Wed, 16 Jun 1999

Parties need conditional accord

The following is the first of two articles on Indonesian post- election politics written by Yulius P. Hermawan,a lecturer on international relations at the Catholic University of Parahyangan and a researcher at the Parahyangan Center for International Studies in Bandung, West Java. He is a graduate of the Department of Politics, Monash University, Australia.

BANDUNG (JP): Indonesian post-election politics is now entering a new challenging phase as none of the contestants in the recent general election is likely to win a considerable majority of votes, like ruling party Golkar always did in the past.

This raises a crucial question about the possible new power holder: will the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan), which is apparently gaining majority votes and seats, hold legitimacy to form a new government?

In the past, Golkar's victories always meant the legitimate right for it to form "leadership" in the country. Even though the decision of the top office holder would be reached through a general session of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), there was no doubt that Golkar would gain majority or absolute majority.

Nowadays, an MPR general session is likely to be more decisive than those in the past in electing the new office holder. The winner of the elections should now go through another political game where many eligible parties will compete with others to reach the executive power. Whoever wants to hold power should gain support from the majority of votes in the coming general session.

Many observers have even predicted that the MPR may elect non- partisan candidates if there comes a deadlock in its session. It means that parties' candidates as well as non-partisans have an equal chance to hold the governmental office. It then also means that the winner of the last general election should also be subject to whatever result of the coming general session of the MPR.

The question about the office holder will, therefore, challenge the formation of stable, credible and legitimate leadership in the Indonesian post-election politics. Who actually holds supreme power to elect credible and legitimate leadership? Are they eligible voters? Or, are they parties' eligible representatives? Of course, the answer of this question has different political-consequences in regard to the degree of credibility and legitimacy of the next government.

Parties' eligible representatives may elect a certain figure whose credibility is acceptable to all members of the MPR. However, if the elected figure does not reflect people's collective choice, the new leadership will lack legitimacy. This will bring a question of whether the new leader can sustain power for one term with a good record since he or she will lack public confidence. The rational manner is so necessary that the newly elected leader will not be rejected by the people.

The issue on leadership also raises another question about the significance of a general election for electing the executive leader, if compared with the significance of the general session of the MPR for doing so. Looking at the past evidence and the Constitution of 1945, people will see that, in some respects, a general election is less significant than the role of the MPR.

Accordingly, a general election is not the only possible means to establish a credible and legitimate government. There is another means to complete all the process of the formation of a new government. Who the right person is to lead the country is still open for debate among MPR members.

The question of the top office holder may occur since there is no clear-cut consensus set prior to the last general election in constituting that the winner will hold superiority in forming the new leadership.

Even more so, the Constitution states that it is the MPR which retains the supremacy to elect a new president. The elected president will then appoint some figures for his cabinet. The problem may be more complicated because the MPR will contain not only 462 representatives elected through the last general election, but also 38 members appointed by the Indonesian Military (TNI), 135 to be elected by 27 provincial councils and 65 others to be appointed as group representatives. Two hundred and thirty eight members (about 31 percent of the planned 700 MPR members) will hold such a significant role in determining who will hold the executive power.

Their role is exactly the same as the role of the representatives to be elected through the public competition. Who will be appointed will be an interesting topic in the near future. Since the appointees are also playing strategic and decisive roles, major parties will be struggling for nominating candidates to be appointed during the selection process.

Before the polls, many political observers and politicians concluded that the formation of a coalition party would be worthy and imperative to guarantee the birth of new credible and legitimate leadership. A coalition among PDI Perjuangan, the National Awakening Party (PKB) and the National Mandate Party (PAN) would generate an ideal coalition government. The coalition would let other parties perform as opposition parties.

However, these parties seem to be very careful to follow up such an idea. Furthermore, they are likely to be very reluctant to initiate the formation of coalition parties. This can be understood because there are some substantial differences among those parties which hinder the initiative to form the coalition.

In post-election politics, the initiative to form a coalition will really depend on the winner's political will.

Theoretically, the winner will see that a coalition is the best, but it should be the last alternative to take after the most prominent party really finds an impasse to win the competition to seek top office. Moreover, the party needs to examine the costs and benefits of the coalition, the joint policy to pursue, the longevity of the coalition party due to potential difficulties in the internal consolidation and the prospective of the coalition party in the next general election.

Such a coalition party may be strategic to win top office, but it will bring some political consequences to the winner as well as for the long-term future of Indonesian politics. The coalition party will reduce power to the winner of the general election to pursue its own policy as well as to set a figure in office.

For the long-term future, the coalition may face a risk of disintegration, particularly when the party should participate in the next public competition. The decision of the winner to form a coalition may be imperative. Yet, no one may force the winner to call for the coalition.

The debate about who and how to establish a new leadership indeed brings one crucial thing which seriously challenges the Indonesian politics and economy. There remains a political uncertainty which will go on until the MPR holds its general session in November.

The uncertainty will affect the Indonesian economy at least until the decision about the new leadership is reached. Broadly speaking, the leadership of President B.J. Habibie will be certainly weakened after Golkar failed to be a superior party in the last election. His public confidence will be seriously questionable. Of course, it will not benefit the Indonesian economy for the time being.