Our defense priorities

Indonesia's defense capability cannot be in any sorrier state than the one found today as recently described by the chiefs of staff of the Navy and the Air Force.

Only a handful of our warships are operational; none are equipped to engage in combat due to a lack of ammunition. The way Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Bernard Kent Sondakh described it at a hearing with the House of Representatives, his ships are good for fishing expeditions and nothing else. Had this information been made public earlier, the deployment of several Navy warships near East Timor's waters during its inception to nationhood in May would have been construed more as a laughable show of weakness and than the show of force it was intended to be.

The Air Force's combat readiness is not in any better shape. Many of its planes have been grounded for lack of spare parts or poor maintenance. Only 11 of its 16 air defense radar stations are operational, making Indonesia a minnow in the region when it comes to its air defense system and capability. Air Force Chief of Staff Marshal Chappy Hakim, during his hearing with the House, disclosed that many of his airmen have not even been able to clock the standard flying time required of military pilots.

Bernard and Chappy cited a lack of funds as the chief reason for this reduced air and sea defense capability. While we may feel fortunate that we live in times of peace, and find comfort in the knowledge that we are not facing any immediate threat of foreign aggression, this in no way should lead us to complacency and to allow our defense posture to become compromised.

Even during peace time, no country will feel safe unless it has taken adequate measures to deal with possible threats from outside, no matter how remote the chance is. That is the reason why every single nation has a military -- to defend the country, the people, the territorial integrity, and the economic resources and interests. If you're going to have a military, you'd better build one that is credible and capable, and one that the nation can be proud of and depend on. That also means we have to build one that is strong enough to repel any foreign attack.

Such disclosures of our defense capability -- incapability is probably a better word -- would have been frowned upon in the past. Showing our weaknesses to the outside world would have compromised our defense ability. The fact that both the Navy and Air Force have gone public with this information reflects the gravity of the situation, and the need to act quickly.

The most appropriate course of action would have been to increase the defense budget and allow the Navy and the Air Force to buy whatever equipment they need. But given that Indonesia is still in a state of economic crisis, this option is not available for many years to come.

But in the interim, the House and the government could help to demand that the Indonesian Military (TNI) realign its spending priorities. Part of the problem with our defense posture has been the misplaced priorities of developing our armed forces, which was built chiefly to deal with suppressing internal dissension rather than with external threats.

That has meant that the bulk of military spending, including for the purchase of military hardware, have gone to the Army, at the expense of the development of the Navy and the Air Force to the point of compromising our air and sea defense capabilities.

Realigning our defense priorities is made possible with the departure of the National Police from TNI in 1999, leaving TNI with three services: Army, Navy and Air Force. This separation has led to a clearer division of labor: internal security is now wholly the domain of the police, and defense (meaning defense against external threats) is the chief affairs of the TNI.

If the TNI, particularly the Army, wholeheartedly accepts its new limited role, it should have been easy to realign its spending priorities. Unfortunately, the TNI, again the Army in particular, is not ready to let go of its powers and privileges yet. Witness its reluctance to dismantle its awesome territorial structure.

The Army's territorial network, with commands all the way down to the district levels, have served not only to help maintain internal security, but also to exercise its political privileges. Now that TNI has agreed to leave the political arena, and that the internal security is being given to the National Police, there is no need for the Army to keep its regional commands.

Dismantling the Army's territorial commands, and sending the soldiers back to the barracks, would represent a huge savings for the TNI. The money released could be used to build or develop Naval and Air Force bases or even to start replenishing the weaponry.

It is clear therefore that dismantling of the Army's huge territorial structure, as reluctant as many in the Army may feel, must form part and parcel of the overall military reforms, that also include the realignment of its spending priorities, and the development of the Navy's and Air Force's capabilities. The quicker we realize this, the sooner this nation can build a more respectable and credible defense posture.