Part 2 of 2: Real military reform depends on civilians

Part 2 of 2: Real military reform depends on civilians

Juwono Sudarsono , London

o Changing legislation governing civilian authority.

A corollary to strengthening political parties and civic
institutions is the need to review and revamp all legislation
confirming half-hearted civilian authority control over the TNI.

Party leaders in the parliament's committee on defense and
foreign affairs should undertake a leading role in galvanizing
new legislation within the next two to three years to revise
existing laws and place the commander of the TNI under the
authority of the Ministry of Defense, preferably with the new
nomenclature of "chief of the defense staff". At the same time,
the National Police chief should be made answerable to the
ministry of home affairs, which ideally would be headed by a
civilian with strong leadership and management skills; the police
would then be formally integrated as part of the criminal justice
system along with the prosecutor's office and the courts.

Separation of the police from the military in 1999-2000 was
welcomed by domestic as well as international observers as steps
towards democratic politics; however, the abrupt change from an
integrated and unified military-cum-police command into two
separate and overly distinct functions has resulted in the
disjointed and haphazard seeking of new roles. It inevitably
intensified rivalry between the Army and police over turf, status
and associated spoils, which needs to be resolved by the parties
and a legislature much more attuned to defense and security
issues.

The newly installed president in October 2004 must be bold
enough to this introduce this legislation while he or she gets to
grips with the nitty gritty of party organization and
consolidation to follow through on providing substance to
civilian control.

o Revising the Security Doctrine

The TNI's self-proclaimed "new paradigm" launched in late
1997-1998 ostensibly revised the doctrine of the "people's total
defense", which had its roots in the guerrilla warfare during the
war of independence in the 1940s and early 1950s. It called for
the "redefinition" and "repositioning" of the TNI and assumed a
viable civilian party-based system would eventually take over
from the heavy dominance of the military in matters of domestic
civil security.

Revising the security doctrine entails three crucial elements:
The imperative to review the TNI's intelligence, territorial and
tactical aspects of its new role. For too long, the doctrine
encompassed all three elements into an integrated body,
reflecting a tendency in Indonesian political culture to
compensate lack of effective ability with an excess of
declaratory dogma. Again, the vigorous participation of political
parties in the legislature and civic groups committed to
establishing an accountable and transparent military will be
urgently required to sustain the commitment for change over the
next few years.

The revised security doctrine must address the fundamental
issues of redefining the changing civil-military relationships, a
clear timetable on the scope and pace of review over the phased
but effective reduction of territorial role of the TNI and the
vital issues of adapting new management techniques and cost
effective technology affecting each service.

Additionally, the doctrine must take into account that prime
responsibility for domestic security be given to the police.
However, given the police force's relatively untrained and
undermanned conditions, debate over this particular area of
security doctrine is expected to be vigorous and heated.

A newly formulated doctrine encompassing the integration of
the three defense services with the National police would
provide a "big-picture spectrum" encompassing each service's
mission carefully calibrate within the network of interaction
between those recognized as essentially defensive measures and
those that are regarded as essentially domestic security issues.

O Devising a 10-year (within a 25-year) Defense Plan:

Of the larger countries in Southeast Asia, Indonesia is the
most under-managed and the most under-funded in terms of national
defense requirements.

National leaders in government, political parties,
parliament, civic groups, the media and research institutes
assisted by sympathetic foreigner observers must embark on a
serious effort to agree on a framework for National Defense
Planning covering the next 10 to 25 years.

This effort would entail the establishment of a combined mid-
level and junior civilian and TNI defense planning team to go
through the political-economic aspects of defense planning,
budgeting and management training and to come to grips with
running a modern but cost-effective TNI, including the choice of
appropriate technologies, operations and maintenance systems for
the Army, Navy and Air Force.

This combined defense planning team would project the medium
and long-term needs of defense and security in terms of
Indonesian geography and focus on overall defense capability
rather than focus on sources of external threat. It would also
set appropriate budgets for each service within a comprehensive
view of "rotational defense" cover and would balance defense of
populated territory with defense of the country's natural
resources. Within the economic means available, it would chose
weapons, equipment and training techniques of military
preparedness that are on par with Indonesia's immediate neighbors
and monitor the evolving regional Asia Pacific security
environment.

All of these elements of medium and long-term defense planning
must become a matter of highest priority of the national agenda
in the 2004-2009 period. A democratic, transparent, accountable
and cost-effective national defense can only be as good as the
vigorous engagement of all parties concerned: The executives in
cabinet, the legislature and political parties, universities and
research institutes, non-governmental organizations and civic
groups transcending primordial identities, indeed even domestic
as well as foreign businesses. A focus on the importance of
defense reform and planning is an agenda whose time has come for
the critical "make or break" years in 2004-2009.

In the final analysis, the provision of a credible,
accountable and effective defense force, working cooperatively
with the National Police, is just as vital a provider of public
goods as the provisions of public highways, electricity grids,
safe harbors, efficient airports, public housing, health care and
social safety nets.

The writer is the Indonesian Ambassador to the United Kingdom
and a former minister of defense. This article is his personal
view.