Peace comes to Aceh
With mixed feelings of cautious expectation and skeptical anxiety, it is a great relief to learn that the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) have finally signed a peace agreement that could end the decades-long secessionist conflict in that troubled province.
The nine-article agreement culminates almost three years of negotiations initiated during the tenure of former president Abdurrahman Wahid in January 2000 and facilitated by the Geneva- based Henri Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.
History will tell whether this seemingly momentous step will eventually become a critical benchmark in the process of democratization, not only in Aceh but in the entire country as well. The agreement itself carries a lot of weight, not only because of the courageous commitment expressed by both parties after years of hostile foot-dragging, but also because of the significant international involvement in the process.
Yet the agreement itself does not guarantee a lasting peace in Aceh, a prerequisite for the process of democratization and the fostering of prosperity for the people of Aceh. As Ambassador S. Wiryono, the top Indonesian government negotiator, remarked: "We still have a long way to go."
The next seven months is a critical period that must be traversed before any efforts toward democratization and socioeconomic rebuilding in Aceh can be undertaken. This first stage includes a two-month grace period during which both sides will demonstrate their commitment to peace by not increasing military strength and by relocating troops to defensive positions.
It also stipulates that the mandate and mission of the notorious police Mobile Brigade (Brimob) have to be reformulated to conform to regular police activities, and as such will no longer initiate offensive actions against members of GAM.
Only after both parties have proven their commitment during this two-month grace period to cease hostilities and all acts of violence, will the process of disarming GAM as well as the phased relocation of Indonesian Military (TNI) forces and their revamping from a strike force to a defensive force take place within the ensuing five months.
Two key elements will become very important during this first stage. The first is the role of the Joint Security Committee (JSC), which was established in 2000 for a humanitarian pause agreement but later deactivated due to unresolved disagreements over various issues with the security forces in Aceh, and will now be reactivated as soon as possible.
First, due to the expanded functions of this Joint Security Committee, including for the implementation of the first stage of this cessation of hostilities, it is of the utmost importance to choose the right representatives for the job and reactivate the JSC as soon as possible.
Second, the agreement emphasizes the right of civil society to exercise their democratic rights without hindrance. The stipulation that the JSC will publish weekly reports on the security situation in Aceh, and that communication with the public will be prioritized, especially through the print and electronic media, hopefully will help urge the public, civil society, to express itself.
The majority of the Acehnese people, however, have become used to keeping things to themselves after being intimidated, harassed, terrorized, threatened, illegally arrested, arbitrarily killed and what not over the last three decades.
We cannot take for granted that this agreement will immediately change their attitude and behavior. There have to be extra efforts from both the government and its security apparatus, as well as GAM, to regain the people's trust. Both parties have to step beyond this agreement to prove that they are committed to the betterment of the Acehnese, who have been sidestepped and neglected by both, particularly over the last four years.
The extent to which both the Joint Security Committee and civil society perform their respective roles during the next seven months will determine the second stage of this peace agreement. The all-inclusive dialog toward a democratic election in Aceh, scheduled for 2004, the long overdue reconstruction of the province and socioeconomic rehabilitation will remain an elusive dream if the first stage of the peace agreement fails.
We should never forget that GAM, proclaimed in 1976, is only one part of the multifaceted problem in Aceh. In fact, it is not even the most important part. The restiveness of the province dates back long before the existence of GAM.
Since the early 1950s, there has been a common feeling of betrayal by the Republic of Indonesia after all that the people of Aceh contributed to the nation's independence and the ensuing years of development.
In a way, many other parts of the country had similar experiences during the first 50 years of the Republic. The coming seven months of the Aceh peace process can become a historical benchmark for the development of civil society in Indonesia, including the future notion of the unitary state.