Part 1 of 2: Sovereignty can't be shelved

Part 1 of 2: Sovereignty can't be shelved

J. Soedjati Djiwandono, Jakarta

I published a book titled, Konfrontasi Revisited (CSIS, 1996),
in which I tried to analyze Sukarno's policy of confrontation,
first against the Dutch over West Irian, with great success, then
soon afterwards against the formation of the Malaysian
federation, with no success. As its conceptual framework, I used
the role and function of a third party in an international
dispute in the context of the Cold War. That helps explain the
title of this commentary and in part its arguments.

The current tension between Malaysia and Indonesia over
Ambalat may also be described as a confrontation. The position of
the two countries, however, is exactly reversed. In the early
1960s, it was an Indonesia confrontation against Malaysia. Now it
is a Malaysian confrontation against Indonesia. Still, the issue
remains basically the same. It is the issue of sovereignty.

Goodwill is obvious in the suggestion offered by my good
friend Makmur Keliat in his article in this paper a few days ago
on shelving the issue of sovereignty in the Ambalat dispute so as
"to transform Ambalat from a zone of hostility to a zone of
functional cooperation through which joint development could be
arranged, for instance, by launching joint exploitation programs
for the resources in the disputed area".

My main objection to that idea is that such an offer should
come from Indonesia, the victimized party by what is definitely
an act of aggression by Malaysia, which has transgressed into
Indonesia's territory backed by its unilateral declaration of
sovereignty over a territory rightly belonging to Indonesia. I do
agree that as far as possible the use of force in any form should
be avoided in the resolution of a conflict.

Indeed, however, there remains the question that students of
international relations can never answered: whether the use of
violence among nations can forever be avoided altogether and at
all costs. The best that one may hope is that the use of force
may be delayed through an endless series of disarmament
agreements. And to delay the use of force (war) continually in
that way almost means to avoid war.

It is wrong to think that to avoid war may be done by general
and total disarmament as many diplomats believe or pretend to
believe, for it is not the possession of arms that causes war. On
the contrary, the possession of arms is due to an expectation of
war among nations, even individuals. People or nations resort to
the use of force with the risk of a war because they fail to
solve their conflicts by peaceful means, but definitely not
because of the possession of arms.

Moreover, physical violence is just one form of violence. I
believe there are more basic than just physical forms of
violence. The most basic form of violence is injustice. In this
sense, it is possible to justify a bloody revolution against
extreme or strongly institutionalized injustice. Another basic
form of violence, which may be regarded as another form of
injustice as far as nation-states are concerned, is transgression
of one nation's sovereignty by another nation.

This is by no means a recommendation for the use of violence
in the present conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia over
Ambalat. Nor is this, however, a recommendation to avoid the
resort to violence at all costs!

Indeed, like Sukarno in his confrontation against Malaysia,
who was "dizzy with success" -- to borrow the famous words of
Joseph Stalin -- because of the recovery of West Irian from the
Dutch through his policy of confrontation, the Malaysian leader
may have been "dizzy with success" after that country's winning
of sovereignty over Sipadan and Ligitan. He may now be so cocky
that he is ignoring the good neighborly spirit that made it
possible to establish ASEAN in 1967.

That spirit was initiated by Soeharto, Indonesia's leader of
the so-called New Order, who put an end to Sukarno's policy of
confrontation, whereby Indonesia recognized Malaysia's
sovereignty. At the same time, Indonesia, the largest nation in
Southeast Asia, was to be "domesticated" within the new
association in the sense that within ASEAN Indonesia was rendered
less "menacing" to its neighbors. Thus, Indonesia's goodwill has
been a significant factor for stability in the Southeast Asia
region and for the continued existence of ASEAN, which now
includes all the countries in Southeast Asia.

The writer is a political analyst.