Part 1 of 2: Strategies for RI civil service reform
Staffan Synnerstrom, Jakarta
Many in Indonesia seem to agree to the need for civil service reform. But a consensus on what a civil service reform would imply does not exist. Partly, this is because there has not been an extensive public debate in which various options have been discussed and examined. These two articles will elaborate on what successful civil service reform in Indonesia would require, hopefully to initiate such a debate.
The articles are partly based on reports published by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Partnership for Governance Reform. They are also based on experience from other transitional countries that, similar to Indonesia, have made dramatic changes from centralized political and planned economic systems to ones based on democratic institutions and open markets.
To be successful, civil service reform will require clear and communicated strategies and strong and committed leadership. Experience from other countries show that when the highest leadership of a country is behind a reform, it will succeed. If not, the results easily get lost in turf wars and obstruction. Changes should be facilitated by well-composed reform teams, thorough preparations, enforced accountability, increased transparency, well sequenced and resourced implementation and by setting up model organizations providing good examples to others.
In addition, successful civil service reform requires external expertise with comparative knowledge providing guidance, facilitation and capacity building. The Partnership for Governance Reform, which in the last few years has emerged as a unique Indonesian organization that has facilitated reforms across a wide spectrum of issues and with a diverse set of partners, is well suited for such a role.
Central to civil service reform is the manner in which staff positions are categorized and organized. Positions in the Indonesian civil service are generally not professionally classified, although some functional positions such as doctors are. Without professional classification and adequate job descriptions, anyone, regardless of educational or professional background, can be put into any position.
That is why, in the Indonesian civil service, engineers can become auditors or can be assigned to prepare legislation. Without professional job classification and adequate job descriptions it is impossible to set up professional selection criteria for recruitment. It is further impossible to set up performance criteria and evaluate performance. This is one reason why Indonesian civil servants are recruited based only on educational levels and promoted on the basis of seniority and attendance of certain mandatory training, not on performance.
The Indonesian civil service used to operate with some 2,000 professionally classified jobs up to 1968, when the professional positions were replaced by the current 17 ranks divided into four echelons. Given the dramatic shift towards democracy in Indonesia, it would seem high time to replace the military-like civil service system introduced by President Soeharto with a professionally classified civil service, as was the case before 1968.
Job evaluation and job classifications schemes need to be developed and implemented. Without professional classification of positions, young people cannot look to the civil service for a professional career -- rather they look to it for reasons of job security, pension guarantee, and the possibility to be part of the fund-sharing taking place within public institutions.
Corruption related to recruitment and promotion is said to be significant in the Indonesian civil service. Positions and promotions are traded. "Fit and proper tests" executed behind closed doors tend to become bargaining sessions rather than tests of suitability. The practice of selling and buying positions multiplies corruption, since investments to gain positions need to be recovered. This devastating practice should be an early and particularly important target in a civil service reform.
As a consequence of introducing professionally classified jobs, candidates would have to apply for specific positions with specific selection criteria ensuring that candidates with the right educational and professional background would be selected. Competition and transparency in the selection would further guarantee that the best candidate would be selected and it would also prevent trading of positions.
In addition to problems related to job classification, staff resources are not allocated according to operational needs but through a superficial procedure aiming to safeguard a certain number of positions on each level in any organizational unit, just like in the army. This inflexible way of determining organizational structures and allocating staff -- "putting the pyramid in place" -- is wasteful and creates overstaffing in most organizations.
Instead, staff allocations should be based on real needs related to the tasks and the workload of an organization and adequate numbers of professionally classified positions should be allocated in accordance with those operational needs. All staff allocations should be reviewed in the yearly budget process.
Functional reviews and staff inspections need to be executed to determine adequate organizational structures and staff allocations. The reviews and inspections could in the early stage target a limited number of institutions and/or districts to transform them into early model organizations. Such model organizations could possibly be created in the parts of Aceh where the administration is to be rehabilitated or at central level in the KPK or the Attorney General's Office.
In determining how to move forward with civil service reform, decentralization must be one key. Decentralization has required many regional governments to expand their workforce to meet their new obligations, while central ministries have not reduced the size of the departments where tasks have been transferred to regional governments.
Since the civil servant payroll determines a large part of the DAU -- the general block grant that provides the major part of local governments financing -- overstaffed regional governments have no incentives to cut down their workforce and understaffed regional governments do not get resources enabling them to catch up. As long as budget funds are provided based on formulae and not on expenditure needs, these kinds of inequalities and restructuring needs will remain.
Three central bodies -- MenPAN, BKN, and LAN -- have ultimate responsibility for public administration and civil service issues. The three institutions could be merged into one, taking on responsibility for the remaining central civil service functions in a decentralized administration, such as making general civil service policies and legislation, managing the database on civil servants, monitoring civil service management, accrediting training programs and providing advisory services to line ministries and regional governments.
Staffan Synnerstrom is Governance Advisor at ADB's Indonesia Resident Mission in Jakarta. He is the editor and co-author of the Country Governance Assessment Report Indonesia (ADB, 2004). The views presented in this article are his personal views. He can be reached on ssynnerstrom@adb.org.