Tue, 28 Sep 2004

PDI-P needs new paradigm, tools for 2009 elections

Mochtar Buchori, Jakarta

While the official vote-count may still be ongoing, it is almost certain that the Megawati Soekarnoputri-Hasyim Muzadi pair has lost the presidential race, and Gen. (ret) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) will become the country's sixth president along with his running mate Jusuf Kalla as vice president.

The contest for the national leadership for the 2004-2009 term has already been settled in a definitive way -- as with Megawati's Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P).

How will the party react to this new situation? It will take some time before PDI-P can take a united stand as a political party in facing the new challenges of the future.

It will be better for the party if it concentrates from this point forth on preparing itself to perform better in the 2009 general elections. There are many, many things to do.

It would be very desirable if, among others, the party managed to heal its many internal wounds by 2007.

It should be noted in this respect that the next general elections would probably take place under conditions different from what we have today. The economic condition will be different -- hopefully better, but it could also get worse. The electorate will be different, and we will have a public that is more mature politically. In addition, the security situation will most likely be different from the situation today.

With all these probable changes, it would be very unwise for the PDI-P to enter the major political contest of 2009 without renewing its intellectual arsenal -- it would be utterly impossible to perform adequately in the next general elections using the same political paradigms and tools that proved disastrous this year.

To compete and succeed in a changed political environment, PDI-P will also have to change, and the party must meet certain requirements to change for the better.

First, it must make an honest assessment concerning the main causes for its present defeat. It must ask itself why, within the short period from 1999 to 2004, it lost so much of its popular appeal.

Second, it must decide whether it really wants to become a democratic party that is run in a genuinely democratic manner, or whether it wants to preserve its current character as a pseudo- democratic party, run in a semi-autocratic manner.

PDI-P has lost much of its popular appeal through the public perception that it is a corrupt party. In the public eye, corruption appears rampant among PDI-P legislators, both at the national and local levels. In addition, the public believes that members of the party's executive councils -- from the national all the way down to the district levels -- are tainted by corruption.

The public verdict on the PDI-P is thus truly devastating: It is a corrupt lot. The extent to which this allegation is true is inconsequential; this is how the public perceives the party.

It is thus interesting to note in this regard the speculation made by some observers -- that voters flocked to the Susilo camp, not so much because they were convinced that Susilo had the capability to bring about those changes for which the people had been yearning, but more so because of public conviction that the PDI-P under Megawati would not be able -- and probably would not ever try -- to stop corruption.

It is this very image that PDI-P must change. As long as this perception persists, it will never regain the popular appeal it enjoyed in 1999, no matter what it does.

The third imperative is for the PDI-P to affirm itself as a party that upholds democracy as a political system.

As a party member, I often have the impression that PDI-P is embracing democracy in name only. The way it conducts its day-to- day business -- insofar as the central executive council is concerned -- is far from democratic.

What has been carried out in the name of the party has seldom been the decision of the entire party leadership. Rather, they have been decisions taken by mighty personalities within the party. Thus, the ensuing impression is that those decisions were made to suit the interests of a few at the top.

If PDI-P wants to win back the trust of its rank and file, it must change the style of its leadership. Furthermore, if it wants to contribute to the democratization of this nation, it must start adopting democratic practices in its political conduct. Unless this is done immediately, PDI-P will become a burden to Indonesia's blossoming democracy, which has gained enough strength and can now be stopped only by brutal totalitarian force.

Is the PDI-P ready to make this change? Under present conditions, this is rather unlikely.

There is still another argument for suggesting change within the party: It never discusses scenarios for the future. Neither the old guard nor the new guard shows sincere concern in this matter. Its interest seems firmly planted in the present, and the party seems to think that whatever comes in the future is the problem of the next generation -- it has nothing to do with the current generation. Furthermore, there is not the slightest indication that the party leadership intends to change this tradition.

The consequence of this myopic view is that PDI-P has never conducted, as far as I know, serious discussions concerning Indonesia's role in the global dynamics of the present.

For a political party as large as PDI-P, this is a serious shortcoming. While young people from various non-political organizations have begun to talk intelligently about global issues that will affect Indonesia's future, PDI-P politicians mumble incoherently about a vision and mission they do not even understand.

It is against this backdrop that more and more members have started talking about the need for radical changes in the party leadership. The argument is that those responsible for the present disaster must be held accountable.

So whither is PDI-P heading?

The writer is a House of Representatives legislator of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) faction.