Sat, 22 May 1999

Parties are not doing much for political education

By Johannes Nugroho

SURABAYA (JP): As Indonesia advances toward the designated "period of political campaign", one pertinent question remains. Amid the continuing pandemonium of conflicting ideas, political brawls and slingshots of accusations, is there any strain of "political education" so often spoken of by the country's political figures? If the answer is in the affirmative, then has the populace successfully ingested the political infusion which conceivably will facilitate the process of democratization as well as political enlightenment?

There is no denying that the Indonesian "political mass" is far from being politically "literate" and its "genres" of political expression are pristinely underdeveloped. The prevalence of street rallies which involve traffic-regulation- defiant "convoys" bears evidence to the need of the grassroots mass to put on a collective show of force in reprisal of decades of repression.

It is the only time when these previously forgotten lower- class-dominated people can savor "self-empowerment", which after all is an elementary need of a human being. The theme of flouting traffic regulations further endorses the "power" element. While this may be psychologically understandable, it enforces the rudimentary nature of Indonesians' political awareness.

By encouraging such rallies, political parties are not exactly doing much for "political education". The rallies serve the purpose of becoming an outlet for "mass emotional sentiments" with the absence of rationale. Political parties, run by a select few, in staging such events, have egotistically manipulated the emotional undercurrents of the populace for their own ends. Moreover, considering the predominant class composition of the participants, such rallies foster class-oriented conflicts.

Along with street rallies sprang the ubiquitous banners and PDI-Perjuangan's posko (posts). The banners appear to voice territoriality with respect to particular political parties. Banners which proclaim "You have entered a PKB (National Awakening Party) or PDI-Perjuangan or PAN (National Mandate Party) district area" are in abundance while Megawati's sympathizers spontaneously prove their devotion by erecting supposedly self-funded, earthy often bamboo-composed "posts", again claiming "territory".

Even though these phenomena are reflective of people's previously "bottled" political aspirations, will they prove effective in the process of democratization? In identifying political leanings with territoriality, thus permitting emotion to get the upper hand, party functionaries have perpetuated the primitive "tribal" sentiments of the Indonesian populace.

The Indonesia "tribality" is presumably a by-product of the country's own history. Centuries of colonial oppression, coupled with two equally overbearing regimes with their stern indoctrination, have left Indonesians in search of their true identity. The fact is most Indonesians are still baffled when it comes to what it means to be Indonesian in the face of whimsical state ideologies.

The Dutch colonialists left a legacy of inferiority complex among Indonesians as well as doing very little to further the nation intellectually. Afterwards, in the fervor of neo- colonialism, Sukarno cajoled and bullied the populace into the "revolution" while Soeharto, repudiating all Sukarno's teachings, brainwashed the populace with state-ideology Pancasila courses.

Depleted of self-identity, Indonesians have arguably swarmed political parties to find a "little of themselves" in one of them. Hence the proclamation of "PKB or PDI" districts, the flying of banners and flags as well as the street rallies.

Yet personalizing politics to such an extent would only lead to outbursts of fanaticism as people succumb to their emotions rather than their intellect. When political parties or political figures have become the embodiment of self-identity, political stability will never materialize.

For a comparison, Indian politics have been a mirror of an extreme infiltration of self-identities. The instability of Indian politics is presumably a direct result of the constant bickering along essentially primal linguistic, religious, caste ethnic and cult-image differences. The partition of India into states and territories along linguistic boundaries, the establishment of the Nehru's dynasty in Indira and Rajiv and the political brawls serve as a reminder of how "ugly" primitive forms of political expression can be.

"Self-identity" could arguably be a pervasive influence on politics through another powerful means, namely religion. That Indonesians are easily agitated along religious lines is irrefutable as outbreaks of pseudo-religious riots are well- documented.

Therefore, is it sagacious to meddle in religious teachings and politics, as an essentially secular affair? While the rest of the world, through centuries of historical trials and errors, recognizes the separation of spiritual and temporal jurisdictions, would Indonesia be tempted to venture into the risky path of pseudo-religious politics?

Although Abdurrahman Wahid, the NU leader known as Gus Dur, has repeatedly expostulated his belief in the segregation of politics from religious affairs, it appears that the dividing line, in view of the "religious-aspiring" Indonesians, is indeed blurred. Gus Dur, utilizing the Koranic principle of "Islam for the universe", which mandates the "tolerance" and "protection" of non-Moslems, elaborates the relationship of state and religion. However, in "tolerating" and "protecting" non-Moslems, a form of inequality and discrimination has presumably been created.

The dividing line is further obfuscated by the joint decree of three party leaders, those of PPP (United Development Party), PNU (Nahdlatul Umat Party) and PKU (Muslim Community Awakening Party) to thwart Megawati's bid for presidency on the grounds that she is a woman. Imparting their own Koranic interpretation of the female "unfitness" for leadership, the three party leaders have appealed to and manipulated the Indonesians' puerile sense of "self-identity".

Even the supposedly intellectual Amien Rais, in one of his party declaration rallies, declared that Golkar had lost the "heavenly mandate", thus spicing a thoroughly secular affair with "heavenly" tints. To make matters worse, two of the political slogans of PBB (The Crescent Star Party) read, "PBB rejects secularism" and "PBB rejects a secular (national) leader".

On a more progressive note, a few political leaders such as Amien Rais (PAN), Yusril Ihza Mahendra (PBB), Sri Bintang Pamungkas (PUDI or Indonesian Uni-democracy Party) and Didin Hafidhuddin (PK or Justice Party) have participated in a presidential debate. Indeed some of them have taken part in the first round of such debates.

Regrettably, a popular candidate for president, Megawati Soekarnoputri, elusively "pooh-poohed" the idea, claiming that it was not "in accordance with the Eastern custom". In saying so, Megawati has resorted to the archaic "cop-out" explanation teeming in the New Order's era. By remaining a recalcitrant to the presidential debate, Megawati has sought to eternalize the "mysterious aura" as well as "infallibility" endowed by previous Indonesian leaders.

Undeniably, the so-called notable "reformist" figures such as Megawati, Amien Rais and Gus Dur have had considerably shared in nurturing the infant Indonesian democracy. They in all probability will continue to influence the survival of democracy in the country. While it is almost improbable to envisage a faultlessly ideal system of democracy, Indonesia's leaders should endeavor to live up to the universal mores of democracy, that is a secular body of state with a harmonious power balance, beholden to the electorate as well as safeguarding and responsive to universal human rights.

The writer works at the International Language Program, Surabaya.