Overcoming the fear: PKS and the democratization

Overcoming the fear: PKS and the democratization

Zulkieflimansyah, Jakarta

The argument that one must be cautious of Islamist parties,
particularly those operating in a democratic setting, is not new.
Rather ironically, such fears have also been used to legitimize
the shift toward a more hard-line, authoritarian position.
Witness what happened in Algeria when it became likely the
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) would win elections there. The
United States and Europe quietly endorsed the Algerian military's
decision to abandon the electoral process and ban the FIS. This
despite the fact that this maneuver would drag Algeria into a
protracted conflict with the Islamists.

The fear of Islamist parties hinges on a key/dominant
argument: since Islam is regarded as being incompatible with
democratic principles such as basic freedoms and universal
citizenship, Islamist parties are likely to subvert the
democratic process once they come to power. Since a particular
brand of Islamic ideology frames these parties, they likely want
to implement sharia and establish an Islamic state once they gain
access to government. In particular, when Islamist political
parties are framed by the ideologies of Muslim thinkers such as
Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb and Maulana Maududi, the argument
goes, they are likely to subvert the democratic process in the
long run.

Iran is often cited as an example of what happens when an
Islamic state is established -- power is centralized in the hands
of a council of ulema and fundamental rights such as women's
rights are grossly violated. The example of Iran continues to be
forwarded, despite the fact that the establishment of an Islamic
state in the country resulted from a specific revolutionary
movement against the rule of the shah, and not via a democratic
electoral/party process. Pakistan is also another example often
cited even though, yet again, Islamist rule there is tied far
more closely with the military then with Maududi's ideal of the
Jemaah Islami' forming an Islamic government.

There are those who refrain from making such a strong
argument, but instead point to the internal organizational
dynamics of Islamist parties. They argue that political parties
that are less then democratic in their organizational structure
are unlikely to uphold democracy when they gain access to the
larger governmental structure. Islamist political parties should
be feared because in all likelihood their internal organizational
mechanisms involve the absolute/authoritarian power of the ulema
in all decision-making, according to this argument.

Both arguments have surfaced with regard to the Prosperous
Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesia. The PKS is seen as a potential
threat to Indonesia's fledging democratic process since its
ideology is said to be tied closely to that of the Muslim
Brotherhood of Egypt. In an article published in the Far Eastern
Economic Review, and subsequently reprinted in The Jakarta Post
(PKS and the future of RI's democracy, The Jakarta Post, Dec. 5),
Sadanand Dhume traced the background of the PKS' leadership and
concluded that the overwhelming influence of Hasan al-Banna and
the Muslim Brotherhood precluded the party from being able to
support Indonesia's democratization.

He wrote that very little separated the ideology of the PKS
from that of the terrorist group Jamaah Islamiyah:

"Like Jamaah Islamiyah, in its founding manifesto, the
(Prosperous) Justice Party called for the creation of an Islamic
caliphate. Like Jamaah Islamiyah, it has placed secrecy --
facilitated by the cell structure both groups borrowed from the
Brotherhood -- at the heart of its organization. Both offer a
selective vision of modernity -- one in which global science and
technology are welcome, but un-Islamic values are shunned. The
two groups differ chiefly in their methods: Jamaah Islamiyah is
revolutionary; the Justice Party is evolutionary .... Of the two,
the Justice Party is by far the larger threat to Indonesia."

But like those who are caught up by the fear of Islamist
parties, Dhume makes several erroneous assumptions in pushing his
argument. While he rightfully points out that the ideas of the
Muslim Brotherhood have had substantial influence in the
worldview of the PKS leaders, he erroneously assumes that there
is a direct and immutable correlation between ideology and
practice. He also assumes that this ideology is static and
unchanging, frozen in time regardless of context and the
practical politics on the ground.

Additionally, he makes far too broad a generalization about
the threat from the Muslim Brotherhood, disregarding the fact
that the Muslim Brotherhood, particularly in Egypt, has gone
through substantial and significance permutations. For example,
in the past 25 years of the Muslim Brotherhood, the movement has
"morphed from a highly secretive, hierarchical, antidemocratic
organization led by anointed elders, into a modern, multivocal
political association steered by savvy professionals".

The worldview and practice of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood has
evolved, which, as some have argued, has made it far more
compatible with democratic processes. One need only look at the
evolution in the role of women within the Muslim Brotherhood in
Egypt.

There is no denying that the PKS evolved out of a movement
that drew its inspiration from the Muslim Brotherhood. But it is
important to remember that this movement emerged at a time when
Muslim students on Indonesian campuses were confronted with a
militaristic, authoritarian regime. The writings of Hasan al-
Banna provided inspiration and a vision for many of these
students leaders vis-a-vis the state.

In the face of tight state control, Muslim student activists
sought to realize an Islamic society that would bring about
greater justice for the community. "Islam is the Answer" became
the motto and the movement was largely a moral one. There was
little thought at the time of forming a political party or
gaining access to state power.

It was only when the regime collapsed and Indonesia began to
democratize that the movement's leaders had to make the critical
decision to transform itself into a political party. The decision
was not an easy one since it was unclear whether such a move
would shift the focus away from the movement's moral objectives.
The ambiguity and confusion over the initial decision to form the
Justice Party (PK) ahead of the 1999 general election was a
factor in the poor performance of the party that year. It was
unable to garner more than 2 percent of the popular vote.

Dr. Zulkieflimansyah is a member of the House of
Representatives from the PKS and a lecturer in the postgraduate
program at the University of Indonesia's Economics Department. He
can be reached at zzulkieflimansyah@yahoo.com.