Part 1 of 2: Serious, not soft, change in TNI

Agus Widjojo, Jakarta

The term de-politicization is central to the whole concept of reforming the Indonesian Military (TNI). However, it should be mentioned that this reform is not only about de-politicization.

What then, is TNI reform all about?

Basically the reform starts from the principle that any roles and consequential authority given to TNI should be based on the principles of democracy, given the assumption that the 1945 Constitution mandated a democratic political system. In a democracy, political authority is entrusted in elected public officials. At an executive level it is the president, at the regional levels, it is the governors, mayors and regent. It is these elected public officials who make the political decisions that are then implemented by their administrations and public institutions.

The TNI is one of these institutions, charged with defending the nation in accordance with the wishes of the elected political authorities. The TNI chief is not an elected public official but is appointed by the president. It logically follows that the TNI chief does not hold the authority to make political decisions and is forbidden to act unilaterally to use the military to respond to national issues. The TNI should have no positions on political issues and should only act in accordance with the wishes of the people's elected representatives, personified by the President who has the authority to deploy the TNI in emergencies.

If the TNI is misused by the politicians, therefore, they are able to be held accountable by the voting public.

Based on the above principles, TNI reform is about both general de-politicization and structural reform. Positioning the TNI chief under the auspices of the Department of Defense, relieving the TNI of its powers as the primary institution responsible for internal security, and adjusting its territorial command structures by limiting their authority to national defense matters are essential moves.

The military must also have clearly set out requirements and restrictions as to how it deals with the civilian population and non-defense matters, and must conform to general democratic principles of accountability, transparency and civilian control.

If we assume that the above concept depicts the scope and objectives of TNI reform, then they should also be commonly understood by the political authorities. In this case regarding the executive powers, it is the president who has the authority to establish national defense policies; which are scrutinized by the legislative powers -- the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) consisting of the House of Representatives (DPR), and the Regional Representatives (DPD) -- the TNI and the public. All groups must agree to this system if it is to work.

If a common understanding is not reached, then there may be no real hard reform in the TNI. But confusion, ambivalence and disorientation are typical conditions of a democratic transition, and Indonesia is not immune. While the old arrangements are being torn down, the new structure has not yet been completely established and the effectiveness of the political institutions that have replaced the TNI's dwifungsi (dual function) role has yet to be realized.

This kind of situation creates uncertainties and people are prone to looking back favorably to the stable but undemocratic past.

This is not surprising in a traditional society that values the status quo more than change and orients more to the past than to the future because the future implies uncertainty.

The historical fact that the TNI has long been an important player in Indonesian politics with a solid and effective organization helps it continue to be a force to be reckoned with in Indonesian politics and the military establishment seems keen to keep its powers through its support of presidential candidates.

This was evident when Art. 19 of (the previous) TNI draft bill, which in crucial issues gave the military independent powers to act, was publicly supported by high-ranking civilian political figures, regardless of the fact that it contradicted fundamental principles of civil supremacy.

This is only one obvious example; there are many others that have missed public attention. The public and the politicians often still subscribe to the point of view that the military is still the sole guardian of the nation and that only TNI can hold the country together, without being aware that doing so is tantamount to recognizing the TNI as a political power.

We should not forget that whatever happens to the country, political accountability rests in the power of the President, not the military, because the TNI chief has no direct relationship to the people, because this chief is not elected by the people.

The historical record of civil-military relations in Indonesia does not make the idea of military reform look likely. With hindsight, there is a main thread running through Indonesian history, that at every instance Indonesia launches an experiment of democratization, establishing civil supremacy in the context of civil-military relations, there is a tendency that civilian authorities lack the confidence to exercise their constitutionally acquired political power effectively, and in turn they tend to turn to the military for political support.

From the military's point of view, their reluctance to let go of their guardianship role, has not been helped by the inferior performance of the political institutions to come up with effective governance.

This ineffective performance of political institutions in the minds of many justifies the military elite's desire to cling to power. This, however, is a typical symptom of a democratic transition, and it would be unrealistic to expect instant results.

The correct identification of the problem and an understanding of the issues are therefore vital.

A major problem that occurred after the separation of the police and the TNI was the issue of the authorities and roles of both law enforcement agencies.

In the past, when the police were part of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI), this blanket organization was responsible for internal security. After the separation it seemed natural to divide the powers of both institutions.

However, this division ended up deepening the gap between the TNI and the police. But what those in both institutions forget is that they are supposed to exist as instruments of state power answerable to the courts and the political authorities.

No role given to TNI or the police exist as automatic, bypassing the political decision making.

Both bodies have explicit set out roles and may only intervene in the other's affairs in cases where they are ordered to do so by politicians or other civil authorities, as in cases of national disasters, where the military capabilities will better handle the extreme nature of the threat.

The writer is a senior fellow at Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and a senior advisor of the UNSFIR -- a joint project between the Indonesian government and the United Nations Development Program. He is also a former Indonesian Military chief of territorial affairs.