Peace agreement in Aceh -- Third time lucky?

Peace agreement in Aceh -- Third time lucky?

Endy M. Bayuni, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta

It is encouraging to note that the signing of a peace
agreement between the Indonesian government and the rebel Free
Aceh Movement (GAM) planned for next month is gaining widespread
support, particularly from quarters where it matters most.

This agreement obviously has its share of doubters and
detractors, but there seems to be a greater optimism today than
we saw at the time of the two earlier agreements that were made
in 2001 and 2002. So, does this mean third time lucky?

We shall know in good time. But there is hope.

The House of Representatives has backed down from its earlier
demand that it be consulted before the Aug. 15 signing in
Helsinki. Most House factions have agreed to discuss GAM's demand
that local political parties be allowed to contest elections in
Aceh. The lone opposition in the House is coming from the
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), but they are not
in a position to stop the signing from taking place.

The Indonesian Military (TNI), whose soldiers have been on the
frontlines in fighting the rebels for 30 years, has given its
backing for the peace process to continue. None of its senior
officers have voiced objections to the planned signing, and they
have largely -- and rightly -- stayed out of the controversy
about regional political parties.

What is most amazing is that the support for the peace
agreement is mounting even though its details have not yet been
fully disclosed. The government and GAM both agreed after their
last meeting this month that full details should not be made
public until after the signing.

What little detail has been disclosed so far are sufficient to
guess that both sides are making significant compromises to make
peace possible, with GAM dropping their demand for independence,
and in return, Indonesia allowing the possibility of regional
parties to emerge. GAM has agreed to surrender its weapons in
return for the phased withdrawal of TNI forces to the minimum
level. There is going to be an amnesty for all GAM members, and
as free men they will be able to run in elections, starting with
the local elections scheduled for next year in Aceh. We also know
that European and Southeast Asian nations have been invited to
send observers to monitor the implementation of the agreement.

These terms seem all too easy and doable to be believable.

How could such a simple deal be struck to end a conflict that
has gone on for three decades and claimed the lives of more than
15,000 mostly innocent people? And how will this Helsinki
agreement, the result of a mere five meetings, be any different
from the earlier agreements that failed?

The first of these failed agreements was the Humanitarian
Pause signed by representatives of the two sides in May 2001 when
Indonesia was led by President Abdurrahman Wahid. The agreement
brought peace momentarily, but seven months later the two sides
resumed fighting without even bothering to renounce the agreement
they had signed.

The Cessation of Hostilities Agreement came into effect in
December 2002 when Indonesia was under President Megawati
Soekarnoputri. The agreement, brokered by the Geneva-based Henry
Dunant Center, broke down just as GAM was supposed to surrender
its weapons and the TNI begin its phased withdrawal from Aceh.
The two sides went back to war within six months when the
Indonesian government declared martial law in Aceh.

The devil is always in the details, and the two earlier
agreements that Indonesia and GAM signed faltered precisely when
they tried to implement the more complex parts of the deal. So,
until we see the full details of the new Helsinki agreement it
would be hard for anyone to estimate its chances of success.

We do know however that conditions today are far different
from the situation when the two earlier agreements were signed.

One thing for sure is that GAM has already dropped its demand
for independence, a point that the Indonesian government has long
insisted was not negotiable. Everything else was open for
discussion, including the establishment of regional political
parties.

The devastating tsunami in Aceh in December put tremendous
pressure on both sides -- but on GAM in particular -- to make
compromises in Helsinki so that the massive rehabilitation and
reconstruction program in Aceh could get underway. Neither side
wants to be accused of obstructing the rebuilding of Aceh, which
is being heavily financed by the international community. And GAM
members are missing out on a chance to take part in the
reconstruction of their own homeland.

And finally, perhaps, we have all learned enough lessons from
the first two agreements to know where the pitfalls are and how
to avoid them. It's not so much a question of third time lucky as
a question of learning from our past mistakes.

One of the lessons learned from the past is that there will
always be detractors, on both sides, who will do anything to
sabotage the peace process in Aceh. They were present in the two
agreements in 2001 and 2002, and they had their way. They are
present today.

Those who truly crave for peace in Aceh must make sure that
these detractors don't prevail this time around. If we fail this
time, it may be a case of three strikes and everybody's out.