Part 1 of 2: The evolution of Indonesian democracy

Part 1 of 2: The evolution of Indonesian democracy

Damien Kingsbury , Jakarta

Although it is yet to be officially announced, it now seems
certain that Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) will become
Indonesia's next president. After a succession of three
presidents whose incumbencies were variously marred, Indonesia
may now have an opportunity to look forward to five years of
relative political stability and effectiveness. Congratulations
on this outcome are, therefore, due.

One must initially congratulate the president-elect for having
achieved office with what at the time of writing looked to be a
very substantial majority, and for the dignified manner in which
he acknowledged his victory. One of the key markers of a true
democracy is that the winner rules on behalf of all, and
Yudhoyono has announced his desire to bring together supporters
of both candidates.

Congratulations, too, are due to the incumbent, Megawati
Soekarnoputri, for her own dignity in this matter. Losing an
election is not easy. Yet even before the election, predicting
the outcome, Megawati had asked her supporters to respect he
result. Graceful acceptance of political loss is also a key
indicator of a true democracy.

But most importantly, congratulations are due to the
Indonesian people for voting in and accepting the outcome of a
generally clean and well run democratic process. In all, the
election process of 2004 has marked Indonesia's most significant
step in the transition to democracy since President Soeharto
resigned from office in May 1998.

The political situation that Indonesia now finds itself in,
however, is less than perfect. As a presidential candidate,
Susilo had the problem of a fledgling party structure competing
with the institutional might of both Golkar and the Indonesian
Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). Susilo and his Democratic
Party largely overcame this problem by making alliances with
various interest groups, only some of which could be said to have
democratic, much less reformist, credentials.

Susilo's continuing associations with serving and retired
military officers gave him an organizational capacity, especially
in the provinces.

Like most political campaigns, Susilo's bid for the
presidency was funded by a range of business sources, including
those that have close business connections with the TNI.

At a local level, much of the campaign process, including in
some officially noted cases of the payment for votes, was
undertaken by local gangsters who work for or have associations
with key Indonesian Military-(TNI)linked business interests, as
well as with some provincial level TNI.

In aiming for the presidency, Susilo also recognized the
importance of securing the more formal Islamic vote, and his
teaming up with Jusuf Kalla delivered not just Sulawesi, but
opened the door to official support from the devoutly Islamic
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and the Crescent Star Party (PBB).
Kalla's own Islamic credentials are, in this respect, very
strong, drawing on South Sulawesi's Islamic tradition, including
its support for the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) in the
1950s.

This is to say that while Susilo carries with him a
perception of political "cleanness", he has increasingly become
surrounded by supporters and hangers-on who only sometimes come
up smelling of roses.

This varied group around Susilo will deliver to him his first
major test, when it comes time to reward supporters but otherwise
attempt to put in place a Cabinet and administrative structure
that is not only loyal (or self-serving) but also competent and
committed to the country.

In this, at least Susilo's reputation for maintaining control
might allow him the flexibility to choose an administrative team
based on competence rather than patronage, and to be able to
limit the political fall-out where his appointment has been
forced.

Similarly, Susilo may use the next five years -- assuming no
personal or political catastrophes -- to build a new support base
more firmly based on the Democratic Party and with its roots in
actual policies, which have been notoriously scarce since 1999.
This then might start to see a shift towards voting for ideas
rather than social or patronage groups (aliran), or for cash. It
will be a slow cultural change if it comes about, but if voters
can see their interests served by policies, this has the capacity
to alter the face of Indonesian political parties and their
politics.

Dr Damien Kingsbury is senior lecturer in international
development at Deakin University, Melbourne. He is author of The
Politics of Indonesia, 3rd edition (Oxford) due January 2005.