Part 1 of 2: Real military reform depends on civilians

Juwono Sudarsono, London

Six years after "the cessation of office" by President Soeharto on May 21, 1998, the Indonesian Military (TNI) remains the most powerful instrument of governance that has the ability to keep the country together. Despite the plethora of political reforms launched by presidents B.J. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Soekarnoputri all committed to building an accountable military, subject to a democratic "civilian control", the residual de facto power of the TNI in politics remains strong for at least the medium term.

Six years of civilian-based party politics has not resulted in any measurable degree of effective "civilian supremacy", much less "civilian control". On paper, there has been much declaratory formalisms of politically correct rhetoric on civilian supremacy: A "return to the barracks" commitment to political neutralism, reduction of the military's role in the national parliament and a myriad of laws passed acknowledging the imperative for civilian authority.

But seasoned politicians and political observers acknowledge that TNI influence, if not power, retains a strong hold over the entire polity. The after effects of dwi-fungsi (dual function) of the military, going back to July 5, 1959, when President Sukarno decreed a return to the 1945 Constitution formalizing the TNI as an integral participant of national politics, lingers pervasively on.

There are several reasons why effective civilian control, as distinct from the formalities of civilian authority, remains both vague and weak.

First and foremost, organized civilian politics at governmental, legislative and the grass roots levels is still largely disjointed, disorganized and often in disarray. Having been instilled with a strong dose of the doctrine of military supremacy over the civilians for over half of their lifetime, the TNI officer corps remain reluctant to respect and adhere to civilian control of the military so long as the civilian politicians have little inclination or ability to control and consolidate their party organizations.

Secondly, presidents Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati all kept hold of the Soeharto-period format of maintaining the presence of the Commander of the TNI and the Chief of the National Police (Polri) in cabinet sessions, acknowledging them on a parallel with, rather than answerable to, the defense minister and the interior minister. Even the legislative reforms following on the "New Paradigm" on the roles of the military and police sanctify this hybrid arrangement. Significantly, all chief ministers of security during the post Soeharto cabinets (Wiranto and Soerjadi Sudirdja under Habibie and Wahid; Ssusilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Agum Gumelar under Wahid; Yudhoyono and Hari Sabarno under Megawati) has been held by officials with military backgrounds.

The all-important interior minister, that ultimate symbol of civilian power, has to date been always held by a retired general (Syarwan Hamid under Habibie, Soerjadi Sudirdja under Wahid, Hari Sabarno under Megawati). All come from the Army, the most politically powerful service. At the provincial, district and local levels, a high percentage of the district and local levels are held by retired military officers. All in all, civilian authority and management skills remain weak.

Third and not least important, the TNI retains a powerful independent financial base, partly funded through the government budget through the ministry of finance and the ministry of defense but independently supplemented by a myriad of foundations, cooperatives and enterprises. The history of these off-budget sources of funding reaches back to the early 1950s when most commands and tactical units in each service were left to themselves to find ways and means to supplement the government's inadequate defense and security budgets.

The proportion of government- to non-government-funded military budgets over the years is a matter of contention among analysts, with estimates differing about the percentage (30:70; 40:60) depending on the benchmarking of calculations.

Against this background, the following is a proposed agenda for a national commitment for military reform and defense planning:

o Strengthening political party and civilian institutions:

A major priority for effective military reform requires a stronger institutional capacity of political parties and civic institutions who understand the urgency to build an accountable, transparent and professional defense force. A major concerted effort is required to build strong civilian political institutions that can effectively challenge and eventually supplant the TNI's long dominant role over the sinews of political power at all levels of political governance.

Indonesia has a long way to go before the required social and economic institutional underpinnings that facilitate the strengthening of political parties and civic organizations. The "magic figure" ascribing readiness for political democracy is that at least 30 percent of the population are members of the middle class, defined as earning at least US$3-4,000 per capita annual income. Since the economic crisis of 1997-1998, Indonesia's per capita annual income has fallen from $1,300 to $850, leading to a sharp downturn in social stability and to increased political unrest and violence during the difficult years of 1998-2001.

Though economic recovery since 2001 has helped restored political stability and social reconciliation there remains much anger and frustration among those who are despondent and desperate as a result of job losses. The road to substantive democracy will remain rocky and full of glitches until Indonesia quadruples both its GDP per capita and the size of our middle class.

Political party and civic leaders must understand that strengthening political and civic institutions are imperative if the general problem of democratic governance, especially in times of widespread poverty and unemployment, is to be seriously addressed. In the past, acceptance of military dominance in the commanding heights of government had been justified by civilian incompetence, intra-party bickering and policy paralysis. Until there is clear, coherent and consistent civilian political leadership and party building, the TNI's effective power will remain unchallenged. Until there are strong civilian institutions, military reform will be largely decided by the military.

The writer is an Ambassador to the United Kingdom and former minister of defense. This article is personal view