One route to Maluku peace

Kirsten E. Schulze, International History, London School of Economics

Since the conclusion of the Malino II agreement a sense of normality has slowly started to return to Ambon. What has made this possible is that the critical mass in both the Christian and the Muslim communities is tired of the conflict.

Only two elements have openly opposed the efforts at reconciliation. They are the Maluku Sovereignty Front (FKM) which continues to advocate independence and the "group of 11", a loose coalition of fringe Islamic organizations, including Laskar Jihad, which sees Malino as a mere government maneuver and a "betrayal" of Muslim aspirations.

To deprive such groups of the potential to sabotage peace- building, by provoking popular reactions from the grassroots on both sides, it is imperative to speedily implement all 11 points of the Malino II agreement, most crucially the restoration of law and order.

While it is debatable that the Malino negotiations created sufficient ownership, and while the absence of concrete mechanisms for critical issues such as disarmament has complicated implementation, that does not mean that Malino II cannot work.

Its success clearly depends on two key factors. First, a genuine commitment by both communities to resolve differences in a non-violent way. Second, the commitment to the full implementation of all 11 points of the agreement.

Most Christians and Muslims want an end to the conflict. Their representatives have advocated, explained, and discussed the agreement's benefits with the grassroots. They have also made some efforts not to be provoked into a return to conflict by the sporadic incidents of violence. Both communities have distanced themselves from their hardliners.

Cautious optimism about the genuineness of this commitment to making Malino work is led by the fact that the two warring factions had reached a stalemate. Further military gains proved impossible and, most importantly, both communities had reached the point of exhaustion.

This created the space for the negotiations, the socialization and the beginning of the implementation -- and it is here that problems are starting to emerge.

Each and every point of the Malino agreement represents a communal grievance; so each and every point must be addressed. Therefore the temptation of "in the spirit" or "a la carte" implementation needs to be resisted at all costs.

A number of efforts have been made to implement the 11 points signed on Feb. 12, underlined by Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare Jusuf Kalla's decision to allocate Rp 300 billion (US$ 30 million) from the national budget over the next three years for rehabilitation in Maluku.

Governor Saleh Latuconsina has among others initiated the reconstruction of the 21,000 houses, 241 churches and mosques, 12 government offices, 10 markets, 29 hospitals and health centers, and the destroyed mobile brigade (Brimob) base at Tantui.

He has also started to deal with the repatriation of some 300,000 refugees. Along with the beginning of voluntary disarmament, the building work in former conflict areas has become a visible symbol of the hope that the conflict is now truly over.

These gains are strengthened by the increasing normalization of movement. Christians and Muslims are no longer restricted to their own neighborhoods and no longer have to go to extraordinary lengths to bypass "hostile" areas. Many are still hesitant in exercising that freedom, but its psychological impact should not be underestimated. The mutual feeling of entrapment and siege has been lifted and the ability to see that the other side is no better off has exploded at least some myths.

Yet the most important challenge now is the restoration of law and order and an end to "self-policing." Yet there is little evidence that the police in Ambon can assert itself and regain the respect of both communities. Internally split since the first year of the conflict, it has not been particularly successful in dealing with its renegades and achieving internal consolidation.

There is a situation of vigilantism and impunity, which fed the conflict and is now undermining reconciliation.

The dire performance of the police contrasts all the more sharply with the military, which, faced with similar challenges at the start of the conflict, has now virtually completed its internal consolidation under Military Commander Brig. Gen. Mustopo while progressively improving its security policy.

The special forces, Kopassus, has proven itself a well- disciplined and highly professional force in Ambon, so much so that it is the only element of the security forces upon whose neutrality and professionalism both Christians and Muslims agree.

The inability of the police in traffic regulation, crime prevention and restoring public order has also negatively affected its coordination and cooperation with the military.

This has proven a stumbling block to creating a proactive and responsive joint-security force to resolve outbreaks of violence, and to creating concrete mechanisms for the recovery of weapons from civilians; in particular the 800 standard ones from Tantui.

A good working relationship will be even more critical once the extended deadline for the voluntary hand-over of arms has expired. Subsequent sweeping will require cooperation and agreed procedures, not least because sweeping in peace-building differs markedly from sweeping in the context of war. The possibility of resistance to disarmament cannot be ruled out, especially in light of the police's inability to protect people.

Another challenge is the rehabilitation of former combatants. It is crucial to ensure that the fighters who had status, respect and power throughout the conflict, are not cast aside into unemployment and potentially into crime, but are given all the support for rehabilitation, education, training and employment.

Apart from providing them with a real post-conflict future, this gives them a clear stake in peace-building, thereby reducing the temptation to respond to acts of provocation and sabotage.

And last, but not least is the challenge posed by provocateurs. Sources of provocation need to be dealt with quickly and decisively. While this danger has been recognized in the agreement, little action has so far been taken.

For example, radio SPMM not only continues its anti-Christian rhetoric but has also been portraying the Muslim delegates to Malino as traitors who have sold out their own community and religion in return for "payment" from the government.

The FKM may raise the RMS (Republic of South Maluku) flag again on April 25. Proactive measures to counter such attempts are vital as is the availability of clear, reliable and credible information for the population.

The way these challenges are dealt with is crucial to securing the gains already achieved. Despite sporadic violence, the situation in Ambon has started to improve. Both communities are trying to make Malino work. There has been some movement on the repatriation of refugees, the rebuilding of the infrastructure, and voluntary disarmament, as well as economic, social and mental rehabilitation.

The independent investigating team looking into the causes of the conflict will also soon start its work. This will hopefully allow for addressing the underlying issues, dynamics and grievances.

Only through full implementation of all 11 points of Malino and a restoration of law and order and security, will the trust between the two communities be re-established, and the necessary resilience for dealing with sporadic violence and sabotage attempts be created.

Dr Kirsten E. Schulze, who has just returned from one of her visits to Maluku, is writing a book on conflict and democratization in Indonesia.