Part 1 of 2: Strategies for RI civil service reform

Part 1 of 2: Strategies for RI civil service reform

Staffan Synnerstrom, Jakarta

Many in Indonesia seem to agree to the need for civil service
reform. But a consensus on what a civil service reform would
imply does not exist. Partly, this is because there has not been
an extensive public debate in which various options have been
discussed and examined. These two articles will elaborate on what
successful civil service reform in Indonesia would require,
hopefully to initiate such a debate.

The articles are partly based on reports published by the
Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Partnership for Governance
Reform. They are also based on experience from other transitional
countries that, similar to Indonesia, have made dramatic changes
from centralized political and planned economic systems to ones
based on democratic institutions and open markets.

To be successful, civil service reform will require clear and
communicated strategies and strong and committed leadership.
Experience from other countries show that when the highest
leadership of a country is behind a reform, it will succeed. If
not, the results easily get lost in turf wars and obstruction.
Changes should be facilitated by well-composed reform teams,
thorough preparations, enforced accountability, increased
transparency, well sequenced and resourced implementation and by
setting up model organizations providing good examples to others.

In addition, successful civil service reform requires external
expertise with comparative knowledge providing guidance,
facilitation and capacity building. The Partnership for
Governance Reform, which in the last few years has emerged as a
unique Indonesian organization that has facilitated reforms
across a wide spectrum of issues and with a diverse set of
partners, is well suited for such a role.

Central to civil service reform is the manner in which staff
positions are categorized and organized. Positions in the
Indonesian civil service are generally not professionally
classified, although some functional positions such as doctors
are. Without professional classification and adequate job
descriptions, anyone, regardless of educational or professional
background, can be put into any position.

That is why, in the Indonesian civil service, engineers can
become auditors or can be assigned to prepare legislation.
Without professional job classification and adequate job
descriptions it is impossible to set up professional selection
criteria for recruitment. It is further impossible to set up
performance criteria and evaluate performance. This is one reason
why Indonesian civil servants are recruited based only on
educational levels and promoted on the basis of seniority and
attendance of certain mandatory training, not on performance.

The Indonesian civil service used to operate with some 2,000
professionally classified jobs up to 1968, when the professional
positions were replaced by the current 17 ranks divided into four
echelons. Given the dramatic shift towards democracy in
Indonesia, it would seem high time to replace the military-like
civil service system introduced by President Soeharto with a
professionally classified civil service, as was the case before
1968.

Job evaluation and job classifications schemes need to be
developed and implemented. Without professional classification of
positions, young people cannot look to the civil service for a
professional career -- rather they look to it for reasons of job
security, pension guarantee, and the possibility to be part of
the fund-sharing taking place within public institutions.

Corruption related to recruitment and promotion is said to be
significant in the Indonesian civil service. Positions and
promotions are traded. "Fit and proper tests" executed behind
closed doors tend to become bargaining sessions rather than tests
of suitability. The practice of selling and buying positions
multiplies corruption, since investments to gain positions need
to be recovered. This devastating practice should be an early and
particularly important target in a civil service reform.

As a consequence of introducing professionally classified
jobs, candidates would have to apply for specific positions with
specific selection criteria ensuring that candidates with the
right educational and professional background would be selected.
Competition and transparency in the selection would further
guarantee that the best candidate would be selected and it would
also prevent trading of positions.

In addition to problems related to job classification, staff
resources are not allocated according to operational needs but
through a superficial procedure aiming to safeguard a certain
number of positions on each level in any organizational unit,
just like in the army. This inflexible way of determining
organizational structures and allocating staff -- "putting the
pyramid in place" -- is wasteful and creates overstaffing in most
organizations.

Instead, staff allocations should be based on real needs
related to the tasks and the workload of an organization and
adequate numbers of professionally classified positions should be
allocated in accordance with those operational needs. All staff
allocations should be reviewed in the yearly budget process.

Functional reviews and staff inspections need to be executed
to determine adequate organizational structures and staff
allocations. The reviews and inspections could in the early stage
target a limited number of institutions and/or districts to
transform them into early model organizations. Such model
organizations could possibly be created in the parts of Aceh
where the administration is to be rehabilitated or at central
level in the KPK or the Attorney General's Office.

In determining how to move forward with civil service reform,
decentralization must be one key. Decentralization has required
many regional governments to expand their workforce to meet their
new obligations, while central ministries have not reduced the
size of the departments where tasks have been transferred to
regional governments.

Since the civil servant payroll determines a large part of
the DAU -- the general block grant that provides the major part
of local governments financing -- overstaffed regional
governments have no incentives to cut down their workforce and
understaffed regional governments do not get resources enabling
them to catch up. As long as budget funds are provided based on
formulae and not on expenditure needs, these kinds of
inequalities and restructuring needs will remain.

Three central bodies -- MenPAN, BKN, and LAN --
have ultimate responsibility for public administration and civil
service issues. The three institutions could be merged into one,
taking on responsibility for the remaining central civil service
functions in a decentralized administration, such as making
general civil service policies and legislation, managing the
database on civil servants, monitoring civil service management,
accrediting training programs and providing advisory services to
line ministries and regional governments.

Staffan Synnerstrom is Governance Advisor at ADB's Indonesia
Resident Mission in Jakarta. He is the editor and co-author of
the Country Governance Assessment Report Indonesia (ADB, 2004).
The views presented in this article are his personal views.
He can be reached on ssynnerstrom@adb.org.