Parties are not doing much for political education

Parties are not doing much for political education

By Johannes Nugroho

SURABAYA (JP): As Indonesia advances toward the designated
"period of political campaign", one pertinent question remains.
Amid the continuing pandemonium of conflicting ideas, political
brawls and slingshots of accusations, is there any strain of
"political education" so often spoken of by the country's
political figures? If the answer is in the affirmative, then has
the populace successfully ingested the political infusion which
conceivably will facilitate the process of democratization as
well as political enlightenment?

There is no denying that the Indonesian "political mass" is
far from being politically "literate" and its "genres" of
political expression are pristinely underdeveloped. The
prevalence of street rallies which involve traffic-regulation-
defiant "convoys" bears evidence to the need of the grassroots
mass to put on a collective show of force in reprisal of decades
of repression.

It is the only time when these previously forgotten lower-
class-dominated people can savor "self-empowerment", which after
all is an elementary need of a human being. The theme of flouting
traffic regulations further endorses the "power" element. While
this may be psychologically understandable, it enforces the
rudimentary nature of Indonesians' political awareness.

By encouraging such rallies, political parties are not exactly
doing much for "political education". The rallies serve the
purpose of becoming an outlet for "mass emotional sentiments"
with the absence of rationale. Political parties, run by a select
few, in staging such events, have egotistically manipulated the
emotional undercurrents of the populace for their own ends.
Moreover, considering the predominant class composition of the
participants, such rallies foster class-oriented conflicts.

Along with street rallies sprang the ubiquitous banners and
PDI-Perjuangan's posko (posts). The banners appear to voice
territoriality with respect to particular political parties.
Banners which proclaim "You have entered a PKB (National
Awakening Party) or PDI-Perjuangan or PAN (National Mandate
Party) district area" are in abundance while Megawati's
sympathizers spontaneously prove their devotion by erecting
supposedly self-funded, earthy often bamboo-composed "posts",
again claiming "territory".

Even though these phenomena are reflective of people's
previously "bottled" political aspirations, will they prove
effective in the process of democratization? In identifying
political leanings with territoriality, thus permitting emotion
to get the upper hand, party functionaries have perpetuated the
primitive "tribal" sentiments of the Indonesian populace.

The Indonesia "tribality" is presumably a by-product of the
country's own history. Centuries of colonial oppression, coupled
with two equally overbearing regimes with their stern
indoctrination, have left Indonesians in search of their true
identity. The fact is most Indonesians are still baffled when it
comes to what it means to be Indonesian in the face of whimsical
state ideologies.

The Dutch colonialists left a legacy of inferiority complex
among Indonesians as well as doing very little to further the
nation intellectually. Afterwards, in the fervor of neo-
colonialism, Sukarno cajoled and bullied the populace into the
"revolution" while Soeharto, repudiating all Sukarno's teachings,
brainwashed the populace with state-ideology Pancasila courses.

Depleted of self-identity, Indonesians have arguably swarmed
political parties to find a "little of themselves" in one of
them. Hence the proclamation of "PKB or PDI" districts, the
flying of banners and flags as well as the street rallies.

Yet personalizing politics to such an extent would only lead
to outbursts of fanaticism as people succumb to their emotions
rather than their intellect. When political parties or political
figures have become the embodiment of self-identity, political
stability will never materialize.

For a comparison, Indian politics have been a mirror of an
extreme infiltration of self-identities. The instability of
Indian politics is presumably a direct result of the constant
bickering along essentially primal linguistic, religious, caste
ethnic and cult-image differences. The partition of India into
states and territories along linguistic boundaries, the
establishment of the Nehru's dynasty in Indira and Rajiv and the
political brawls serve as a reminder of how "ugly" primitive
forms of political expression can be.

"Self-identity" could arguably be a pervasive influence on
politics through another powerful means, namely religion. That
Indonesians are easily agitated along religious lines is
irrefutable as outbreaks of pseudo-religious riots are well-
documented.

Therefore, is it sagacious to meddle in religious teachings
and politics, as an essentially secular affair? While the rest of
the world, through centuries of historical trials and errors,
recognizes the separation of spiritual and temporal
jurisdictions, would Indonesia be tempted to venture into the
risky path of pseudo-religious politics?

Although Abdurrahman Wahid, the NU leader known as Gus Dur,
has repeatedly expostulated his belief in the segregation of
politics from religious affairs, it appears that the dividing
line, in view of the "religious-aspiring" Indonesians, is indeed
blurred. Gus Dur, utilizing the Koranic principle of "Islam for
the universe", which mandates the "tolerance" and "protection" of
non-Moslems, elaborates the relationship of state and religion.
However, in "tolerating" and "protecting" non-Moslems, a form of
inequality and discrimination has presumably been created.

The dividing line is further obfuscated by the joint decree of
three party leaders, those of PPP (United Development Party), PNU
(Nahdlatul Umat Party) and PKU (Muslim Community Awakening Party)
to thwart Megawati's bid for presidency on the grounds that she
is a woman. Imparting their own Koranic interpretation of the
female "unfitness" for leadership, the three party leaders have
appealed to and manipulated the Indonesians' puerile sense of
"self-identity".

Even the supposedly intellectual Amien Rais, in one of his
party declaration rallies, declared that Golkar had lost the
"heavenly mandate", thus spicing a thoroughly secular affair with
"heavenly" tints. To make matters worse, two of the political
slogans of PBB (The Crescent Star Party) read, "PBB rejects
secularism" and "PBB rejects a secular (national) leader".

On a more progressive note, a few political leaders such as
Amien Rais (PAN), Yusril Ihza Mahendra (PBB), Sri Bintang
Pamungkas (PUDI or Indonesian Uni-democracy Party) and Didin
Hafidhuddin (PK or Justice Party) have participated in a
presidential debate. Indeed some of them have taken part in the
first round of such debates.

Regrettably, a popular candidate for president, Megawati
Soekarnoputri, elusively "pooh-poohed" the idea, claiming that it
was not "in accordance with the Eastern custom". In saying so,
Megawati has resorted to the archaic "cop-out" explanation
teeming in the New Order's era. By remaining a recalcitrant to
the presidential debate, Megawati has sought to eternalize the
"mysterious aura" as well as "infallibility" endowed by previous
Indonesian leaders.

Undeniably, the so-called notable "reformist" figures such as
Megawati, Amien Rais and Gus Dur have had considerably shared in
nurturing the infant Indonesian democracy. They in all
probability will continue to influence the survival of democracy
in the country. While it is almost improbable to envisage a
faultlessly ideal system of democracy, Indonesia's leaders should
endeavor to live up to the universal mores of democracy, that is
a secular body of state with a harmonious power balance, beholden
to the electorate as well as safeguarding and responsive to
universal human rights.

The writer works at the International Language Program,
Surabaya.