Pakistan's unhealthy dependence

Iffat Idris, The Dawn, Asia News Network, Karachi

Imagine if President Pervez Musharraf's journey a week ago on Sunday had ended differently. Imagine if the bomb that blew a huge hole in the Ammar Chowk Bridge had exploded sixty seconds earlier. Imagine Pakistan without President Pervez Musharraf.

What springs to mind? Shock and sadness, of course, at the violent demise of a leader who, despite his many faults, is still more admired than loathed. And questions: "Why was he killed? By whom? How could it happen?" Not a few would answer "fate" and "history" -- no Pakistani military ruler has ever left office voluntarily. But the overwhelming and enduring emotion would be uncertainty.

What will happen to Pakistan? Will Pakistan continue to support the U.S.-led war against terror? Will it continue the "peace process" with India? What will happen on the domestic front? Will liberalism remain the order of the day, or will it presage a return to the old days of state-enforced piety? How will the fundamentalists and militants react? What will happen to the local government system?

A comparable event in many other countries would not generate the same reaction. If Tony Blair died tomorrow, there would be the same shock and sadness, the same questions of why, but not the same uncertainty. Why the difference? Why the uncertainty in Pakistan -- especially given the fact that there is nothing wrong with many of Musharraf's policies?

For the course he has set Pakistan on is generally the right one for the country. Domestically, a drive to curb militancy, sectarianism and religious extremism; and a reform program that takes decision-making to the grassroots and promotes better service delivery.

Internationally, policies that acknowledge international realpolitik (the sole superpower status of the U.S.); and that seek to reduce tension in the region, possibly leading to a permanent resolution of the Kashmir dispute. None of these policies blatantly go against national interest.

One can (and many do) disagree with the motives and/or the wisdom of some of Musharraf's actions. Was the local government system introduced solely to improve the lot of the Pakistani masses, or was it also intended to dilute the power of federal and provincial politicians and create a pro-Musharraf constituency? Is Musharraf's willingness to make concessions to the Indians foolish and short-sighted? Is he going too far in kowtowing to the U.S.? All justifiable questions, but the bottom line remains that his policies are generally designed to serve the national interest.

There are of course exceptions to this. Aside from the way he took power the two big ones are the referendum (an inexcusable abuse of power) and the propensity to appoint military figures to head civilian institutions. The take-over of civilian bodies by men in khaki has been unprecedented under Musharraf.

NAB's transformation from an anti-corruption task force into a coercive stick for the military government to use against non- compliant politicians, is the third big exception.

There is no justification, no national interest service, in any of these. But even with these blemishes, on balance it is hard to find issue with the substance of many of Musharraf's policies. Why then would they be so endangered if he is not at the helm?

The reason, as well as the distinguishing feature that explains the uncertainty here but the lack of it in London, is the way so much in Pakistan is dependent on the person of the national leader -- President Pervez Musharraf. Virtually all major policies implemented by this government originate in the person of Pervez Musharraf.

The decision to support the U.S.-led war against terror, and specifically to cooperate with the American attack on Afghanistan, was purportedly taken by Musharraf while talking on the phone to Colin Powell.

A process of consultation with senior political and other figures did take place -- but only after Musharraf had committed Pakistan to the U.S. side.

The pledge to send Pakistani troops to Iraq was even more blatantly made by the President alone. Within hours of George Bush making the request to him during their Camp David meeting, Musharraf announced on American TV that he had "agreed in principle" to send Pakistani troops.

It was only the popular backlash at home -- strongly against deployment -- coupled with the rising coalition body count in Iraq that prevented Musharraf acting on his pledge. The same could be said of the president's hints about recognizing Israel.

In the "peace process" with India, Musharraf is by far the most prominent player on the Pakistani side. True, Prime Minister Jamali made the official invitation to Vajpayee to come to Pakistan (in the summer), and he announced Pakistan's unilateral cease-fire along the Line of Control.

But no one doubts that those initiatives came from the president and his circle of advisers. Pakistan's latest peace gesture -- flexibility on the UN resolutions on Kashmir -- was made directly by Musharraf.

There was no prior public debate about the concession: No discussion in the National Assembly, or even in the cabinet. The local government system differs somewhat in that it has the collective stamp of military government -- rather than the purely personal stamp of Musharraf -- all over it.

Decentralization in Pakistan owes its creation and early nourishment very much to the army. For a process that seeks to promote grassroots democracy and participation, it was imposed in a distinctly undemocratic top-down manner.

The extent to which "Pakistan" is a one-man show is quite astonishing. But it alone does not account for the vulnerability of Musharraf's policies.

Had the "one man" been elected democratically with a wide support base (like Mahathir Mohamad, for example), his policies would still stand a good chance of surviving without him. But Musharraf's route to power -- a military coup and a rigged referendum -- does not fit that description.

The president owes his position to the strength of the army, and to the willingness of various politicians to cut deals with him and provide the facade of democratic rule. Such foundations do not confer legitimacy or durability.

The risks to the local government system, the normalization process with India, the domestic drive to eradicate sectarianism and so on, stem not from what they are, but from how they were introduced: By a combination of military rule and one-man decision-making. It is this combination -- not the substance of the policies -- that makes them so vulnerable.

Consider the British example again: Policies in Britain (with the possible exception of Britain's Blair-driven participation in the Iraq war) are introduced on the much wider basis of elections, cabinet discussions, and debate and approval in the Parliament.

There is an institutional basis to policy-making in the UK. That institutional basis ensures that even if one foundation stone (Tony Blair) is removed, the whole edifice does not come tumbling down.

This is the most important lesson to be learned from the assassination attempt: The unhealthy dependence of so much in Pakistan on just one man. That dependence has to end.

The basis of policy-making has to be widened -- made collective and institutionalized. Only then can Pakistan face the possibility of Musharraf's departure with -- if not confidence -- at least a measure of equanimity.