Part 2 of 2: The revolution of Indonesian democracy

Damien Kingsbury, Jakarta

Susilo's problems, however, will really begin with the House of Representatives, which already presents an opposition majority, despite his own strong mandate as leader. It is an appropriate function of a legislature to critically scrutinise legislative proposals and to counter the capacity for a president to assume too much authority. This check and balance is a further key component of any democratic process.

The concern is that the House will choose to become obstructionist; that it will block Yudhoyono's legislative agenda not because it is poorly conceived or authoritarian, but because it can.

One hopes in this that the House will be able to display some political maturity, and recognize that democracy revolves around the art of negotiation and compromise, rather than the "realism" of machiavellian power politics.

Should the House choose to be unreasonably obstructionists, however, Susilo's significant mandate could give the political authority to force the issue. It will also open up political space for what is broadly called "civil society" to step back in. This is a very healthy part of political competition.

Where problems with the House are most likely to arise will be around what might be called the "reform" agenda. Here the House might see some of the vested interests of its members threatened, which they could try to object to on "policy" grounds. But Susilo is not a risk-taker, and is much more likely to try to get through a part of his agenda successfully rater than try to push it all and get nothing through. Again, the art of compromise will play in this.

In that the House could protect the interests of its members, Indonesia's elite needs to start to move away from the single, venal idea of "take" to accommodate the idea of "give". That is, if Indonesia's elites wants to continue to live more or less in the comfort to which they have clearly become accustomed, they might need to start entertaining the idea of a social contract. In such a "social contract", the "little people" will tolerate relative disparities of wealth if some of their own needs are a bit better met.

Susilo could use his presidency to introduce such a "social contract", by way of policy development, as a basis of helping secure his own political future. It is perhaps hoping for too much for the parties in the House to also compete for the provision of popular policies. But this is a hope worth maintaining none the less.

In that Susilo is not a risk taker, he is also not likely to take too hard a line on "Islamic terrorism". Terrorism certainly exists in Indonesia and there is little doubt that some, perhaps much of it is linked to a radical Islamic agenda. Some might also be linked to other agendas, which may reflect non-Islamic criminal or political interests.

But Susilo has become too closely identified with a devout section of the Islamic community to want to alienate it. And he doesn't want to fall out with his vice-president, Jusuf Kalla, who has a history of asserting himself if and where he thinks necessary.

This then leaves the Indonesia military (TNI). The TNI has been in a process of coalescing since the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid, and under Megawati firmly consolidated around a core of professional, conservative officers. Under such officers, the TNI's political agenda has changed and it is little interested in the day to day politics of the country.

However, the TNI still maintains that the unity of the state and any issue which could affect that remains if not its exclusive domain then at least one in which it will retain a dominant influence. Not only has Susilo remained close to many former and serving officers, and relied on their organisational support, but he is very much a product of a military background and whose personal associations reflect a strong political heritage.

Susilo would therefore not be inclined to assert too much presidential authority over the TNI, mostly because he remains comfortable with his former colleagues. While a change of the TNI's leadership can be expected in the not too distant future, this is likely to be one change that could not be categorised as a part of any reform agenda.

This then raises the issue of the "security approach" to resolving issues such as separatism in Aceh. The cost of the Aceh campaign has been very large and both the government and the TNI have been stretched to maintain it. It would not be surprising to see a scaling down of the TNI presence in Aceh, on the pretext that it had largely fulfilled its intended function of limiting the Free Aceh Movement (GAM).

Yet anyone familiar with Aceh will know that while GAM has been damaged, it remains largely intact. This then will provide a pretext for the TNI to maintain its active involvement in "security" policy. A partial TNI withdrawal, therefore, would suit more than one interest.

But if Susilo is serious about resolving the Aceh problem, he might consider inviting in a trusted third party to broker a settlement, such as the Japanese government. Japan has shown a strong interest in seeing the Aceh issue settled, and is sufficiently distant from both parties to be acceptable.

Susilo would probably have to release at least the jailed GAM negotiators to allow real talks to begin again. If he was really serious about peace, he could even offer to GAM members a general amnesty, which has been shown to work elsewhere.

The possibilities for moving forward, then, are almost endless, as are the obstacles to such progress. But with the will of a significant majority of the people behind him, a careful, occasionally forceful but most of all well intentioned president could achieve much.

And if the political achievements of the next five years are more modest than might be hoped for, it is worth remembering that democratisation is a process; it does not have a final destination.

Dr Damien Kingsbury is senior lecturer in international development at Deakin University, Melbourne. He is author of The Politics of Indonesia, 3rd edition (Oxford) due January 2005.