Overcoming the fear: PKS and the democratization

Zulkieflimansyah, Jakarta

The argument that one must be cautious of Islamist parties, particularly those operating in a democratic setting, is not new. Rather ironically, such fears have also been used to legitimize the shift toward a more hard-line, authoritarian position. Witness what happened in Algeria when it became likely the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) would win elections there. The United States and Europe quietly endorsed the Algerian military's decision to abandon the electoral process and ban the FIS. This despite the fact that this maneuver would drag Algeria into a protracted conflict with the Islamists.

The fear of Islamist parties hinges on a key/dominant argument: since Islam is regarded as being incompatible with democratic principles such as basic freedoms and universal citizenship, Islamist parties are likely to subvert the democratic process once they come to power. Since a particular brand of Islamic ideology frames these parties, they likely want to implement sharia and establish an Islamic state once they gain access to government. In particular, when Islamist political parties are framed by the ideologies of Muslim thinkers such as Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb and Maulana Maududi, the argument goes, they are likely to subvert the democratic process in the long run.

Iran is often cited as an example of what happens when an Islamic state is established -- power is centralized in the hands of a council of ulema and fundamental rights such as women's rights are grossly violated. The example of Iran continues to be forwarded, despite the fact that the establishment of an Islamic state in the country resulted from a specific revolutionary movement against the rule of the shah, and not via a democratic electoral/party process. Pakistan is also another example often cited even though, yet again, Islamist rule there is tied far more closely with the military then with Maududi's ideal of the Jemaah Islami' forming an Islamic government.

There are those who refrain from making such a strong argument, but instead point to the internal organizational dynamics of Islamist parties. They argue that political parties that are less then democratic in their organizational structure are unlikely to uphold democracy when they gain access to the larger governmental structure. Islamist political parties should be feared because in all likelihood their internal organizational mechanisms involve the absolute/authoritarian power of the ulema in all decision-making, according to this argument.

Both arguments have surfaced with regard to the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesia. The PKS is seen as a potential threat to Indonesia's fledging democratic process since its ideology is said to be tied closely to that of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt. In an article published in the Far Eastern Economic Review, and subsequently reprinted in The Jakarta Post (PKS and the future of RI's democracy, The Jakarta Post, Dec. 5), Sadanand Dhume traced the background of the PKS' leadership and concluded that the overwhelming influence of Hasan al-Banna and the Muslim Brotherhood precluded the party from being able to support Indonesia's democratization.

He wrote that very little separated the ideology of the PKS from that of the terrorist group Jamaah Islamiyah:

"Like Jamaah Islamiyah, in its founding manifesto, the (Prosperous) Justice Party called for the creation of an Islamic caliphate. Like Jamaah Islamiyah, it has placed secrecy -- facilitated by the cell structure both groups borrowed from the Brotherhood -- at the heart of its organization. Both offer a selective vision of modernity -- one in which global science and technology are welcome, but un-Islamic values are shunned. The two groups differ chiefly in their methods: Jamaah Islamiyah is revolutionary; the Justice Party is evolutionary .... Of the two, the Justice Party is by far the larger threat to Indonesia."

But like those who are caught up by the fear of Islamist parties, Dhume makes several erroneous assumptions in pushing his argument. While he rightfully points out that the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood have had substantial influence in the worldview of the PKS leaders, he erroneously assumes that there is a direct and immutable correlation between ideology and practice. He also assumes that this ideology is static and unchanging, frozen in time regardless of context and the practical politics on the ground.

Additionally, he makes far too broad a generalization about the threat from the Muslim Brotherhood, disregarding the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood, particularly in Egypt, has gone through substantial and significance permutations. For example, in the past 25 years of the Muslim Brotherhood, the movement has "morphed from a highly secretive, hierarchical, antidemocratic organization led by anointed elders, into a modern, multivocal political association steered by savvy professionals".

The worldview and practice of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood has evolved, which, as some have argued, has made it far more compatible with democratic processes. One need only look at the evolution in the role of women within the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

There is no denying that the PKS evolved out of a movement that drew its inspiration from the Muslim Brotherhood. But it is important to remember that this movement emerged at a time when Muslim students on Indonesian campuses were confronted with a militaristic, authoritarian regime. The writings of Hasan al- Banna provided inspiration and a vision for many of these students leaders vis-a-vis the state.

In the face of tight state control, Muslim student activists sought to realize an Islamic society that would bring about greater justice for the community. "Islam is the Answer" became the motto and the movement was largely a moral one. There was little thought at the time of forming a political party or gaining access to state power.

It was only when the regime collapsed and Indonesia began to democratize that the movement's leaders had to make the critical decision to transform itself into a political party. The decision was not an easy one since it was unclear whether such a move would shift the focus away from the movement's moral objectives. The ambiguity and confusion over the initial decision to form the Justice Party (PK) ahead of the 1999 general election was a factor in the poor performance of the party that year. It was unable to garner more than 2 percent of the popular vote.

Dr. Zulkieflimansyah is a member of the House of Representatives from the PKS and a lecturer in the postgraduate program at the University of Indonesia's Economics Department. He can be reached at zzulkieflimansyah@yahoo.com.