Part 1 of 2: Sovereignty can't be shelved

J. Soedjati Djiwandono, Jakarta

I published a book titled, Konfrontasi Revisited (CSIS, 1996), in which I tried to analyze Sukarno's policy of confrontation, first against the Dutch over West Irian, with great success, then soon afterwards against the formation of the Malaysian federation, with no success. As its conceptual framework, I used the role and function of a third party in an international dispute in the context of the Cold War. That helps explain the title of this commentary and in part its arguments.

The current tension between Malaysia and Indonesia over Ambalat may also be described as a confrontation. The position of the two countries, however, is exactly reversed. In the early 1960s, it was an Indonesia confrontation against Malaysia. Now it is a Malaysian confrontation against Indonesia. Still, the issue remains basically the same. It is the issue of sovereignty.

Goodwill is obvious in the suggestion offered by my good friend Makmur Keliat in his article in this paper a few days ago on shelving the issue of sovereignty in the Ambalat dispute so as "to transform Ambalat from a zone of hostility to a zone of functional cooperation through which joint development could be arranged, for instance, by launching joint exploitation programs for the resources in the disputed area".

My main objection to that idea is that such an offer should come from Indonesia, the victimized party by what is definitely an act of aggression by Malaysia, which has transgressed into Indonesia's territory backed by its unilateral declaration of sovereignty over a territory rightly belonging to Indonesia. I do agree that as far as possible the use of force in any form should be avoided in the resolution of a conflict.

Indeed, however, there remains the question that students of international relations can never answered: whether the use of violence among nations can forever be avoided altogether and at all costs. The best that one may hope is that the use of force may be delayed through an endless series of disarmament agreements. And to delay the use of force (war) continually in that way almost means to avoid war.

It is wrong to think that to avoid war may be done by general and total disarmament as many diplomats believe or pretend to believe, for it is not the possession of arms that causes war. On the contrary, the possession of arms is due to an expectation of war among nations, even individuals. People or nations resort to the use of force with the risk of a war because they fail to solve their conflicts by peaceful means, but definitely not because of the possession of arms.

Moreover, physical violence is just one form of violence. I believe there are more basic than just physical forms of violence. The most basic form of violence is injustice. In this sense, it is possible to justify a bloody revolution against extreme or strongly institutionalized injustice. Another basic form of violence, which may be regarded as another form of injustice as far as nation-states are concerned, is transgression of one nation's sovereignty by another nation.

This is by no means a recommendation for the use of violence in the present conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia over Ambalat. Nor is this, however, a recommendation to avoid the resort to violence at all costs!

Indeed, like Sukarno in his confrontation against Malaysia, who was "dizzy with success" -- to borrow the famous words of Joseph Stalin -- because of the recovery of West Irian from the Dutch through his policy of confrontation, the Malaysian leader may have been "dizzy with success" after that country's winning of sovereignty over Sipadan and Ligitan. He may now be so cocky that he is ignoring the good neighborly spirit that made it possible to establish ASEAN in 1967.

That spirit was initiated by Soeharto, Indonesia's leader of the so-called New Order, who put an end to Sukarno's policy of confrontation, whereby Indonesia recognized Malaysia's sovereignty. At the same time, Indonesia, the largest nation in Southeast Asia, was to be "domesticated" within the new association in the sense that within ASEAN Indonesia was rendered less "menacing" to its neighbors. Thus, Indonesia's goodwill has been a significant factor for stability in the Southeast Asia region and for the continued existence of ASEAN, which now includes all the countries in Southeast Asia.

The writer is a political analyst.