Part 2 of 2: The revolution of Indonesian democracy

Part 2 of 2: The revolution of Indonesian democracy

Damien Kingsbury, Jakarta

Susilo's problems, however, will really begin with the House
of Representatives, which already presents an opposition
majority, despite his own strong mandate as leader. It is an
appropriate function of a legislature to critically scrutinise
legislative proposals and to counter the capacity for a president
to assume too much authority. This check and balance is a further
key component of any democratic process.

The concern is that the House will choose to become
obstructionist; that it will block Yudhoyono's legislative agenda
not because it is poorly conceived or authoritarian, but because
it can.

One hopes in this that the House will be able to display some
political maturity, and recognize that democracy revolves around
the art of negotiation and compromise, rather than the "realism"
of machiavellian power politics.

Should the House choose to be unreasonably obstructionists,
however, Susilo's significant mandate could give the political
authority to force the issue. It will also open up political
space for what is broadly called "civil society" to step back in.
This is a very healthy part of political competition.

Where problems with the House are most likely to arise will be
around what might be called the "reform" agenda. Here the House
might see some of the vested interests of its members threatened,
which they could try to object to on "policy" grounds. But Susilo
is not a risk-taker, and is much more likely to try to get
through a part of his agenda successfully rater than try to push
it all and get nothing through. Again, the art of compromise will
play in this.

In that the House could protect the interests of its members,
Indonesia's elite needs to start to move away from the single,
venal idea of "take" to accommodate the idea of "give". That is,
if Indonesia's elites wants to continue to live more or less in
the comfort to which they have clearly become accustomed, they
might need to start entertaining the idea of a social contract.
In such a "social contract", the "little people" will tolerate
relative disparities of wealth if some of their own needs are a
bit better met.

Susilo could use his presidency to introduce such a "social
contract", by way of policy development, as a basis of helping
secure his own political future. It is perhaps hoping for too
much for the parties in the House to also compete for the
provision of popular policies. But this is a hope worth
maintaining none the less.

In that Susilo is not a risk taker, he is also not likely to
take too hard a line on "Islamic terrorism". Terrorism certainly
exists in Indonesia and there is little doubt that some, perhaps
much of it is linked to a radical Islamic agenda. Some might also
be linked to other agendas, which may reflect non-Islamic
criminal or political interests.

But Susilo has become too closely identified with a devout
section of the Islamic community to want to alienate it. And he
doesn't want to fall out with his vice-president, Jusuf Kalla,
who has a history of asserting himself if and where he thinks
necessary.

This then leaves the Indonesia military (TNI). The TNI has
been in a process of coalescing since the presidency of
Abdurrahman Wahid, and under Megawati firmly consolidated around
a core of professional, conservative officers. Under such
officers, the TNI's political agenda has changed and it is little
interested in the day to day politics of the country.

However, the TNI still maintains that the unity of the state
and any issue which could affect that remains if not its
exclusive domain then at least one in which it will retain a
dominant influence. Not only has Susilo remained close to many
former and serving officers, and relied on their organisational
support, but he is very much a product of a military background
and whose personal associations reflect a strong political
heritage.

Susilo would therefore not be inclined to assert too much
presidential authority over the TNI, mostly because he remains
comfortable with his former colleagues. While a change of the
TNI's leadership can be expected in the not too distant future,
this is likely to be one change that could not be categorised as
a part of any reform agenda.

This then raises the issue of the "security approach" to
resolving issues such as separatism in Aceh. The cost of the Aceh
campaign has been very large and both the government and the TNI
have been stretched to maintain it. It would not be surprising to
see a scaling down of the TNI presence in Aceh, on the pretext
that it had largely fulfilled its intended function of limiting
the Free Aceh Movement (GAM).

Yet anyone familiar with Aceh will know that while GAM has
been damaged, it remains largely intact. This then will provide a
pretext for the TNI to maintain its active involvement in
"security" policy. A partial TNI withdrawal, therefore, would
suit more than one interest.

But if Susilo is serious about resolving the Aceh problem, he
might consider inviting in a trusted third party to broker a
settlement, such as the Japanese government. Japan has shown a
strong interest in seeing the Aceh issue settled, and is
sufficiently distant from both parties to be acceptable.

Susilo would probably have to release at least the jailed GAM
negotiators to allow real talks to begin again. If he was really
serious about peace, he could even offer to GAM members a general
amnesty, which has been shown to work elsewhere.

The possibilities for moving forward, then, are almost
endless, as are the obstacles to such progress. But with the will
of a significant majority of the people behind him, a careful,
occasionally forceful but most of all well intentioned president
could achieve much.

And if the political achievements of the next five years are
more modest than might be hoped for, it is worth remembering that
democratisation is a process; it does not have a final
destination.

Dr Damien Kingsbury is senior lecturer in international
development at Deakin University, Melbourne. He is author of The
Politics of Indonesia, 3rd edition (Oxford) due January 2005.