Fri, 21 May 1999

One year later

One year after Soeharto was forced to step down as president of Indonesia, the balance sheet of democratic reforms promised by the new regime that replaced him gives little cause for rejoicing, particularly to the youths and students who spearheaded the movement, often at the cost of their lives. Under pressure of the circumstances that prevailed at that time, the man who replaced Soeharto -- his vice-president and long-time protege B.J. Habibie -- began some of the most urgent economic and political reforms needed to correct the worst of the ills of Soeharto's corrupt and authoritarian regime. To be fair, some of those efforts have borne results.

On the economic front, restructuring efforts in banking and other sectors were undertaken to repair the country's economic fundamentals, severely distorted by more than three decades of misuse and mismanagement under Soeharto's New Order regime. As a result, the paralyzing economic crisis appears to have bottomed out, though many analysts caution against any overoptimism at this point. On a wider national scale, the press was given back its freedom. The freedoms of association and of expression were restored, leading, among other things, to the emergence of a plethora of new political parties. Though many political prisoners remain in jail, many others were set free.

But as welcome as those measures are as stepping stones toward democracy, they do not by themselves touch the core objective which the reformists envision -- which is to build a lasting framework for a clean and democratic civil society. However, all too many indications exist that the current transitional government of President Habibie is halfhearted at best in its efforts to bring about real reform. To mention a few examples, none of the string of cases of violence and human rights violations involving the death or disappearance of students and political activists have been satisfactorily resolved. Since official incompetence on this scale is difficult for the common Indonesian to believe, the most simple conclusion is that the government is unwilling to reveal the real perpetrators behind the incidents because of their links and positions in the former New Order regime.

Another example involves demands that Soeharto be put on trial for his alleged corruption and nepotism during the 32 years he was in power. Though government officials have consistently denied that any proof of wrongdoing by Soeharto exists, the latest Time magazine investigation into the wealth of the Indonesian ex-president's family has only helped to fuel suspicions that the Habibie government is determined to leave the issue of Soeharto's wealth alone. The next inevitable conclusion that this invites is that at least some very powerful people in the present Habibie administration are afraid to comply to the public demands lest, apparently, their own wrongdoings in the past will be exposed.

All this can have far-reaching consequences on the success, or failure, of the current reform drive. One onerous question that has been plaguing many Indonesians in the past weeks is why the ruling party Golkar and Habibie are so adamant on winning the upcoming general election. Could it be because there are certain things that they would prefer to remain hidden forever? And would they be willing to resort to any means in order to achieve that objective? And, once firmly in power again, wouldn't they have second thoughts about bringing about reforms? After all, practically all the top-echelon officials and ministers in President Habibie's cabinet are members of Soeharto's New Order administration.

The Golkar party and Habibie could have avoided all these problems by graciously bowing out of the upcoming elections, as many esteemed observers and analysts have proposed. But since that seems to be too much to hope for, the best thing the proreform camp can do is to make sure that they win the ballot in the June 7 elections. The only way to ensure that is by setting aside, at least for the moment, all their differences and strive as one toward one goal: to ensure that the reform movement remains on track by winning the elections.