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Papua's case in the eyes of the European Commission

| Source: JP

Papua's case in the eyes of the European Commission

Neles Tebay, Pontifical University of Urbaniana, The Jakarta Post,
Rome

The Indonesian government has begun intensifying efforts to
settle the Papua conflict by making it one of its main
priorities, given reports that the government will launch
diplomatic approaches to foreign countries to request support
regarding Indonesia's territorial integrity, including the
province of Papua.

One institute that needs to be approached is the Brussels-
based European Commission (EC). Before lobbying the institute,
the government needs to be informed of the EC's stance regarding
Papua.

It is good to know that the EC sent an independent mission to
Indonesia last year, including Papua, to assess the potential for
supporting conflict prevention. The mission published its report,
which has been available online since June 26, 2002. This means
that the Papua issue is not something new for the EC.

The report points out three sources of the conflict in Papua:
First, it is related to the 1969 Act of Free Choice. The report
says, "Indonesian troops immediately took control of the
territory, and the 'Act of Free Choice', which took place on Aug.
2, 1969, was never more than a farce. A grand total of 1,025
Papuans, all selected by the Indonesian authorities, were
permitted to vote -- with virtually no UN monitoring -- on the
future of West Papua's 800,000 inhabitants.

"Not too surprisingly, they unanimously voted to remain in
Indonesia, and the territory became an autonomous province in the
same year and was renamed Irian Jaya ('Victorious Irian') in
1973."

The second source of the conflict, the report said, was the
ethnic and religion distinctions between non-Papuans and Papuans
due to the influx of migrants. The total population of Papua was
estimated at 1,800,000 and there was an estimated 770,000
migrants living in Papua. Many Papuans feel that they had been
reduced to being second-class citizens in their homeland, and
became victims of prolonged discrimination.

The third source of the conflict is the unfair revenue
policies over the allocation of Papua's vast natural resources
between the province and Jakarta. In addition to this, the report
recognized that the Indonesian development policies had created
widespread environmental destruction in Papua.

In addition to these three, the mission reported that Papua
had the poorest health standards of all Indonesian provinces.

Regarding the deployment of the troops in Papua, the mission
said that "actions by the security forces in Papua remain
significant grievances of local people, where intimidation and
fear for violence have become a part of their lives."

In regards the special autonomy for Papua, the mission
recognized that it gave much authority to the local government in
Papua. On the one hand, the special autonomy, if implemented
properly, would create new room for "freedom" in relation to
well-being and human rights.

On the other hand, the mission indicated that the special
autonomy bill for Papua failed to address the political case of
Papua, which is "the call for political freedom". It is hence "a
partial response, but still a real response."

The mission also discovered that in Papua "there remains
strong but peaceful support for independence, with uncertainty
and some resistance toward the bill" on the part of the Papuans.
The mission reminded that continued security operations in Papua
would also increase the public rejection of special autonomy.

In its executive summary, the mission highlighted some
problems to be addressed. These include: the accountability of
past human rights violations; the history of Papua's merger into
Indonesia; the limited space for Papuan cultural expression and
the status of the Morning Star flag of those who advocate for
Papua's independence; strong racial and prejudicial attitudes;
social and economic inequalities between Papuans and non-Papuans;
the lack of democratic accountability and transparency in local
government; and the role of the military in Papua.

A few of the recommendations are that the commission support
the implementation of special autonomy to meet the needs of the
people of Papua, to support the police in developing a more
effective police force, and to strengthen civil society and
democratic institutions.

Among other recommendations to the Indonesian government, the
mission said, "there is a need for the government to develop
policies and credible processes to address (a) past injustices,
human rights abuses and the historical events surrounding the
integration of Papua into Indonesia, (b) racial discrimination in
Papua, (c) needs for improvement in governance and civilian
control over the military."

From the report, we can glean several things. First, the
report recognizes the presence of the Papuan aspiration for
independence, but does not recommend the EC to support the
independence movement in Papua.

Second, the report brings to light the problems in Papua that
should be addressed by the Indonesian government.

Third, it is certain that the EC will continue to support
Indonesian territorial integrity, including Papua, even without
launching a diplomatic approach.

Fourth, having its own report on the problems in Papua, the EC
might closely follow how the Indonesian government addresses
these problems.

Fifth, the Indonesian government could inform the EC that
special autonomy is the final solution for Papua. But the EC
might also ask how the central government plans to support the
implementation of special autonomy.

Therefore, the government should be ready to explain why it
continues to delay its approval of establishing the Papuan
People's Assembly (Majelis Rakyat Papua, or MRP), which is
already included in the bill and is very crucial for the
implementation of special autonomy in Papua.

Sixth, it would be helpful for Indonesian diplomatic relations
with foreign countries if the government has clear policies and
credible processes to address the problems in Papua, including
the unresolved human rights violations in the past, the
controversial 1969 Act of Free Choice, racial discrimination, and
civilian control over the military in Papua.

The EC could ask, "OK, we support the territorial integrity of
your country, but how are you going to solve the problems in
Papua?"

The EC might want to know the Indonesian government's response
to the Papuans' call for a genuine dialog raised since 2000.

It would be more convincing for all parties if the policies
and credible processes were worked out by both the Indonesian
government and the Papuans in a genuine dialog.

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