Overcoming the fear: PKS and democratization

Overcoming the fear: PKS and democratization

Zulkieflimansyah, Jakarta

PK reconfigured itself into the PKS ahead of the 2004
elections and garnered 7.5 percent of the popular vote, gaining
45 seats in the 550-member House of Representatives and becoming
the seventh largest party in Indonesia. It is this perceived
growth in the strength of the popular support for the PKS that
has led to arguments regarding the potential threat of the party
to Indonesia's democracy. Since the PKS campaigned in a non-
Islamist language in 2004, observers worry there is a hidden
agenda that will rear its head when the time is appropriate.

Such fears need to be conquered and the PKS should be
evaluated objectively as a political party. We must be critical
in rethinking the assumptions of exceptionalism by which we
approach Islamist political parties. Only then can we realize
that like other political organizations, the translation of
ideology into practice is hardly absolute nor is it static for
the PKS.

Similarly, as a political party the PKS has found itself
subject to the same institutional rules of the political game. In
other words, the transformation of the PKS from a movement into a
political party was a significant one. The change was not in name
only nor did it serve as simply a tactical move for the
movement's ultimate aim of establishing an Islamic state (or
worse, as Dhume asserts, an Islamic caliphate).

As a political party, the PKS has had to adapt its ideological
framework to the realities of democratic politics in Indonesia.
The PKS is not confronted with an authoritarian regime that it
must fight against. Instead, it is faced with access to
government via a democratic process, and this has translated into
the practical realities of bargaining as part of a governing
coalition. In other words, the party has to deal with the
necessary compromises with other actors within the political
system, including other political parties and the government.

There are ample examples which point to the complexities
inherent in the PKS functioning as a political party and not just
a religious movement. As the seventh largest political party in
the country, PKS leaders were faced with the option of joining
the governing coalition in 2004 or serving as an opposition in
the legislature. Had the party leaders stuck to the static
framework of the Muslim Brotherhood, it is unlikely the PKS would
have agreed to partake in government.

Yet, the PKS decided to engage with and support the governing
coalition led by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Vice
President Jusuf Kalla. Party leaders were convinced that such
cooperation would add to their political education, including the
art of governing. The party leaders also saw participation as a
means to prevent Islamic radicalism from entrenching itself in
Indonesia as a result of Muslim communities feeling alienated
from participation in the government structure.

Internally, the PKS has also begun to learn the art of
democratic practice. For example, in the run-up to the
presidential election in 2004, PKS leaders had to decide on which
candidate to support. A segment of the party advocated support
for Gen. (ret) Wiranto for pragmatic reasons, chiefly the
calculated chance of Wiranto winning the election. The majority,
however, supported Amien Rais. In the end the Majelis Syuro
(religious council) voted in favor of Amien Rais, despite strong
pressure for the party to throw its weight behind Wiranto.

The government's recent decision to sharply raise fuel prices
is another example of the PKS' political education, particularly
in the art of compromise. As part of the governing coalition, the
PKS had to face the difficult task of supporting the decision
even when it would affect the everyday lives of its constituents.
The decision to support the government was based on the rational
calculation of supporting an unpopular government move for the
longer term benefit of turning the economy around and stabilizing
the democratic process.

At the same time PKS leaders sought to remind the government
of the need to channel the accumulated savings into community-
oriented projects like education for the masses, an important
component of the party's overall objective of improving society.

The fallout from the party's decision to support the
government has been quite real, so much so that the highest
decision-making body in the party, the Majelis Syuro, has had to
reconsider the PKS' continued role as part of the governing
coalition. PKS supporters have been quite vocal in their calls
for the party to reposition itself as an opposition facing the
government, rather than being within the government. Indeed, such
a move would be extremely popular.

However, PKS' leaders have stuck to the need to work with the
government for the overall stability of Indonesia's
democratization process.

One needs to overcome this fear of Islamist parties in order
to evaluate them objectively. There is as yet no single example
of an Islamist party that has successfully gained access to
government via the democratic process and which subsequently went
on to subvert that same democracy. Should the PKS succeed in
becoming one of the two largest parties in Indonesia, it would be
the first Islamist party with the power to form the government.
What it does subsequently can then be judged.

From all indications thus far it is unlikely that the PKS will
undermine the democratic process.

First, its Islamist framework does not necessarily preclude
support for the democratic process, though admittedly more can be
done in terms of the party's approach to issues of plurality and
the role of women in the public sphere. Party leaders are already
cognizant of the issues they have to address as they adapt to the
prevailing process. There are no indications of wanting to
subvert the system, but rather of learning and finding the
balance between the Islamist model they began with and the
existing system of the modern, globalized world.

Second, the best scenario for Indonesia is the evolution of a
well-institutionalized two-party or three-party system. It is
unlikely the PKS will be able to emerge as the sole
dominant/hegemonic political party. It will most likely have to
contend with more secular-oriented, non-Islamist political
parties in government. Continued bargaining and compromise will
remain the political game well into the future. This will serve
as a moderating force for the PKS, whether members like it or
not.

Finally, and more importantly, perhaps, is the fact that as
the party grows it must, in the end, respond to the middle ground
of the electorate. The structural dynamics at play will pressure
the PKS to become a mainstream political party in Indonesia, but
one with the potential capacity and mandate to push for good
governance.

Dr. Zulkieflimansyah is a member of the House of
Representatives from the PKS and a lecturer in the postgraduate
program at the University of Indonesia's Economics Department. He
can be reached at zzulkieflimansyah@yahoo.com.