Papua problems: More pebbles in Jakarta's shoes?

Aboeprijadi Santoso, The Hague

A Dutch study on Papua, charged with political implications for Indonesia, has been greeted with rejoicing by many Papuans, and led to controversy in the Netherlands and growing concern about the prospects for Papua.

Nov. 15, 2005, will go down in history as an important day for Papuans as Prof. P.J. Drooglever's long awaited study, Een Daad van Vrije Keuze (An Act of Free Choice), was finally launched in The Hague. The Dutch-commissioned report has now confirmed international findings that the UN held "vote" in 1969, that put Papua under Indonesian sovereignty, was "a sham" -- a conclusion likely to strengthen the pro-independence Papuan perspective and the international criticism of Papua's integration into Indonesia.

Jakarta has always considered Papua its province in the legitimate and ultimate sense, and The Hague has stated that it categorically respects Indonesia's territorial integrity. Drooglever's work, though, is not a political document, but a study written at the request of the Dutch Foreign Ministry. Yet the launching of the report has been a delicate and sensitive affair precisely because of its conclusions.

Neither Indonesian diplomats nor Dutch government officials, both moving in tandem, were willing to attend. Foreign Minister Bernhard Bot refused to officially receive the book, which he dismissed as "superfluous" despite it being sponsored by his ministry. Instead, it was presented to his predecessor, Joziaas van Aartsen, the man who actually gave the go-ahead to the study.

The two governments' conspicuous silence indicates a cautious, but undeclared concern that Drooglever's findings might complicate the issue of Papua by provoking Papuan and international demands for a "historical rectification" of the 1969 vote, i.e. a new referendum.

Few anticipated such a prospect when, following President Abdurrachman "Gus Dur" Wahid's opening up toward Papua in 1999, a Dutch-Papua lobby proposed a historical study on Papua. But, then Foreign Minister J. van Aartsen, perhaps naively, agreed without seeking parliamentary consent or considering its implications.

The proposal by two legislators from small Christian-based parties, E. van Middelkoop and G. van den Berg, thus resulted in the Drooglever assignment. But, much to their dismay, Gus Dur was deposed a year later and, worse, the special autonomy offered and welcomed by the Papuans in 2001 has since been effectively decapitated by the division of the province, resulting in growing local resistance.

Thus, the success of the Papua lobby and Drooglever's publication in the Netherlands, came just as the condition in Papua has grown worse, leaving Jakarta and The Hague with its consequences.

Minister Bot, anxious to guard the improved relationship with Indonesia, has denied that The Hague was responsible for the Drooglever assignment. Indeed, recognizing that the project would be viewed as an unfriendly act to a friendly country, Bot took a historic step, acknowledging Indonesia's Aug. 17, 1945 independence day. Neither is the Dutch parliament planning to do anything with Drooglever's findings. Yet van Aartsen and the Papua lobby, the "heroes" at launch day, maintained, "the book is about our (Dutch) history", hence, the government's sponsorship.

Viewed from the Papuan perspective, however, Drooglever's publication -- precisely because it was commissioned by the Dutch administration -- has assumed an importance that it is hoped will take Papua to a new departure after decades of abuse, inconsistencies and confusion.

In particular, it is seen as opening up an opportunity for encouraging a dialog on "historical rectification" as demanded by the historic Second Papua People's Congress of 2000 -- the first ever Pan Papua mass meeting, which significantly defined the parameters of Papuan identity, dignity and objectives.

Certainly, no book will by itself change history, but Drooglever's publication has started a momentum that could bring Papuan politics into line with history. The presence, therefore, of a dozen representatives of key Papuan organizations at the seminar is a clear sign of a new determination among Papuans to pursue a peaceful struggle to encourage the international community to help Papuans rectify history.

Ironically, the Papua issue has always evoked sympathy from among the paternalistic conservatives, including the Dutch Foreign Minister of the 1960s and 1970s, Joseph Luns -- the last Dutch "imperialist" and champion of Papuan rights.

P.J. Drooglever has no doubt written a credible and most comprehensive study on Papua. He recognizes that the Papua issue began after the Dutch raised the idea of zelf-beschikkingsrecht (right to self-determination) at the Linggardjati talks (1948) and put it in the Round Table Agreement (1949). However, President Sukarno and Foreign Minister Soebandrio's successful diplomacy cornered Joseph Luns after the two Kennedys, John and Robert, threw U.S. support behind Indonesia.

The sham that thwarted a free vote began after Gen. Soeharto declared he would only accept the results if Papua, then called West Irian, joined Indonesia. Based on archives and testimony, Drooglever argues, the 1969 vote was not, in fact, held quite in accordance with the 1962 New York Agreement. In fact, there was no vote at all as the process went through stages where decisions were taken collectively by carefully selected Papuans on the basis of written prescriptions -- often with intimidation and threats of violence forming the backdrop.

It seems unfair for Jakarta to deal with the problems in Papua without addressing the very issues the Papuans themselves have been raising since the 2000 Papuan People's Congress. Like Aceh's pro-referendum mass meetings and the pro-democracy manifestations elsewhere in Indonesia during the late-1990s, the forgotten Papuan congress produced genuine expressions of local aspirations that need to be respected.

To restore Papuan dignity means to rectify history. Papuans need peace and dialog, and to be made the masters in their own land -- without having to endure ever-changing rules from Jakarta. The New Order's total failure to win hearts and minds by combining diplomacy and violence made the East Timor issue -- that "pebble in Jakarta's shoe" -- unbearable the East Timor was finally resolved.

A similar process is now taking place in Aceh with the successful implementation of the Helsinki deal. It's time to learn these lessons and apply them also in Papua.

The writer is journalist with Radio Netherlands.