Part 2 of 2: Real military reform depends on civilians

Juwono Sudarsono , London

o Changing legislation governing civilian authority.

A corollary to strengthening political parties and civic institutions is the need to review and revamp all legislation confirming half-hearted civilian authority control over the TNI.

Party leaders in the parliament's committee on defense and foreign affairs should undertake a leading role in galvanizing new legislation within the next two to three years to revise existing laws and place the commander of the TNI under the authority of the Ministry of Defense, preferably with the new nomenclature of "chief of the defense staff". At the same time, the National Police chief should be made answerable to the ministry of home affairs, which ideally would be headed by a civilian with strong leadership and management skills; the police would then be formally integrated as part of the criminal justice system along with the prosecutor's office and the courts.

Separation of the police from the military in 1999-2000 was welcomed by domestic as well as international observers as steps towards democratic politics; however, the abrupt change from an integrated and unified military-cum-police command into two separate and overly distinct functions has resulted in the disjointed and haphazard seeking of new roles. It inevitably intensified rivalry between the Army and police over turf, status and associated spoils, which needs to be resolved by the parties and a legislature much more attuned to defense and security issues.

The newly installed president in October 2004 must be bold enough to this introduce this legislation while he or she gets to grips with the nitty gritty of party organization and consolidation to follow through on providing substance to civilian control.

o Revising the Security Doctrine

The TNI's self-proclaimed "new paradigm" launched in late 1997-1998 ostensibly revised the doctrine of the "people's total defense", which had its roots in the guerrilla warfare during the war of independence in the 1940s and early 1950s. It called for the "redefinition" and "repositioning" of the TNI and assumed a viable civilian party-based system would eventually take over from the heavy dominance of the military in matters of domestic civil security.

Revising the security doctrine entails three crucial elements: The imperative to review the TNI's intelligence, territorial and tactical aspects of its new role. For too long, the doctrine encompassed all three elements into an integrated body, reflecting a tendency in Indonesian political culture to compensate lack of effective ability with an excess of declaratory dogma. Again, the vigorous participation of political parties in the legislature and civic groups committed to establishing an accountable and transparent military will be urgently required to sustain the commitment for change over the next few years.

The revised security doctrine must address the fundamental issues of redefining the changing civil-military relationships, a clear timetable on the scope and pace of review over the phased but effective reduction of territorial role of the TNI and the vital issues of adapting new management techniques and cost effective technology affecting each service.

Additionally, the doctrine must take into account that prime responsibility for domestic security be given to the police. However, given the police force's relatively untrained and undermanned conditions, debate over this particular area of security doctrine is expected to be vigorous and heated.

A newly formulated doctrine encompassing the integration of the three defense services with the National police would provide a "big-picture spectrum" encompassing each service's mission carefully calibrate within the network of interaction between those recognized as essentially defensive measures and those that are regarded as essentially domestic security issues.

O Devising a 10-year (within a 25-year) Defense Plan:

Of the larger countries in Southeast Asia, Indonesia is the most under-managed and the most under-funded in terms of national defense requirements.

National leaders in government, political parties, parliament, civic groups, the media and research institutes assisted by sympathetic foreigner observers must embark on a serious effort to agree on a framework for National Defense Planning covering the next 10 to 25 years.

This effort would entail the establishment of a combined mid- level and junior civilian and TNI defense planning team to go through the political-economic aspects of defense planning, budgeting and management training and to come to grips with running a modern but cost-effective TNI, including the choice of appropriate technologies, operations and maintenance systems for the Army, Navy and Air Force.

This combined defense planning team would project the medium and long-term needs of defense and security in terms of Indonesian geography and focus on overall defense capability rather than focus on sources of external threat. It would also set appropriate budgets for each service within a comprehensive view of "rotational defense" cover and would balance defense of populated territory with defense of the country's natural resources. Within the economic means available, it would chose weapons, equipment and training techniques of military preparedness that are on par with Indonesia's immediate neighbors and monitor the evolving regional Asia Pacific security environment.

All of these elements of medium and long-term defense planning must become a matter of highest priority of the national agenda in the 2004-2009 period. A democratic, transparent, accountable and cost-effective national defense can only be as good as the vigorous engagement of all parties concerned: The executives in cabinet, the legislature and political parties, universities and research institutes, non-governmental organizations and civic groups transcending primordial identities, indeed even domestic as well as foreign businesses. A focus on the importance of defense reform and planning is an agenda whose time has come for the critical "make or break" years in 2004-2009.

In the final analysis, the provision of a credible, accountable and effective defense force, working cooperatively with the National Police, is just as vital a provider of public goods as the provisions of public highways, electricity grids, safe harbors, efficient airports, public housing, health care and social safety nets.

The writer is the Indonesian Ambassador to the United Kingdom and a former minister of defense. This article is his personal view.