Papua problems: More pebbles in Jakarta's shoes?

Papua problems: More pebbles in Jakarta's shoes?

Aboeprijadi Santoso, The Hague

A Dutch study on Papua, charged with political implications
for Indonesia, has been greeted with rejoicing by many Papuans,
and led to controversy in the Netherlands and growing concern
about the prospects for Papua.

Nov. 15, 2005, will go down in history as an important day for Papuans
as Prof. P.J. Drooglever's long awaited study, Een Daad van Vrije
Keuze (An Act of Free Choice), was finally launched in The Hague.
The Dutch-commissioned report has now confirmed international
findings that the UN held "vote" in 1969, that put Papua under
Indonesian sovereignty, was "a sham" -- a conclusion likely to
strengthen the pro-independence Papuan perspective and the
international criticism of Papua's integration into Indonesia.

Jakarta has always considered Papua its province in the
legitimate and ultimate sense, and The Hague has stated that it
categorically respects Indonesia's territorial integrity.
Drooglever's work, though, is not a political document, but a
study written at the request of the Dutch Foreign Ministry. Yet
the launching of the report has been a delicate and sensitive
affair precisely because of its conclusions.

Neither Indonesian diplomats nor Dutch government officials,
both moving in tandem, were willing to attend. Foreign Minister
Bernhard Bot refused to officially receive the book, which he
dismissed as "superfluous" despite it being sponsored by his
ministry. Instead, it was presented to his predecessor, Joziaas
van Aartsen, the man who actually gave the go-ahead to the study.

The two governments' conspicuous silence indicates a cautious,
but undeclared concern that Drooglever's findings might
complicate the issue of Papua by provoking Papuan and
international demands for a "historical rectification" of the
1969 vote, i.e. a new referendum.

Few anticipated such a prospect when, following President
Abdurrachman "Gus Dur" Wahid's opening up toward Papua in 1999, a
Dutch-Papua lobby proposed a historical study on Papua. But, then
Foreign Minister J. van Aartsen, perhaps naively, agreed without
seeking parliamentary consent or considering its implications.

The proposal by two legislators from small Christian-based
parties, E. van Middelkoop and G. van den Berg, thus resulted in
the Drooglever assignment. But, much to their dismay, Gus Dur was
deposed a year later and, worse, the special autonomy offered and
welcomed by the Papuans in 2001 has since been effectively
decapitated by the division of the province, resulting in growing
local resistance.

Thus, the success of the Papua lobby and Drooglever's
publication in the Netherlands, came just as the condition in
Papua has grown worse, leaving Jakarta and The Hague with its
consequences.

Minister Bot, anxious to guard the improved relationship with
Indonesia, has denied that The Hague was responsible for the
Drooglever assignment. Indeed, recognizing that the project would
be viewed as an unfriendly act to a friendly country, Bot took a
historic step, acknowledging Indonesia's Aug. 17, 1945
independence day. Neither is the Dutch parliament planning to do
anything with Drooglever's findings. Yet van Aartsen and the
Papua lobby, the "heroes" at launch day, maintained, "the
book is about our (Dutch) history", hence, the government's
sponsorship.

Viewed from the Papuan perspective, however, Drooglever's
publication -- precisely because it was commissioned by the Dutch
administration -- has assumed an importance that it is hoped will
take Papua to a new departure after decades of abuse,
inconsistencies and confusion.

In particular, it is seen as opening up an opportunity for
encouraging a dialog on "historical rectification" as demanded by
the historic Second Papua People's Congress of 2000 -- the first
ever Pan Papua mass meeting, which significantly defined the
parameters of Papuan identity, dignity and objectives.

Certainly, no book will by itself change history, but
Drooglever's publication has started a momentum that could bring
Papuan politics into line with history. The presence, therefore,
of a dozen representatives of key Papuan organizations at the
seminar is a clear sign of a new determination among Papuans to
pursue a peaceful struggle to encourage the international
community to help Papuans rectify history.

Ironically, the Papua issue has always evoked sympathy from
among the paternalistic conservatives, including the Dutch Foreign
Minister of the 1960s and 1970s, Joseph Luns -- the last Dutch
"imperialist" and champion of Papuan rights.

P.J. Drooglever has no doubt written a credible and most
comprehensive study on Papua. He recognizes that the Papua issue
began after the Dutch raised the idea of zelf-beschikkingsrecht
(right to self-determination) at the Linggardjati talks (1948)
and put it in the Round Table Agreement (1949). However,
President Sukarno and Foreign Minister Soebandrio's successful
diplomacy cornered Joseph Luns after the two Kennedys, John and
Robert, threw U.S. support behind Indonesia.

The sham that thwarted a free vote began after Gen. Soeharto
declared he would only accept the results if Papua, then called
West Irian, joined Indonesia. Based on archives and testimony,
Drooglever argues, the 1969 vote was not, in fact, held quite in
accordance with the 1962 New York Agreement. In fact, there was
no vote at all as the process went through stages where
decisions were taken collectively by carefully selected Papuans
on the basis of written prescriptions -- often with intimidation
and threats of violence forming the backdrop.

It seems unfair for Jakarta to deal with the problems in Papua
without addressing the very issues the Papuans themselves have
been raising since the 2000 Papuan People's Congress. Like Aceh's
pro-referendum mass meetings and the pro-democracy manifestations
elsewhere in Indonesia during the late-1990s, the forgotten
Papuan congress produced genuine expressions of local aspirations
that need to be respected.

To restore Papuan dignity means to rectify history. Papuans
need peace and dialog, and to be made the masters in their own
land -- without having to endure ever-changing rules from
Jakarta. The New Order's total failure to win hearts and minds by
combining diplomacy and violence made the East Timor issue --
that "pebble in Jakarta's shoe" -- unbearable the East Timor was
finally resolved.

A similar process is now taking place in Aceh with the
successful implementation of the Helsinki deal. It's time to
learn these lessons and apply them also in Papua.

The writer is journalist with Radio Netherlands.