People have yet to adjust after a change of regime

People have yet to adjust after a change of regime

The following is the second part from an interview with Greg
Barton Ph.D, senior lecturer at Deakin University, Australia, who
is also the authorized biographer of Indonesian President
Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid.

An expert on liberal Islam in Indonesia, Barton started
writing the biography a long time before Gus Dur became President
last October. He expects to finish the book toward the end of
this year. Barton, who is a regular visitor to Indonesia, talked
to The Jakarta Post's Harry Bhaskara in Jakarta early this week.

What are other typical elements in a country undergoing a
regime change?

Another element is euphoria in the initial stage and a sense
of high expectation, followed by a period of big disappointment.
We saw this very clearly with Russia.

There is a natural euphoria associated with change and there
is a natural desire to push things ahead faster than perhaps
might be the best course of action.

The lesson for us is that expectation tends to be
unrealistically high and there is the danger that when this
expectation fails, people become embittered and look for some
way of countering that. I think the lesson of such circumstances
is we need to be patient about the pace of change.

I think one of the strengths of Gus Dur is his personal
orientation toward evolutionary rather than revolutionary change.
Revolutionary change as a political mechanism has a very poor
track record. It almost always fails to produce what people hope
for. And the aftermath is a disappointment. The cost of getting
there is often very high as well.

A third element is that countries that are coming out of very
authoritarian rule almost invariably experience their
institutions being distorted and eroded. Individuals responsible
for certain tasks in the public sector, bureaucrats and so forth,
have in some ways been compromised and corrupted but even more
insidiously than that the culture has been a culture that has
ill-prepared them with the new era.

An obvious problem area is the legal system that just does not
function properly. One of the sad ironies of regime change is
that often its legal system that works after a fashion within
certain limitations and certain prejudices and malicious intents
under authoritarian rule proves to be very unsatisfactory in a
more open government.

Could you cite an example?

In Indonesia we can see this clearly in that even though we
know that in democracy we need to have ministers who are capable
to take initiatives, the people who are in a situation that makes
up government ministers today for the most part have no
experience to take the initiatives.

Under Soeharto it was the natural cultural orientation that
the president gave you guidelines and told you what to do. So it
is a great irony that one of the criticisms of Gus Dur's
government is that he is not giving enough direction.

But this is not unique to Indonesia, this is another facet of
regime change.

You said you don't subscribe to the theory of Balkanization of
Indonesia, what is the basis of your view?

For all of the failings of Sukarno's and Soeharto's
governments, there is today in Indonesia, a sense of being
Indonesian. For Indonesians who were born after Soeharto became
president, their first identity is Indonesian and their second
identity might be religious or ethnic. This is a very positive
thing.

There are also things that I can't put my finger on but I feel
in my heart to be true, like the existence of a natural
resilience in Indonesian society. Despite all the awful things
that have happened, there is a desire to make things work.

You said people need to have patience in a regime change, why
do you think so?

Well, there are at least three reasons.

One is that a lot of awful things are happening now and it is
understandable that people want to see them stop. We would all
like to see the violence in Maluku stop tomorrow. There have been
several thousand people killed already. We would like to see that
death toll stop right now, not even increase by one person. But
we know that is not realistic. Yet it is a legitimate desire.

Similarly if you walk around Jakarta and see people who find
it hard to feed their children and you say poor people should not
be like this. Poor people should have enough to at least eat.
Kids, all kids whether they come from rich families or poor
families should go to school. But we are feeling the effect of
the economic crisis still. So it is a very legitimate desire to
hope things will get better.

The second reason, something we have touched on earlier, is
the lack of experience of a regime change. We don't have an
effective yardstick to use in measuring the rate of progress. If
you use the yardstick of international experience with Latin
America or Eastern Europe we would see that actually the progress
of this government is not too bad. But we all lack this
experience. Most Indonesians today were born after Soeharto came
to power.

The third factor, is there are some individuals whether for
party political reasons or because they are linked directly or
indirectly with the former regime who are trying to destabilize
this government.

They are playing upon people's natural and quite
understandable feelings of concern and impatience and they
inflame those concerns for their own purposes.

And of course they use the language of concern for the poor,
concern for change. But it is cynical and manipulative because
they are not concerned for the poor. They are only concerned
about their own futures and their own possibilities of being
taken before a court of law or losing wealth or whatever.

