Parties need conditional accord

Parties need conditional accord

The following is the first of two articles on Indonesian post-
election politics written by Yulius P. Hermawan,a lecturer on
international relations at the Catholic University of Parahyangan
and a researcher at the Parahyangan Center for International
Studies in Bandung, West Java. He is a graduate of the Department
of Politics, Monash University, Australia.

BANDUNG (JP): Indonesian post-election politics is now
entering a new challenging phase as none of the contestants in
the recent general election is likely to win a considerable
majority of votes, like ruling party Golkar always did in the
past.

This raises a crucial question about the possible new power
holder: will the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI
Perjuangan), which is apparently gaining majority votes and
seats, hold legitimacy to form a new government?

In the past, Golkar's victories always meant the legitimate
right for it to form "leadership" in the country. Even though the
decision of the top office holder would be reached through a
general session of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR),
there was no doubt that Golkar would gain majority or absolute
majority.

Nowadays, an MPR general session is likely to be more decisive
than those in the past in electing the new office holder. The
winner of the elections should now go through another political
game where many eligible parties will compete with others to
reach the executive power. Whoever wants to hold power should
gain support from the majority of votes in the coming general
session.

Many observers have even predicted that the MPR may elect non-
partisan candidates if there comes a deadlock in its session. It
means that parties' candidates as well as non-partisans have an
equal chance to hold the governmental office. It then also means
that the winner of the last general election should also be
subject to whatever result of the coming general session of the
MPR.

The question about the office holder will, therefore,
challenge the formation of stable, credible and legitimate
leadership in the Indonesian post-election politics. Who actually
holds supreme power to elect credible and legitimate leadership?
Are they eligible voters? Or, are they parties' eligible
representatives? Of course, the answer of this question has
different political-consequences in regard to the degree of
credibility and legitimacy of the next government.

Parties' eligible representatives may elect a certain figure
whose credibility is acceptable to all members of the MPR.
However, if the elected figure does not reflect people's
collective choice, the new leadership will lack legitimacy. This
will bring a question of whether the new leader can sustain power
for one term with a good record since he or she will lack public
confidence. The rational manner is so necessary that the newly
elected leader will not be rejected by the people.

The issue on leadership also raises another question about the
significance of a general election for electing the executive
leader, if compared with the significance of the general session
of the MPR for doing so. Looking at the past evidence and the
Constitution of 1945, people will see that, in some respects, a
general election is less significant than the role of the MPR.

Accordingly, a general election is not the only possible means
to establish a credible and legitimate government. There is
another means to complete all the process of the formation of a
new government. Who the right person is to lead the country is
still open for debate among MPR members.

The question of the top office holder may occur since there is
no clear-cut consensus set prior to the last general election in
constituting that the winner will hold superiority in forming the
new leadership.

Even more so, the Constitution states that it is the MPR which
retains the supremacy to elect a new president. The elected
president will then appoint some figures for his cabinet. The
problem may be more complicated because the MPR will contain not
only 462 representatives elected through the last general
election, but also 38 members appointed by the Indonesian
Military (TNI), 135 to be elected by 27 provincial councils and
65 others to be appointed as group representatives. Two hundred
and thirty eight members (about 31 percent of the planned 700 MPR
members) will hold such a significant role in determining who
will hold the executive power.

Their role is exactly the same as the role of the
representatives to be elected through the public competition. Who
will be appointed will be an interesting topic in the near
future. Since the appointees are also playing strategic and
decisive roles, major parties will be struggling for nominating
candidates to be appointed during the selection process.

Before the polls, many political observers and politicians
concluded that the formation of a coalition party would be worthy
and imperative to guarantee the birth of new credible and
legitimate leadership. A coalition among PDI Perjuangan, the
National Awakening Party (PKB) and the National Mandate Party
(PAN) would generate an ideal coalition government. The coalition
would let other parties perform as opposition parties.

However, these parties seem to be very careful to follow up
such an idea. Furthermore, they are likely to be very reluctant
to initiate the formation of coalition parties. This can be
understood because there are some substantial differences among
those parties which hinder the initiative to form the coalition.

In post-election politics, the initiative to form a coalition
will really depend on the winner's political will.

Theoretically, the winner will see that a coalition is the
best, but it should be the last alternative to take after the
most prominent party really finds an impasse to win the
competition to seek top office. Moreover, the party needs to
examine the costs and benefits of the coalition, the joint policy
to pursue, the longevity of the coalition party due to potential
difficulties in the internal consolidation and the prospective of
the coalition party in the next general election.

Such a coalition party may be strategic to win top office, but
it will bring some political consequences to the winner as well
as for the long-term future of Indonesian politics. The coalition
party will reduce power to the winner of the general election to
pursue its own policy as well as to set a figure in office.

For the long-term future, the coalition may face a risk of
disintegration, particularly when the party should participate in
the next public competition. The decision of the winner to form a
coalition may be imperative. Yet, no one may force the winner to
call for the coalition.

The debate about who and how to establish a new leadership
indeed brings one crucial thing which seriously challenges the
Indonesian politics and economy. There remains a political
uncertainty which will go on until the MPR holds its general
session in November.

The uncertainty will affect the Indonesian economy at least
until the decision about the new leadership is reached. Broadly
speaking, the leadership of President B.J. Habibie will be
certainly weakened after Golkar failed to be a superior party in
the last election. His public confidence will be seriously
questionable. Of course, it will not benefit the Indonesian
economy for the time being.