Part 1 of 2: Serious, not soft, change in TNI

Part 1 of 2: Serious, not soft, change in TNI

Agus Widjojo, Jakarta

The term de-politicization is central to the whole concept of
reforming the Indonesian Military (TNI). However, it should be
mentioned that this reform is not only about de-politicization.

What then, is TNI reform all about?

Basically the reform starts from the principle that any roles
and consequential authority given to TNI should be based on the
principles of democracy, given the assumption that the 1945
Constitution mandated a democratic political system. In a
democracy, political authority is entrusted in elected public
officials. At an executive level it is the president, at the
regional levels, it is the governors, mayors and regent. It is
these elected public officials who make the political decisions
that are then implemented by their administrations and public
institutions.

The TNI is one of these institutions, charged with defending
the nation in accordance with the wishes of the elected political
authorities. The TNI chief is not an elected public official but
is appointed by the president. It logically follows that the TNI
chief does not hold the authority to make political decisions and
is forbidden to act unilaterally to use the military to respond
to national issues. The TNI should have no positions on political
issues and should only act in accordance with the wishes of the
people's elected representatives, personified by the President
who has the authority to deploy the TNI in emergencies.

If the TNI is misused by the politicians, therefore, they are
able to be held accountable by the voting public.

Based on the above principles, TNI reform is about both
general de-politicization and structural reform. Positioning the
TNI chief under the auspices of the Department of Defense,
relieving the TNI of its powers as the primary institution
responsible for internal security, and adjusting its territorial
command structures by limiting their authority to national
defense matters are essential moves.

The military must also have clearly set out requirements and
restrictions as to how it deals with the civilian population and
non-defense matters, and must conform to general democratic
principles of accountability, transparency and civilian control.

If we assume that the above concept depicts the scope and
objectives of TNI reform, then they should also be commonly
understood by the political authorities. In this case regarding
the executive powers, it is the president who has the authority
to establish national defense policies; which are scrutinized by
the legislative powers -- the People's Consultative Assembly
(MPR) consisting of the House of Representatives (DPR), and the
Regional Representatives (DPD) -- the TNI and the public. All
groups must agree to this system if it is to work.

If a common understanding is not reached, then there may be no
real hard reform in the TNI. But confusion, ambivalence and
disorientation are typical conditions of a democratic transition,
and Indonesia is not immune. While the old arrangements are being
torn down, the new structure has not yet been completely
established and the effectiveness of the political institutions
that have replaced the TNI's dwifungsi (dual function) role has
yet to be realized.

This kind of situation creates uncertainties and people are
prone to looking back favorably to the stable but undemocratic
past.

This is not surprising in a traditional society that values
the status quo more than change and orients more to the past than
to the future because the future implies uncertainty.

The historical fact that the TNI has long been an important
player in Indonesian politics with a solid and effective
organization helps it continue to be a force to be reckoned with
in Indonesian politics and the military establishment seems keen
to keep its powers through its support of presidential
candidates.

This was evident when Art. 19 of (the previous) TNI draft
bill, which in crucial issues gave the military independent
powers to act, was publicly supported by high-ranking civilian
political figures, regardless of the fact that it contradicted
fundamental principles of civil supremacy.

This is only one obvious example; there are many others that
have missed public attention. The public and the politicians
often still subscribe to the point of view that the military is
still the sole guardian of the nation and that only TNI can hold
the country together, without being aware that doing so is
tantamount to recognizing the TNI as a political power.

We should not forget that whatever happens to the country,
political accountability rests in the power of the President, not
the military, because the TNI chief has no direct relationship to
the people, because this chief is not elected by the people.

The historical record of civil-military relations in Indonesia
does not make the idea of military reform look likely.
With hindsight, there is a main thread running through Indonesian
history, that at every instance Indonesia launches an experiment
of democratization, establishing civil supremacy in the context
of civil-military relations, there is a tendency that civilian
authorities lack the confidence to exercise their
constitutionally acquired political power effectively, and in
turn they tend to turn to the military for political support.

From the military's point of view, their reluctance to let go
of their guardianship role, has not been helped by the inferior
performance of the political institutions to come up with
effective governance.

This ineffective performance of political institutions in the
minds of many justifies the military elite's desire to cling to
power. This, however, is a typical symptom of a democratic
transition, and it would be unrealistic to expect instant
results.

The correct identification of the problem and an understanding
of the issues are therefore vital.

A major problem that occurred after the separation of the
police and the TNI was the issue of the authorities and roles of
both law enforcement agencies.

In the past, when the police were part of the Indonesian Armed
Forces (ABRI), this blanket organization was responsible for
internal security. After the separation it seemed natural to
divide the powers of both institutions.

However, this division ended up deepening the gap between the
TNI and the police. But what those in both institutions forget is
that they are supposed to exist as instruments of state power
answerable to the courts and the political authorities.

No role given to TNI or the police exist as automatic,
bypassing the political decision making.

Both bodies have explicit set out roles and may only intervene
in the other's affairs in cases where they are ordered to do so
by politicians or other civil authorities, as in cases of
national disasters, where the military capabilities will better
handle the extreme nature of the threat.

The writer is a senior fellow at Centre for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS) and a senior advisor of the UNSFIR
-- a joint project between the Indonesian government and the
United Nations Development Program. He is also a former
Indonesian Military chief of territorial affairs.