Part 1 of 2: The evolution of Indonesian democracy
Damien Kingsbury , Jakarta
Although it is yet to be officially announced, it now seems certain that Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) will become Indonesia's next president. After a succession of three presidents whose incumbencies were variously marred, Indonesia may now have an opportunity to look forward to five years of relative political stability and effectiveness. Congratulations on this outcome are, therefore, due.
One must initially congratulate the president-elect for having achieved office with what at the time of writing looked to be a very substantial majority, and for the dignified manner in which he acknowledged his victory. One of the key markers of a true democracy is that the winner rules on behalf of all, and Yudhoyono has announced his desire to bring together supporters of both candidates.
Congratulations, too, are due to the incumbent, Megawati Soekarnoputri, for her own dignity in this matter. Losing an election is not easy. Yet even before the election, predicting the outcome, Megawati had asked her supporters to respect he result. Graceful acceptance of political loss is also a key indicator of a true democracy.
But most importantly, congratulations are due to the Indonesian people for voting in and accepting the outcome of a generally clean and well run democratic process. In all, the election process of 2004 has marked Indonesia's most significant step in the transition to democracy since President Soeharto resigned from office in May 1998.
The political situation that Indonesia now finds itself in, however, is less than perfect. As a presidential candidate, Susilo had the problem of a fledgling party structure competing with the institutional might of both Golkar and the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). Susilo and his Democratic Party largely overcame this problem by making alliances with various interest groups, only some of which could be said to have democratic, much less reformist, credentials.
Susilo's continuing associations with serving and retired military officers gave him an organizational capacity, especially in the provinces.
Like most political campaigns, Susilo's bid for the presidency was funded by a range of business sources, including those that have close business connections with the TNI.
At a local level, much of the campaign process, including in some officially noted cases of the payment for votes, was undertaken by local gangsters who work for or have associations with key Indonesian Military-(TNI)linked business interests, as well as with some provincial level TNI.
In aiming for the presidency, Susilo also recognized the importance of securing the more formal Islamic vote, and his teaming up with Jusuf Kalla delivered not just Sulawesi, but opened the door to official support from the devoutly Islamic Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and the Crescent Star Party (PBB). Kalla's own Islamic credentials are, in this respect, very strong, drawing on South Sulawesi's Islamic tradition, including its support for the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) in the 1950s.
This is to say that while Susilo carries with him a perception of political "cleanness", he has increasingly become surrounded by supporters and hangers-on who only sometimes come up smelling of roses.
This varied group around Susilo will deliver to him his first major test, when it comes time to reward supporters but otherwise attempt to put in place a Cabinet and administrative structure that is not only loyal (or self-serving) but also competent and committed to the country.
In this, at least Susilo's reputation for maintaining control might allow him the flexibility to choose an administrative team based on competence rather than patronage, and to be able to limit the political fall-out where his appointment has been forced.
Similarly, Susilo may use the next five years -- assuming no personal or political catastrophes -- to build a new support base more firmly based on the Democratic Party and with its roots in actual policies, which have been notoriously scarce since 1999. This then might start to see a shift towards voting for ideas rather than social or patronage groups (aliran), or for cash. It will be a slow cultural change if it comes about, but if voters can see their interests served by policies, this has the capacity to alter the face of Indonesian political parties and their politics.
Dr Damien Kingsbury is senior lecturer in international development at Deakin University, Melbourne. He is author of The Politics of Indonesia, 3rd edition (Oxford) due January 2005.