Outlook for postwar Iraq: Diplomatic rifts

Outlook for postwar Iraq: Diplomatic rifts

Bantarto Bandoro, Editor, 'The Indonesian Quarterly',
Centre For Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),
Jakarta, bandoro@csis.or.id

As U.S.-led troops tightened their grip in and around Baghdad,
political leaders in several countries, including key parts of
the coalition forces, have already begun to reposition themselves
for the next phase of the drama. The past few weeks witnessed a
series of diplomatic maneuvers to search for a common stand on
the future of Iraq. There was a report of a meeting in Belfast
between George W. Bush and Tony Blair, at which the two leaders
discussed scenarios for postwar Iraq.

As war begins to fade into postwar reconstruction, Chancellor
Gerhard Schroeder of Germany, President Jacques Chirac of France
and President Vladimir Putin of Russia plan a meeting in St.
Petersburg to search for a common way forward, which may include
a bid for rapprochement with Washington. UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan is also seeking a consensus on Iraq with the leaders
of France, Germany, Britain and Russia.

The UN's role in postwar Iraq could become as great an
international bone of contention as did the second UN resolution
before the war.

The postwar era seems to be one in which Iraq, by design, is
turning into a ground for new "projects". Political and
diplomatic rifts may emerge between countries that have
anticipated huge benefits, politically and economically, from
such a project.

Though the Bush-Blair summit indicated their common stand on
the future of Iraq, each possessed his own vision about how the
future of Iraq was to be managed. Britain stressed a strong role
for the UN, but the U.S., which has carried the brunt of the
invasion to topple Saddam Hussein, appears to be less
enthusiastic about UN participation in an interim administration.

The idea that London wants to garner wide international
support and UN endorsement for the future of Iraq is, perhaps, to
placate antiwar countries -- particularly France and Germany --
and also to appease widespread international skepticism about the
motives of the U.S. But in a joint press conference with Prime
Minister Blair after the summit, President Bush modified his
language, to talk about a "vital role" for the UN in postwar
Iraq, rather than the secondary role he seemed to have envisioned
in his earlier comments on the role of the UN.

It is doubtful whether the U.S. meant a role for the UN beyond
involvement in delivering food, construction materials and other
humanitarian aid, etc. The UN is likely to be sidelined again, at
least at the outset of the process, in Iraq's rebuilding and
reconstruction. Some members of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations and the European Union strongly advocate that
postwar Iraq be managed outside the UN framework, arguing that
the UN should be the only international institution that
legitimizes all work in postwar Iraq.

If the U.S. is to go ahead with its postwar Iraq plans and
wishes to seek endorsement from the UN Security Council for
example, France and other antiwar countries would likely vote
against a resolution that would give the American and British
belligerents the right to administer Iraq. Differences over how
to run Iraq have put added strain on already tense relations
between the U.S. and several European countries.

Signs that the U.S. will venture forth and go ahead
unilaterally with its plans for postwar Iraq are reflected in the
decision by Bush to dispatch to Iraq a retired American general,
F.J. Walters, to bring democracy and aid to Iraq. It is reported
that he will cooperate with another American retired general,
Jay. Garner, whose task is to lead a postwar administration in
Iraq.

The appointment of Gen. Garner would look too much like an
American consul overseeing an American protectorate in Iraq. This
perception would increase antagonism in the Arab world and has
already angered people in Britain and other European countries.

The problem in Iraq now is not only about designing an interim
government. Public facilities, such as hospitals, schools, roads
and other infrastructure, would have to be fully rebuilt. It is
against such a background that the private sector is seeking a
big role in postwar Iraq. American, J.A Jones construction
company, which has a longstanding record of building and managing
construction of U.S. military bases, for example, has reportedly
shown its preparedness to take part in huge postwar Iraq
projects. Other U.S. companies are also eyeing postwar Iraq.

Worried it could be shut out of business deals in postwar
Iraq, France has reportedly drawn up plans to win French
companies access to lucrative oil and reconstruction contracts,
despite its vigorous opposition to the war.

The strong enthusiasm demonstrated by French companies in the
postwar Iraq project is perhaps due to the concern of the French
that a U.S.-led administration in Iraq would favor companies from
the U.S. and other prowar countries, while penalizing companies
from France.

French companies, many with ties to Baghdad stretching back
for decades, have established themselves as the largest suppliers
of goods to Iraq since a UN trade embargo was partially lifted in
1996. A postwar Iraq is likely to witness severe diplomatic rifts
as well as business competition from the private sector.

If a postwar Iraq is to be seen as a "project", it should be
projected to restoring the activities of the Iraqi state in all
their aspects, with the support of the world community.

Reconstruction of Iraq must also delve into the issue of
power, meaning the transition and transformation from the rule of
a single party to a pluralism of voices and the "reengineering"
of Iraq's army to an institution of nation building and defense.

By transforming its military from a force that threatens
neighboring states into an army of nation building, perhaps Iraq
could provide a model that strengthens security in the region and
reduces bloated military budgets.

It is almost certain that the U.S. is to lead the formation of
an interim authority in Iraq, meaning that though the UN can
contribute to that process, its role would be no more than
auxiliary. A U.S.-led coalition will probably run the country for
at least six months until a new Iraqi government is in place.
Whether the U.S. and its allies have the focus and commitment for
the long haul that Iraq's reconstruction requires is unclear. The
questions here might properly be: Can Iraq really be rebuilt and
can the rebuilding be profitable?