Papua, integrity and Susilo's presidency

Papua, integrity and Susilo's presidency

Agus Sumule, Manokwari, Papua

The downfall of former president Soeharto on May 21, 1998,
undoubtedly fueled the widespread revival of free speech among
the people -- including Papuans -- in determining their own
future. And as the reform movement, or reformasi, swept across
the archipelago, it revealed itself in Papua with the indigenous
people of the province demanding merdeka -- or simply "M" among
locals -- meaning separation from Indonesia.

Many reasons lie behind this demand, but they can basically be
grouped into three main categories.

First of all are those factors related to human rights
violations. Issues included under this category are
extrajudicial executions, disappearances, torture and arbitrary
detention of civilians, as well as disrespect of the government
and the private sector for the indigenous people's customary
rights to natural resources.

Second, are factors related to Papua's political history. Many
Papuans believe that they have not been given a fair chance to
determine their own future. They claim that the New York
Agreement drawn up in 1962 under the auspices of the United
Nations to end the dispute between Indonesia and the Dutch over
Netherlands New Guinea -- the former name for Papua -- was done
without consulting the Papuan people and without their consent.

Third, are factors related to the unfair distribution of
wealth and social services. Papua is one of the most wealthy
provinces of Indonesia due to its natural resources: minerals,
oil and gas, forest products and fish. Yet, these resources are
continually tapped for the benefit of others. Furthermore, the
Papuans' efforts to claim their rights have met repeatedly with
stern military/police actions.

Fourth, at the micro level is the economic discrepancy that
has already caused social jealousy and is manifested in the
marginalization of the indigenous people in their positions and
role in the modern economy.

As a result, many indigenous Papuans came to believe that 35
years was long enough a time to measure Indonesia's seriousness
in improving the Papuan people's welfare through equal treatment.

Facing the increasing demand for a self-determination ballot
or an independence referendum, the People's Consultative
Assembly, the highest law-making body in the country, reached a
consensus to give Papua the authority to deal with its own
affairs under special autonomy, stipulated in Assembly Decree No.
4/1999.

Despite their skepticism, the Papuan people accepted the
special autonomy as a means to resolve the issue.

In its implementation, however, Jakarta again deceived the
Papuan people with its reluctance to fully enforce Law No.
21/2001 on special autonomy for Papua, a new legislation endorsed
by the government and the House of Representatives.

Fearing that special autonomy would be used as a political
vehicle to promote Papuan independence, former president Megawati
Soekarnoputri delayed the establishment of the Papuan
Consultative Assembly (MRP) and the issuance of necessary
government regulations to enforce the law. Worse, Megawati issued
the controversial Presidential Instruction No. 1/2003 to enforce
Law No. 45/1999 on the division of Papua into three provinces for
security, political and economical interests.

The Papuan people knew that then-chief security minister
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono disagreed with Jakarta's betrayal of the
national consensus on Papua. Consequently, the majority of
Papuans voted for Susilo-Kalla in the presidential election upon
the single hope that he would implement the Special Autonomy Law
on Papua and resolve the issue.

The question remains as to why the Papuans preferred a retired
army general than Megawati, even though many of them had suffered
under the heavy military presence in the province since 1963.
Furthermore, how should Susilo and his administration respond to
their trust and mandate?

Susilo was viewed by many Papuans as the only other minister
in Megawati's Cabinet besides foreign minister Hassan Wirayuda
who was consistent in maintaining that special autonomy was the
solution to the Papua issue.

Obviously, Papuans gave their mandate to Susilo for one
reason: he was perceived as the leader most likely to keep the
government's promises under the Special Autonomy Law on Papua.

He thus has no option but to fulfill this promise during his
presidency.

First, it is imperative that Susilo immediately pledge his
intention to implement special autonomy in Papua fully, and use
the law as the basis for his policies on the province.

Second, Susilo needs to set up a capable institution to assist
him in managing the complex problems of Papua. This institution
should be manned by individuals he trusts -- and equally
important, these individuals must also be accepted by Papuans.

Third, a government regulation on the MRP should be issued
within the first 100 days of the Susilo administration. The draft
regulation was submitted in July 2002 by the provincial
legislature and should have been approved by August of that year,
as stipulated in Article 72 of the Special Autonomy Law on Papua.

Fourth, the controversial Presidential Instruction should be
reviewed. Even without a specific presidential instruction, the
division of Papua into three provinces will eventually take place
as anticipated in Article 76 of the Special Autonomy Law.

As such, the Susilo administration needs to issue the
regulation on MRP, and the province will be divided into three as
stipulated.

Supremacy of law should be the key principle of the Susilo
administration in dealing with the division of Papua. The so-
called "political reality" of Western Papua province, created by
a mere presidential instruction, should be dealt with by using
the Special Autonomy Law.

Fifth, the government must engage in a series of constructive
dialog with different circles in Papuan society.

Finally, it is crucial that the government and the Papuan
people begin preparations for a new era under a fully implemented
special autonomy.

It is no exaggeration to say that special autonomy is the only
remaining option for Indonesia to maintain Papua, peacefully and
constitutionally, as an integral part of the country. If the
Papuan people's trust erodes further due to the inconsistency and
inability of the new administration -- including the local
government -- to deliver the promises made under the Special
Autonomy Law, the national integrity inclusive of Papua will come
under tremendous threat.

If the Susilo administration is serious about the
implementation of special autonomy in Papua, and the Papuan
government and people fulfill their responsibilities, we will
witness a significant improvement in the socio-political
situation in Papua from 2004 to 2009. On the other hand, if
special autonomy fails to be applied during Susilo's term,
Indonesia's nightmare of losing Papua will very likely come true.

The writer is a researcher at Cenderawasih University in
Manokwari, Papua, and is a member of the Task Force for Papua's
Special Autonomy. He can be reached at agussumule@yahoo.com.