PDI-P seeks power on continued compromise

PDI-P seeks power on continued compromise

Anton Doni, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta

At the beginning, it was the "little people" (wong cilik) who
were the source of power of the Indonesian Democratic Party of
Struggle (PDI-P). Suppressed under the New Order regime, the
people were in need of any figure perceived to be able to bring
about a relatively better life.

They eventually found Megawati Soekarnoputri, daughter of the
first president, who was then treated unworthily by then
president Soeharto. The later years of the New Order saw throngs
of people rallying around Megawati, the alternative figure.

Following this came the deep economic crisis and the momentum
for the substantial growth of a "reform" movement. A free
election was held in 1999 and the party gained the most votes,
although only 33.7 percent. From then on PDI-P and Megawati,
first as vice president and then as president, started a new
journey -- which is now five years old. No less than the "little
people" themselves have made judgment on whether PDI-P has been
serious in meeting their expectations.

Many of the party's previously fanatic supporters have
concluded that what the party has been looking for all along is
power; hence its need of masses of "little people".

This is what they could understand from price hikes such as
those for electricity, while the price of foodstuffs was still
relatively high. Of course the policy was a joint product of
other parties in power, but Megawati and PDI-P also supported the
policy.

Coming to power to eradicate corruption, Megawati, the symbol
of PDI-P who once gave an assurance that her family would be
clean from anything smelling like corruption, has not been able
to deliver on her commitment. Stories of family members' business
practices have raised eyebrows.

Worse, the government has yet to come up with a bold poverty
alleviation measure, a clear policy to overcome unemployment,
amid seemingly timid action against alleged human rights
violators and large-scale corruptors. In Megawati's early days
she supported the reelection of Jakarta Governor Sutiyoso -- not
only the capital's military commander during the violent takeover
of Megawati's faction of the then split Indonesian Democratic
Party in 1996 -- but a governor who has increasingly displayed a
"no-turning-back" attitude on evictions of slum dwellers, a large
part of the wong cilik.

Coming to power and forgetting promises is a typical story.
With PDI-P there was also the issue of incompetence, a sad
reality for any party other than the previous ruling party
Golkar.

The PDI-P was initially shocked at its abundant power
following the 1999 elections. The most competent people it had
were still poor organizers and largely inexperienced politicians.

As a result, its members at various levels frequently failed
in carrying out their legislative duties. They were weak in the
face of new temptations. Economist Kwik Kian Gie, a deputy
chairman of PDI-P, angered party colleagues when he said that
PDI-P was among the most corrupt political parties.

In this precarious situation the party was open to power-
seeking people who at least appeared to be competent in technical
or political skills. A new power configuration in the party grew,
while the party did not see a significant increase in executives
who displayed a strong commitment to the common people.

With barely 35 percent of votes PDI-P also lacked the
political clout needed in decision making.

This constraint was most evident ahead of Megawati's struggle
to replace Abdurrahman Wahid as president. The support secured
from other parties and the need to retain it have exacted their
own toll.

The first is worsening relations with the National Awakening
Party (PKB), a party that along with PDI-P was considered among
the potential pillars for a new Indonesia, at least given its
mass base.

At one point Abdurrahman Wahid, PKB founder and Megawati's
former political confidante, joined the Muslim-oriented "central
axis", which was hostile to the prospect of a female president.

The second relates to the political support available from the
Golkar Party -- allegations immediately emerged of Megawati's
administration compromising on promises to fight corruption.
Among several signs was the failure of legislators to establish a
special committee to investigate alleged corruption of billions
of rupiah from the State Logistics Agency (Bulog).

The third toll was PDI-P's compromise regarding Islamic
ideological ideas, despite the party's "nationalist" rhetoric.

The controversial law on the National Education System rules
that the purposes of education include those regarding faith,
iman dan takwa (faith and piety) -- terms that critics said only
applied to Muslims.

Whatever the party's excuses for the incompetence of its
legislators, its absence of a clear position on this law confirms
its fear of losing its support from the Muslim political elite.

Therefore, plurality has become the high price of PDI-P's need
to maintain the support of the Muslim parties.

A fourth toll has been PDI-P's costly compromise with the
military. Until now the accountability of the military's
leadership remains a question, among others in the cases of the
Trisakti and Semanggi shootings of students in Jakarta. Hence,
PDI-P is perceived to have benefited the most from the early days
of the "reform movement", regardless of the students who
sacrificed their lives.

Also, in the absence of the party's clear paradigm on a
"unitary state", PDI-P seems only to accept uncritically the
notion that everything must give way for the sake of territorial
integrity, regardless of what people in the said territory may
actually feel.
This leads, in turn, to the party's upholding of military action
in dealing with separatist and supposedly separatist movements.

Thus, to gain more power and to sustain it, the party, riding
on its rhetoric of "the party of the little people", has broken
its commitment and the moral foundations upon which its power
originated.

Surveys have already indicated its decreasing support. But
the following factors must also be taken into account.

First, PDI-P can still count on voters' loyalty in several
provinces. Competition from other parties with the same
nationalist orientation is a threat, but PDI-P's "nationalist"
brand is still too strong in a number of areas.

Second, many voters in villages do not have access to
criticism of the party. A smaller decrease in support in villages
would be expected, compared with that in the cities.

Third, PDI-P is increasingly reaching out to people at all
levels; it now has opinion leaders ready to "neutralize" negative
views of the party.

Fourth, for the common people in many places there seem to be
no alternative figures or parties. At present, since all parties
look unreliable to them, they might simply vote the way they did
in the last polls. This might work to the advantage of PDI-P.

The writer is a member of PDI-P.