguing that any military alliance would create an enemy.

Indonesian President Soeharto avoided responding to Hashimoto's argument since his government had upheld the Declaration of the Southeast Asia Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality of 1971. The declaration bans foreign military bases in the region. In Vietnam, it is believed that a similar response was received from Vietnamese leaders.

Thus, Hashimoto failed to achieve the desired purpose of his trip. That is to say, his effort to convince the Japanese people, particularly, the people of Okinawa that all ASEAN countries support the American presence in Asia. The purpose was to provide justification for the retention of American marine corps in Okinawa.

Another problem was relations between the strengthening of the Japan-U.S. security treaty and China's engagement policy.

China strongly reacted to the Japan-U.S. joint declaration claiming that the security treaty expanded its geographical area and now targeted China. Although the Hashimoto government strongly denied the charge, government sources informally spread the word that the future of China was potentially dangerous to Japan, and the strengthening of the treaty was for that purpose.

The Japan-U.S. declaration thus increased the mistrust between the two countries and supported plans for the Chinese military to strengthen its military preparedness.

In the Philippines, U.S. forces were not withdrawn by a government decision, but a Senate decision which was supported by people power. By the same token, U.S. bases in Okinawa would be obliged to withdraw from Okinawa not at the wish of the Japanese and U.S. governments, but by the strong stand taken by the local government and people of Okinawa.

The writer is director of the Japan Center for International Strategies.