You touched on the military withdrawal from politics earlier,
how long will it take this process to arrive at a point of no
return?

The only way of being certain of this is to have a strong
civilian government in place that gives no excuse for military
intervention. Even a fairly reform minded military if it sees a
civilian government that is not performing would be tempted to
intervene, right or wrong.

But there needs to be cultural change from the military
itself, a change in mindset so that over a period of years people
quite naturally say dwifungsi (dual function) belongs to the
past, that is not the future. Now we are concentrating on doing
professional duty. That takes some years, although I don't know
how many years.

It also takes time for interference from the counter-
reformation forces to be completely overcome. I think in the
early years of change that will be a factor. Only over time do
they begin to loose their power.

I think through the course of the five-year time of Gus Dur
this will be a factor but I would like to believe by the time we
have the next elections, the military will accept that its role
is not to intervene directly in politics.

How do you see Gus Dur's health?

His present health is excellent. He is considerably overweight
from a medical point of view and he has a history of stroke. But
his blood-pressure has been stable for some time. He is not
anywhere near the danger zone. And because it has been stable for
some time there is every reason to expect that it will continue
to be stable, in which case we need not fear for another stroke.

Although his health seems slightly worse perhaps than his
peers, his level of energy and stamina is extraordinary. He also
has much more fire of intelligent and much greater power of
memory than his average.

Some of his critics, furious over occasional moves they
consider confusing to the people, say the President can no longer
change. Do you think Gus Dur can learn from his mistakes?

This is a question of a relative nature. Can he make a
dramatic change physically and drop 20 kilograms? I don't think
that will happen.

He could try to be a good manager and a good administrator,
but I don't think he is going to either and I don't think he
will.

In certain ways, Gus Dur will stay as Gus Dur. But we
shouldn't go to the other extreme that he won't change because
there is a lot of evidence that shows here is somebody who is a
very genuine individual. As part of that, he has got a very
genuine humanitarian outlook and concern and a lot of personal
integrity.

For that reason he has been open to change. All of his life he
has been a student of human nature. And his love of literature
and of studying politics and studying biographies make him
acutely aware of human nature.

He still tends to be a man who finds it hard to take advice,
particularly from younger people, but I think he is more open now
than he has been in years past.

Bear in mind the background he comes from. And the pesantren
(Muslim boarding school) where he comes from and it is not
average. It does not necessarily equip one to be emotionally
expressive and open to taking advice and so on.

I think in that context he has made changes. He is more easy
going and relaxed, emotionally demonstrative and open person than
he has been in the past. And I think that gives reason to hope
that he will continue to change in a moderate way.

Some think Gus Dur has a different yardstick to decide things
right or wrong due to his pesantren background. For example, when
he accepted money from the Sultan of Brunei or received money
from people prior to his overseas trip...

I think there are two factors to consider here. One, we need
to reflect if we make the statement that Gus Dur's style of doing
things is like a kyai in a pesantren.

I think in certain respects this is true but it is not
completely true by the way. Pesantren is said to be very feudal
and authoritarian. In some respects pesantren is more democratic
than we expect.

Even if it is true that in many ways Gus Dur's style is like a
kyai and pesantren we have to ask the question, okay, so it's not
like a modern approach to governance. But is a modern approach to
government necessarily and automatically successful in a period
of regime change?

To put it practically, Gus Dur got a soft-loan of US$ 2
million from the Sultan of Brunei and rather than put it through
the government's account it goes through an account he has
personal control over. That gives the wrong impression.

On the other hand if he would have put it in a government
account, it could be a little bit like putting a loaf of bread,
in a cupboard while we know full well that at the back of the
cupboard there is a large hole. You can be fairly sure that the
loaf will be nibbled away by the rats.

I think that it is practically difficult to work in an
entirely legislative and normal way at the moment. Because you
can't trust the institutions, you can't trust the law courts, you
can't trust government departments necessarily.

So that's one issue. In some ways, it is idiosyncratic, a sort
of pesantren style, may be more appropriate for a regime change
than we acknowledged. I am not saying perfectly appropriate but
we need to give credit when the credit is due. We are not in a
period of a normal governance here.

The second factor of this, Gus Dur as a kyai from pesantren to
consider, is that as irritating as it may be, inappropriate as it
may be, there is a positive side to it as well.

