Part 2 of 2: Africa, Asia and global security

Part 2 of 2: Africa, Asia and global security

Juwono Sudarsono, Jakarta

Over 70 percent of the world's financial, investment, banking
and trading companies command the capital, services, human skills
that define the accumulation, distribution and legal
underpinnings of global capital movements. These movements drive
the demand and provision of strategic energy, minerals and other
wealth creating value-added goods and services. The "24/7" nature
of these global transactions fuel the industrial, commercial and
military reach of the powerful nations that define security at
the regional and global levels.

Of critical importance within African and Asian states are the
dangers of acute internal disparities between those who gain from
financial services through globalization and those who remain in
deep inertia because they cannot gain access to the human and
technological skills needed to be connected with the outside
world.

Of the more than 90 percent of international trade transported
by sea, more than 70 percent of commercial fleets are owned,
controlled or operated by countries and firms constituting less
than 20 percent of the world's population. Of the more than 2200
warships and 5000 strike aircraft worldwide, more than 40 percent
are owned by the United States and its NATO allies.

Together they command more than 80 percent of the available
nuclear and conventional air firepower. It follows that the
security of the global trading system is underpinned by powerful
military forces guaranteeing free flow access and openness to the
world's seas and skies.

African and Asian nations seek to redress the balance of these
deeply unjust military power inequities by persuading the
countries of the developed world that unless military spending in
the rich countries are re-allocated to provide economic
assistance to the world's poorest countries, the vengeance of
transnational crimes -- illegal immigration, drugs and narcotics
profiteering, small arms smuggled to fuel violent crime in the
urban centers of the rich countries -- will visit the rich world
from time to time.

The success of the New Asia Africa Strategic Partnership will
depend on how the powerful engines of growth of China and India
will be sustained through 2050. Assuming that the combined
population of China and India will reach 4.2 billion out of a
world total of 9 billion by 2050, the "center of economic
gravity" will focus on these two economies.

The very size of the two countries as vast markets in Asia
will define the scope and speed of the scientific and
technological advancement that industry standards have to
maintain in order to produce enough of the manufacturing goods
needed to feed, house and provide adequate water and electricity
of their large populations.

The actual spin-offs emanating from the production and
distribution of these giants will benefit the economies of
Southeast Asia, largely through the geographical proximity and
commercially viable access to energy, mineral and timber
resources. With Japan repositioning itself to the rising
competitive forces from China and India, a more Asian-centric
identity can be created.

The combined North-East Asia, Southeast Asia and South Asia
community could shift the distribution of power to the Asia-
Pacific and the Pacific. The more difficult proposition would be
to connect the Asia-centric rise of India, China and Japan with
the more fragmented poles of regional development of Southern
Africa, West Africa and East Africa.

Japan has long looked to the whole world as it sources energy
for its industries, going as far as Brazil and Central America
for its mineral resources. China has developed plans to extend
its reach to the energy sources available across Russia into the
hinterland. It has also expanded its reach to the resource-rich
countries of West Africa and beyond. India seeks new access to
oil and gas by building and financing pipelines across Pakistan
to the oil-rich Central Asia republics.

The energy-market nexus linking Asia and Africa is harder to
connect and consolidate largely because the majority of African
states south of the Sahara do not have as many mineral resources
as the gas fields and undersea resources of the Asian mainland.
Connection is made more difficult by the relative low purchasing
powers of the majority of the African states. South Africa, West
Africa and East Africa do not have the same geographical
proximity and economic mutuality that favors the Japan-China-
India triangle.

In addition, so long as many countries in southern Africa face
dire political and economic conditions arising from endemic
ethnic tension, internal conflict and violence over claims of
tribal identity and territorial integrity, it would remain
difficult to inject strong commitment to widen and deepen
political and economic links with Asia.

In the final analysis, while the nations of Africa and Asia
seek to redefine the terms and conditions of global security in
the wider sense, they will have to depend more on the persuasive
forces of market attraction than on the application of credible
coercive means of compliance.

Until the economic and military imbalances are adequately
restructured and reformed, the quest toward a more equitable
global security system will remain tenuous. In the past, widening
gaps between rich and poor have led to numerous movements against
global injustice.

The industrialized world has only recently realized that
conducting a Global War On Terror (GWOT) only exacerbates the
sense of injustice and humiliation felt by many of Asia's and
Africa's youth. The change to a Strategy Against Violent
Extremism (SAVE) can only succeed if the industrialized world
provide outreach and sustenance for the many countries in Asia
and Africa that remain trapped in grinding poverty.

Correspondingly, throughout 2005-2050 leaders in Asia and
Africa must consistently pursue policies and actions that provide
greater opportunities for employment, education and health care
for the poor within their borders. As with global security,
domestic security can only long endure if it is increasingly
underpinned by a broader network of social and economic justice.

Global security ultimately depends on broader-based social and
economic justice within the regions in Asia and Africa. Regional
peace and security in turn depends on domestic distributive
justice, a necessary pre-condition for regional stability. If the
nations of Asia and Africa wish to play a more effective role in
galvanizing global security, then all leaders of Asia and Africa
must have a greater commitment to social justice at home. Hi-tech
guns, tanks, ships, sensors, munitions and strike aircraft alone
do not insure sustainable security.

The greatest test for the leaders and nations of Asia and
Africa is that their search for global security must begin with
broader and fairer social justice at home. That is the ultimate
challenge for the next 50 years

The writer is the Minister of Defense for Indonesia.