Papuans need democracy not separatism

Papuans need democracy not separatism

Andri Hadi, Jakarta

Efforts by certain quarters, within and outside Indonesia, to
question the decolonization process in Papua gain a momentum by
the declassification of restricted documents in the U.S.
recently.

The documents portray the 1969 "Act of Free Choice" (AFC) as a
sham, among others because it excluded most Papuans (The Jakarta
Post, July 16, 2004). Arguably, this development may provide
ammunition to the hands of people pursuing the separatist
aspiration in Papua, thus endangering Indonesia's territorial
integrity and its democracy.

Questioning the decolonization process serves no purpose at
all. The main pretext used by certain quarters to meddle in Papua
is about upholding and promoting human rights, justice and
welfare for the Papuans. Admittedly, these are all important
issues that have to be pursued honestly of which the present-day
democratic Indonesia serves as the best framework. Hence,
justifying separatism is wrong and will lead nowhere in terms of
redressing those important grievances.

Law No 21/2001 issued by the Government of Indonesia on Nov.
21, 2001 grants Special Autonomy Status to Papua and represents
an honest attempt to give an opportunity for the Papuans to
manage their own household. The Law also contains a generous
scheme for revenue sharing in which Papua will receive around 80
percent of the money derived from forestry, fishery, taxation, as
well as gas, oil and other mining explorations.

For the Indonesians the reintegration of Papua to the fold of
the motherland, long denied by the Dutch, has exacted a lot of
costs in terms of blood and tears. The Indonesians would
therefore consider the duty to defend the Province as an article
of faith. The status of the Province of Papua as part of
Indonesia is final and was endorsed in 1970 by General Assembly
Resolution 2504.

Let us put the record straight: Papua was an integral part of
the Netherlands East Indies (NEI). From administrative point of
view, the Dutch colonial government administered from Batavia
(presently Jakarta) the whole territory of NEI. From territorial
point of view, the indivisibility of Papua as part of NEI was
recognized in the London Agreement of 1824 between Great Britain
and the Netherlands as well as reflected in the 1825 Map of the
NEI which places Papua as its easternmost boundary.

When declaring independence, Indonesia's founding fathers
refer to the whole territory of NEI as the legitimate territory
of Indonesia. This is in line with the principle of "Usi
Posidentis" in which the successor state would inherit the whole
territorial boundary of a colony. As far as Indonesians are
concerned, the 1945 proclamation of independence was in itself an
act of self-determination, covering the whole territory of
Indonesia from Sabang to Merauke.

Self-determination is a one-off event and in the case of
Indonesia, took place in 1945 in terms of Proclamation of
Independence by Sukarno and Hatta. As such, all ethnic groups in
Indonesia were automatically subsumed into the Republic of
Indonesia without even being asked by way of "act of free
choice". In this context, the Papuans are "more fortunate" than
other ethnic groups in Indonesia simply because they were given
the chance to express their choice in 1969.

Furthermore, Indonesia's nationalism is not based on certain
ethnicity but possesses the nature of all-inclusiveness. This is
the very reason why the concept of "indigenous people" with its
possible implication that each group has its own right of self-
determination is not applicable in Indonesia's context.

Indonesia embraces a long standing stance that decolonization
process should be implemented once and for all for the whole
territory of NEI, in the sense that no part of the former colony
(i.e. Papua) should be treated differently. This stance -
justified as it is in international law - represents one of the
roots of Indonesias irredentist claim over Papua.

It is also to be borne in mind that UN General Assembly
Resolution 1514 (1960) concerning the right of decolonization did
not mandate the application of the "one man one vote" system as
the only way for decolonization process. Most importantly, the
resolution underlined that self determination shall not result in
a partial or total destruction of sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the successor states.

It is important to note that following the adoption of
Resolution 1514 (1960), many new states in Africa came into being
in the 1960s without resorting to a plebiscite or "one man one
vote system". In our immediate region, Sabah and Sarawak were
also incorporated into Malaysia in 1963 without direct "one man
one vote" plebiscite but by certification of a visiting UN
mission that the people in these two regions seemingly did wish
to joint the newly established Federation of Malaysia.

The legacy of colonialism has also compounded the application
of "one man one vote" system. As we know, colonialism brings
about a condition in which many countries in the Third World
consist of many different ethnicities which are often
crisscrossing and straddling states borders in a complex pattern.
Henceforth, the rigid application of "one man one vote" system
would be detrimental to the existing state borders and may
provoke unnecessary conflicts.

In its attempt to reintegrate Papua, Indonesia used a range of
methods, including coercive diplomacy. After it was clear that
international situation (due to the height of the Cold War)
militated against the Dutch continuing its retention of Papua, an
opportunity was therefore ripe for the conclusion of the New York
Agreement in 1962, which was basically a face saving formula for
the Dutch. The final outcome of the Agreement was considered as
granted, namely the ultimate reintegration of Papua into
Indonesia.

As a matter of fact, the 1962 Agreement never defines the
method with which the AFC should be conducted in Papua.
Therefore, there is no obligation for Indonesia to employ "one
man one vote" system for the AFC, especially in the light of
difficult circumstances in Papua at that time, both relating to
the human and social conditions as well as to the geographical
situation and its inherent technical problems.

In this regard, one could not but observe with regret the
tendency to use "present lens" to interpret past event taking
place in Papua. Interpretation of such a mode will obviously be
misleading as well as out of context.

In conclusion, the AFC in Papua should be seen within the
context of bilateral agreement between Indonesia and the
Netherlands as well as the overall circumstances in Papua in the
late 1960s of which employing the "one man one vote" system was
not possible nor practical.

From the Indonesian perspective, Papua is first and foremost
an irredentist claim due to the Dutch recalcitrance to return it
to the fold of Motherland and the General Assembly resolution
2504 (1970) has sealed its final status within Indonesia.

The unified and democratic Indonesia is the best framework to
correct the perceived injustice in Papua. In this regard, the
international community should support Indonesia's attempt to
consolidate its democracy. Indeed, fanning separatist sentiment,
including questioning the AFC under the pretext of reestablishing
history, would only weaken Indonesia's efforts to strengthen the
democratic process.

Needless to say, separatism is a solution in search of problem
and best to be avoided.

The writer is the Director for Public Diplomacy and Head of
the Working Group on Papua at the Department of Foreign Affairs,
Republic of Indonesia.