Optimism for Indonesia in the midst of global terrorism

S.P. Seth Sydney

Is Indonesia turning the corner? It depends on: What is meant by "turning the corner"? But, by any reckoning, the news about Aceh is optimistic. Under the peace accord, Aceh should be able to participate in national affairs as an autonomous part of the country. There will, of course, be problems on the way about interpreting and implementing the agreement. But with goodwill on both sides, it should be a turning point.

Where East Timor failed, Aceh might be a different story. It might become a model for some other regions struggling to find their own political, economic and socio-cultural space, like Papua. It could become the basis for a successful federal political system, with constituent units having a stake in its functioning and perpetuity.

It is too early though for the celebrations but the political agreement on Aceh certainly is an important milestone.

Another hopeful sign is the abatement of terrorist activity in Indonesia. If true over a period of time, Indonesia might be able to teach some lessons to the rest of the world in this regard. The most important lesson would be not to deal with Muslims as an undifferentiated lot. Indonesia doesn't fit the image of militant Islam, even though it has its militant fringe.

Any attempt, therefore, to tar the global Muslim community as potential terrorists, through racial profiling and so on, betrays political naivety. Muslims, like people of any other community, are individuals who respond differently to different situations. They don't necessarily follow religious or political edicts of their real or supposed leaders.

Where they are minorities (as in the West), they certainly feel insecure because their religion marks them out as terrorist suspects. Therefore, what they need most is a sense of security and belonging when living in Western societies.

This was illustrated the other day in an interview on the Australian television with a young Muslim couple, both born in Australia. They were proud of their Islamic identity and decried terrorist violence. The young woman told the interviewer that she very much wished that, every time there was terrorist violence anywhere in the world, we (as Muslims) should not be expected or required to apologize or prove our loyalty to our country (Australia in this case).

They stressed that they, like any other Australian, were trying to make their way in life like pursuing a career, buying a house, paying their mortgage and so on.

However, because of this mass anti-Muslim hysteria, they and others in their community have to often face personal abuse and hostility in their daily lives. Which, in turn, fosters and reinforces ghettoization.

It is, therefore, imperative to lessenen the pressure on the Muslim community to make statements and edicts of loyalty and allegiance to their adopted countries. At the same time as the law and order machinery gets into gear to nab the terrorists, the authorities might also start a process of acknowledging some of the failings of marginalizing their Muslim citizens and doing something about it. It will be a slow process but then there is no quick fix for terrorism.

In the larger context, the United States believes that democratization of the Islamic world is the answer. But there are problems here.

First: It is the image problem. The United States is not known for its altruism. Therefore, its democratic protestations are not entirely credible in that part of the world.

Second: There is a strong view that Washington wants to secure the Middle East oil fields. So far it has done it through its compliant regimes. But they are now vulnerable to terrorism in the absence of popular legitimacy. Hence the pressure on them to introduce some sort of democracy, like holding elections. But whatever little is happening in this respect lacks credibility.

The United States badly needs allies on the ground in the Middle East, other than the present discredited regimes. A democracy based on the support of the moderate Muslim middle class might be the answer. Their popular appeal, though, is limited. As Martin Woollacott has pointed out in the Guardian newspaper in the context of recent Iranian elections, there is a bigger "constituency of more ordinary folk, with conservative Islamic leanings, a desire for clean government and not much interest in cultural freedom. It is a constituency visible everywhere in the Middle East." This constituency is not terribly receptive to the American message of freedom and liberty.

In any case, any middle class regime with U.S. blessings is unlikely to be seen as authentic. They can, however, acquire a good measure of popular legitimacy by claiming success on the Palestine sovereignty issue and the Iraq situation by nudging Washington in that direction. The first would require Israeli cooperation, which doesn't seem likely to the extent that might pacify the Middle East.

The U.S. can't afford to alienate Israel because it is its most reliable strategic asset in the region. Israel also has a strong political constituency in the United States.

The second-the Iraq situation- looks like a bottomless pit.

The U.S. could still push democracy in the Middle East. But that might bring the extremist Islamic parties to power, and that will be a disaster. It is not easy to be a superpower.

Indonesia, on the other hand, appears relatively calm and promising, going by the Aceh peace accord and abatement of terrorist activity.

The author is a freelance writer. He can be reached at SushilPSeth@aol.com.