People power unlikely to develop in Yangon

By Martin Stuart-Fox and Suresh Kumar

SINGAPORE (JP): Now that the dust has cleared in Indonesia, it is time to ask how events there will impact the region. On the face of it, a dictatorial government has been overthrown through popular protest. Could what happened in Indonesia happen elsewhere?

It is easy to see a pattern in the overthrowing of autocratic regimes through the exercise of "people power". Students have been instrumental in overthrowing unpopular, military-backed regimes in Thailand, the Philippines, South Korea and now Indonesia. So where else in the region might such a regime be vulnerable? The obvious answer is of course Myanmar.

Could events in Jakarta threaten the military's hold on power in Yangon?

Myanmar's opposition leaders in exile seem to think so. The lesson they draw is that military leaders in Myanmar should immediately enter into "tripartite dialog" with the National League for Democracy (led by Aung San Suu Kyi) and various ethnic groups -- or face a similar fate to Soeharto. But is this likely?

Superficially at least there do seem to be similarities between the situation in Myanmar and that in Indonesia prior to the fall of Soeharto.

As in Indonesia, the economy of Myanmar has been badly shaken by the Asian currency crisis. The value of the Myanmar kyat has fallen from a black market value of 140 to the U.S. dollar in July 1997 to as low as 350 today.

Other economic problems include inflation running as high as 30 percent, a struggling industrial sector, weak financial institutions and widespread corruption. But the kyat is not convertible and there is no stock market so the Myanmar economy is much more protected than is the Indonesian economy from the buffeting forces of globalization.

The worsening economy in Myanmar may exacerbate popular dissatisfaction within the regime, but that does not mean the military regime is in danger of being challenged by "people power". For one thing, most schools and universities in Myanmar have been closed for more than a year now and students are intimidated and poorly organized. In January, student leaders were charged with the crime of terrorism and jailed for 15 years for compiling a history of the student movement.

The real difference between Indonesia and Myanmar lies in the political role of the military in each country, in relation both to government and to the people. In Indonesia the military came to power more than three decades ago as a national savior and since then the Armed Forces has played an important constitutional role in government. But while the military backed Soeharto, he was a popularly elected president.

The interests of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) and Soeharto have not always coincided and indeed by this year they clearly diverged. So in Indonesia an aging leader was eased out of office in large part by the military, for many in ABRI shared the widespread perception that the country could no longer afford the nepotism and cronyism that prevailed. What was at stake was not just a continuing role for ABRI in government, but also relations with the Indonesian people.

Whatever role some elements of ABRI may have played in the street violence that preceded Soeharto's resignation, most ABRI officers were reluctant to order their troops to fire on their own citizens. Instrumental in the departure of Soeharto, the military in Indonesia has remained in a position of considerable influence and power.

None of this is true for Myanmar. Although the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) regime in Myanmar has tried to model itself on the military as saviors of the country with legitimate (if not yet constitutional) role in government, the situation in Myanmar is quite different from that in Indonesia. There is no equivalent figure to Soeharto in Myanmar, for Gen. Ne Win, whatever influence he may still have behind the scenes, has already long since stepped aside as president.

So in Myanmar there is no single dictatorial leader, family or group upon whom popular anger might be focused -- only the military as a whole. Moreover, there is no indication the Tatmadaw (armed forces) is so fictionalized that some would side with popular protesters. Relations between the Tatmadaw and the general population seem too fraught with a painful past.

The events of 1988 when hundreds of students were massacred on the streets of Yangon are still vividly etched in the national psyche. Should student-led demonstrations erupt again, it is very likely that the military will have little compunction about firing on its own citizens -- and the Myanmar people know this.

The image of a people's army enjoyed by ABRI is not one the Tatmadaw enjoys.

In the eyes of many a Myanmar citizen, the Tatmadaw has usurped power from the popularly elected NLD. Its leaders are thus widely considered illegitimate -- which is not the case for ABRI.

Paradoxically therefore it is the very weakness of the Myanmar military, both constitutionally and in its relations with the people of Myanmar, which makes it unlikely that "people power" would be successful in forcing a change of government in Yangon. Should students here attempt to emulate their Indonesian counterparts, their actions would likely end in a bloody tragedy. And this very likelihood serves to underline the tragedy of Myanmar itself.

Dr. Martin Stuart-Fox is head of the History Department at the University of Queensland and Suresh Kumar is broadcast journalist with Radio Singapore International.