One year later

One year later

One year after Soeharto was forced to step down as president
of Indonesia, the balance sheet of democratic reforms promised by
the new regime that replaced him gives little cause for
rejoicing, particularly to the youths and students who
spearheaded the movement, often at the cost of their lives. Under
pressure of the circumstances that prevailed at that time, the
man who replaced Soeharto -- his vice-president and long-time
protege B.J. Habibie -- began some of the most urgent economic
and political reforms needed to correct the worst of the ills of
Soeharto's corrupt and authoritarian regime. To be fair, some of
those efforts have borne results.

On the economic front, restructuring efforts in banking and
other sectors were undertaken to repair the country's economic
fundamentals, severely distorted by more than three decades of
misuse and mismanagement under Soeharto's New Order regime. As a
result, the paralyzing economic crisis appears to have bottomed
out, though many analysts caution against any overoptimism at
this point. On a wider national scale, the press was given back
its freedom. The freedoms of association and of expression were
restored, leading, among other things, to the emergence of a
plethora of new political parties. Though many political
prisoners remain in jail, many others were set free.

But as welcome as those measures are as stepping stones toward
democracy, they do not by themselves touch the core objective
which the reformists envision -- which is to build a lasting
framework for a clean and democratic civil society. However, all
too many indications exist that the current transitional
government of President Habibie is halfhearted at best in its
efforts to bring about real reform. To mention a few examples,
none of the string of cases of violence and human rights
violations involving the death or disappearance of students and
political activists have been satisfactorily resolved. Since
official incompetence on this scale is difficult for the common
Indonesian to believe, the most simple conclusion is that the
government is unwilling to reveal the real perpetrators behind
the incidents because of their links and positions in the former
New Order regime.

Another example involves demands that Soeharto be put on trial
for his alleged corruption and nepotism during the 32 years he
was in power. Though government officials have consistently
denied that any proof of wrongdoing by Soeharto exists, the
latest Time magazine investigation into the wealth of the
Indonesian ex-president's family has only helped to fuel
suspicions that the Habibie government is determined to leave the
issue of Soeharto's wealth alone. The next inevitable conclusion
that this invites is that at least some very powerful people in
the present Habibie administration are afraid to comply to the
public demands lest, apparently, their own wrongdoings in the
past will be exposed.

All this can have far-reaching consequences on the success, or
failure, of the current reform drive. One onerous question that
has been plaguing many Indonesians in the past weeks is why the
ruling party Golkar and Habibie are so adamant on winning the
upcoming general election. Could it be because there are certain
things that they would prefer to remain hidden forever? And would
they be willing to resort to any means in order to achieve that
objective? And, once firmly in power again, wouldn't they have
second thoughts about bringing about reforms? After all,
practically all the top-echelon officials and ministers in
President Habibie's cabinet are members of Soeharto's New Order
administration.

The Golkar party and Habibie could have avoided all these
problems by graciously bowing out of the upcoming elections, as
many esteemed observers and analysts have proposed. But since
that seems to be too much to hope for, the best thing the
proreform camp can do is to make sure that they win the ballot in
the June 7 elections. The only way to ensure that is by setting
aside, at least for the moment, all their differences and strive
as one toward one goal: to ensure that the reform movement
remains on track by winning the elections.