Good kyai, not all kyai are good, many kyai in their lifetime
handle million of dollars but they don't become millionaires
because they are stewards of the money. And their fear of God
automatically stops them from enriching themselves. They channel
that money through the pesantren which may be in their names
illegally but they don't regard it as personal property. And many
poor people get education.

There are good examples and bad examples. But at its best a
pesantren tradition is a tradition of stewardship. And I think it
is quite clear with Gus Dur, whenever he is failing he is not an
avaricious individual, he is not greedy for money. And his
motivation is sound, even if the application or the
implementation is not always appropriate.

You seem to be optimistic about changes taking place which
appear to be in contrast to what most observers here think. Does
distance matter?

To some extent my distance does help because I can stand by
and ask, "well how is Indonesia compared with other countries?
How would things look in the longer term?"

Looking at contrasts with other countries and looking at the
longer term, it is easy to be optimistic. Another reason for my
optimism is I know Gus Dur very well. People, of course, quite
reasonably, would be critical of me saying that I am just
defending him or I am just too one-sided. That may be true but I
seek to be objective in my analysis. But I get the privilege to
know him in a way that other people don't.

And the advantage of this privilege is that I have a sense of
confidence about his moral integrity and purpose that others may
not have, simply because I know him. But I think there are plenty
of external factors that support this analysis.

Some critics have gone as far as to suggest Gus Dur has to go.
Suppose we put ourselves in their shoes, what alternative of
leaders do we have?

At this stage it is very hard for me to imagine that we will
get somebody necessarily better. I can accept that if we change
Gus Dur we would get somebody better in certain areas, maybe a
better manager, maybe more efficient, maybe a better
communicator, less mysterious, whatever, but I am not convinced
that we would get somebody who is better overall.

But there is another factor about change. If we call ourselves
democrats and committed to reform, that means that we can't
lightly accept the possibility of change of government unless it
is done in a constitutionally legitimate way.

Democracy very seldom produces a result that is completely
satisfying but we have to live with what we get. We should think
about ways which we can help him, strengthen him rather than
allow energies channel into undermining him.

Even if there was somebody better and even if there is a
democratic way to undergo a leadership change, the human cost is
likely to be very high. Such changes very likely would
destabilize the whole country.

Maybe this is providential that he is here at this point in
time when we need a rather unusual leader, perhaps even a
maverick leader to deal with regime change.

In some ways it reminds me of Winston Churchill. Churchill may
have been a very strange prime minister or a very strange man but
in the middle of World War II he was exactly the right man for
Great Britain.

In what way should sections of society strengthen him?

Well, strengthening him may be put a bit too narrowly because
part of our role should be strengthening society. For example, if
there was a large conference organized involving the leading
intellectuals on issues of regime change and international
experts were brought in, not necessarily academics but people who
have lived through the experience themselves.

Invite people from Latin America or Eastern Europe or
wherever, and they could share with us their experiences. That is
not focused on changing Gus Dur but on educating ourselves and
educating society.

In terms of helping the government directly, a big challenge
facing Gus Dur is thinking about the issue about consolidating,
restructuring or perhaps streaming down significantly, perhaps
changing substantially his cabinet toward the end of this year.

For example, even now, it is possible to help somebody like
Marzuki Darusman talking with him about his vision and
difficulties and give him a chance to talk about this to the
general public. In that way civil society can really strengthen
the government.

In some way it is like the relationship between husband and
wife. Any successful relationship involves a degree of mutual
change.

Some of the changes that can occur not just from the level of
government ministers and the President but also civil society.
For example, in the legal system, it is certain that civil
society can make a contribution there. Also in terms of reform of
the military, if it is mature, sensitive and intelligent. The
establishment of strong NGOs for specific tasks can be very
constructive and we have seen that in the past.

If there were groups who were intelligently and articulately
agitating for better basic wages, better conditions for factory
workers, I think that it is quite likely to help the government
bringing some change. So there is scope for taking initiative
without saying it is just a question of changing the government.

One of the minor tragedies of this whole process of regime
change is that many civil society groups have been so focused on
the condition of the reformist regime they are almost like caged
birds.

Once the door of the cage has been opened, they don't know
what to do. And they surely don't feel like flying out of the
cage.

Slowly, I think, NGOs and other elements of civil society will
think about the new possibilities to have under this government.
And those new possibilities include and go well beyond just
criticizing the government. There are actual projects that they
could be doing. And they can now do it in a way they couldn't do
it in the past.