Wed, 27 Jul 2005

Peace agreement in Aceh -- Third time lucky?

Endy M. Bayuni, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta

It is encouraging to note that the signing of a peace agreement between the Indonesian government and the rebel Free Aceh Movement (GAM) planned for next month is gaining widespread support, particularly from quarters where it matters most.

This agreement obviously has its share of doubters and detractors, but there seems to be a greater optimism today than we saw at the time of the two earlier agreements that were made in 2001 and 2002. So, does this mean third time lucky?

We shall know in good time. But there is hope.

The House of Representatives has backed down from its earlier demand that it be consulted before the Aug. 15 signing in Helsinki. Most House factions have agreed to discuss GAM's demand that local political parties be allowed to contest elections in Aceh. The lone opposition in the House is coming from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), but they are not in a position to stop the signing from taking place.

The Indonesian Military (TNI), whose soldiers have been on the frontlines in fighting the rebels for 30 years, has given its backing for the peace process to continue. None of its senior officers have voiced objections to the planned signing, and they have largely -- and rightly -- stayed out of the controversy about regional political parties.

What is most amazing is that the support for the peace agreement is mounting even though its details have not yet been fully disclosed. The government and GAM both agreed after their last meeting this month that full details should not be made public until after the signing.

What little detail has been disclosed so far are sufficient to guess that both sides are making significant compromises to make peace possible, with GAM dropping their demand for independence, and in return, Indonesia allowing the possibility of regional parties to emerge. GAM has agreed to surrender its weapons in return for the phased withdrawal of TNI forces to the minimum level. There is going to be an amnesty for all GAM members, and as free men they will be able to run in elections, starting with the local elections scheduled for next year in Aceh. We also know that European and Southeast Asian nations have been invited to send observers to monitor the implementation of the agreement.

These terms seem all too easy and doable to be believable.

How could such a simple deal be struck to end a conflict that has gone on for three decades and claimed the lives of more than 15,000 mostly innocent people? And how will this Helsinki agreement, the result of a mere five meetings, be any different from the earlier agreements that failed?

The first of these failed agreements was the Humanitarian Pause signed by representatives of the two sides in May 2001 when Indonesia was led by President Abdurrahman Wahid. The agreement brought peace momentarily, but seven months later the two sides resumed fighting without even bothering to renounce the agreement they had signed.

The Cessation of Hostilities Agreement came into effect in December 2002 when Indonesia was under President Megawati Soekarnoputri. The agreement, brokered by the Geneva-based Henry Dunant Center, broke down just as GAM was supposed to surrender its weapons and the TNI begin its phased withdrawal from Aceh. The two sides went back to war within six months when the Indonesian government declared martial law in Aceh.

The devil is always in the details, and the two earlier agreements that Indonesia and GAM signed faltered precisely when they tried to implement the more complex parts of the deal. So, until we see the full details of the new Helsinki agreement it would be hard for anyone to estimate its chances of success.

We do know however that conditions today are far different from the situation when the two earlier agreements were signed.

One thing for sure is that GAM has already dropped its demand for independence, a point that the Indonesian government has long insisted was not negotiable. Everything else was open for discussion, including the establishment of regional political parties.

The devastating tsunami in Aceh in December put tremendous pressure on both sides -- but on GAM in particular -- to make compromises in Helsinki so that the massive rehabilitation and reconstruction program in Aceh could get underway. Neither side wants to be accused of obstructing the rebuilding of Aceh, which is being heavily financed by the international community. And GAM members are missing out on a chance to take part in the reconstruction of their own homeland.

And finally, perhaps, we have all learned enough lessons from the first two agreements to know where the pitfalls are and how to avoid them. It's not so much a question of third time lucky as a question of learning from our past mistakes.

One of the lessons learned from the past is that there will always be detractors, on both sides, who will do anything to sabotage the peace process in Aceh. They were present in the two agreements in 2001 and 2002, and they had their way. They are present today.

Those who truly crave for peace in Aceh must make sure that these detractors don't prevail this time around. If we fail this time, it may be a case of three strikes and everybody's out.