PDI: Ideology vs clientalism

By Arief Budiman

SALATIGA, Central Java (JP): Political power depends on followers. Why do people follow?

According to Max Weber, there are three types of political leaders: traditional, charismatic and legal-rational.

The first type, the traditional leader, gets power from existing tradition. For instance, according to tradition, the eldest son (or daughter in the case of no son) of a king automatically becomes the new leader when the king passes away. The second type, the charismatic leader, obtains power from personal charm.

The late President Sukarno is a good example of a charismatic leader. With his charm he mesmerized people when he delivered speeches. The last type, the legal-rational leader, is a modern leader who obtains power through legal-rational procedures, such as a general election.

Another way of looking at the typology of leaders is by examining their power base: clientalism or ideology. Clientalism is related to patronage (usually economic gains or political protection) provided by a leader in return for services (especially political support) from the followers. Thus, the relationship between leaders and followers is somehow pragmatic. Power through clientalism is considered more modern because it is "rational" and based on a mutual exchange of interests, like commodities in the market.

Ideology is related to a set of values shared by a group of people. Power based on ideology is considered "less modern" because it is based on "irrational" beliefs. Although some interests are also included here, they are not the dominant factor in the making of ideological followers. People follow communism, Naziism or Marhaenism (Sukarno's version of Indonesian nationalism and socialism) not for economic gain but because they believe in the values advocated in the ideology.

In this sense, power based on ideology is more persistent then power based on clientalism. Followers will not easily change their ideological values, while clientalism-based followers will leave their leader if the latter fails to provide adequate economic patronage.

Coming back to Weber's typology, we can see that if traditional and charismatic leadership is based more on ideology, legal-rational leadership tends to be created through clientalism. Therefore, according to Weber, the latter is more advanced, more modern, more progressive. As the American sociologist Daniel Bell once stated, the post industrial society is characterized by the end of ideology.

Historical fact, however, does not support this allegation. Ideology does not die in a modern, post-industrial society. The revival of quasi-religions in the shape of modern cults in the United States, Europe and Japan proves that man still needs some sort of ideology to not get lost in this pragmatic, materialistic world. The end-of-ideology thesis is thus debatable.

When we look into Indonesia's political phenomena we find some interesting insights. There is still a battle between clientalism and ideology, between "modern" political power based on interests and "traditional" power based on values and beliefs.

The battle started in the 1950s and 1960s. As we know, Sukarno's political power was based mainly on ideology. Combining Marhaenism and his charismatic personality, he succeeded in winning the hearts of many Indonesian people. Until now, his grave in Blitar is a place to where people from all over Indonesia make a pilgrimage. It is difficult to deny that the power of Megawati, the daughter of Sukarno and the recently overthrown leader of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), comes partly from the charisma of her late father.

Unlike Sukarno, Soeharto based his power on clientalism. People follow Soeharto because they gain material benefit from his administration. Ideology plays only a vague role here. Soeharto doesn't need to mesmerize his audience when he delivers a speech because people do not support him for his charismatic personality. The downfall of Sukarno in 1965, and the fast ascendance of Soeharto, is considered the victory of a modern polity over a traditional one and the end of an era of ideology in Indonesia.

But the battle continues. If we look at the current political parties we find similarities. Golkar is clearly not a party based on strong ideology. It is a party based on interest and clientalism. Golkar supporters are mostly public servants and their families, who benefit directly from the bureaucracy. On the other hand, the other two parties, the United Development Party (PPP) and the PDI, are heavily based on ideology: Islam for the PPP and Sukarnoism for the PDI.

These differences are easily seen in the electoral campaigns. PPP and PDI constituents fully participate with emotion and high spirits, while Golkar supporters attend their rallies as if they were at a business meeting. PPP and PDI followers come to express their shared values, while Golkar supporters participate by calculating what they will get, or not get, if they fail to show up.

The endurance of the PDI members loyal to Megawati owes more to the relationship between the leader and her followers, which is based on ideology, not interest. Megawati constituents are not making profit calculations but defending and expressing values.

Those behind Megawati are more likely to lose than gain, but by supporting her they reactualize their values.

The other PDI faction led by Soerjadi, who recently dethroned Megawati, is trying to break this ideological loyalty by playing on interests. Supporting Soerjadi means opening the door to political positions, which mean power and material gain. The government has given Soerjadi the right to propose candidates for the general elections in 1997. Soerjadi then asked to be considered the legitimate leader of the party. We still have to see how many people will respond positively to this appeal.

In short, the battle continues between pragmatism and ideological loyalty, between material benefits and non-material values. There is a strong belief that, in the end, material interests will overpower ideological loyalty and that the PDI will be transformed from an ideology-based party into one based on clientalism. So far, the dramatic demonstrations of support by Megawati's followers in Jakarta and other big cities in Indonesia have failed to verify the above assumption.

They are still loyal to their ideology and Megawati has become the personification of the values that make her followers feel proud for supporting her.

However, we have yet to see if this condition will stay firm in the coming months. If it does, Golkar, and its power based on clientalism, has a lot to learn about developing a convincing ideology that will maintain its political hegemony.

The writer is a sociologist and researcher based in Salatiga.

Window A: Supporting Soerjadi means opening the door to political positions, which mean power and material gain.

Window B: There is a strong belief that, in the end, material interests will overpower ideological loyalty and that the PDI will be transformed from an ideology-based party into one based on clientalism.