One route to Maluku peace

One route to Maluku peace

Kirsten E. Schulze, International History, London School of Economics

Since the conclusion of the Malino II agreement a sense of
normality has slowly started to return to Ambon. What has made
this possible is that the critical mass in both the Christian and
the Muslim communities is tired of the conflict.

Only two elements have openly opposed the efforts at
reconciliation. They are the Maluku Sovereignty Front (FKM) which
continues to advocate independence and the "group of 11", a loose
coalition of fringe Islamic organizations, including Laskar
Jihad, which sees Malino as a mere government maneuver and a
"betrayal" of Muslim aspirations.

To deprive such groups of the potential to sabotage peace-
building, by provoking popular reactions from the grassroots on
both sides, it is imperative to speedily implement all 11 points
of the Malino II agreement, most crucially the restoration of law
and order.

While it is debatable that the Malino negotiations created
sufficient ownership, and while the absence of concrete
mechanisms for critical issues such as disarmament has
complicated implementation, that does not mean that Malino II
cannot work.

Its success clearly depends on two key factors. First, a
genuine commitment by both communities to resolve differences in
a non-violent way. Second, the commitment to the full
implementation of all 11 points of the agreement.

Most Christians and Muslims want an end to the conflict. Their
representatives have advocated, explained, and discussed the
agreement's benefits with the grassroots. They have also made
some efforts not to be provoked into a return to conflict by the
sporadic incidents of violence. Both communities have distanced
themselves from their hardliners.

Cautious optimism about the genuineness of this commitment to
making Malino work is led by the fact that the two warring
factions had reached a stalemate. Further military gains proved
impossible and, most importantly, both communities had reached
the point of exhaustion.

This created the space for the negotiations, the socialization
and the beginning of the implementation -- and it is here that
problems are starting to emerge.

Each and every point of the Malino agreement represents a
communal grievance; so each and every point must be addressed.
Therefore the temptation of "in the spirit" or "a la carte"
implementation needs to be resisted at all costs.

A number of efforts have been made to implement the 11 points
signed on Feb. 12, underlined by Coordinating Minister for
People's Welfare Jusuf Kalla's decision to allocate Rp 300
billion (US$ 30 million) from the national budget over the next
three years for rehabilitation in Maluku.

Governor Saleh Latuconsina has among others initiated the
reconstruction of the 21,000 houses, 241 churches and mosques, 12
government offices, 10 markets, 29 hospitals and health centers,
and the destroyed mobile brigade (Brimob) base at Tantui.

He has also started to deal with the repatriation of some
300,000 refugees. Along with the beginning of voluntary
disarmament, the building work in former conflict areas has
become a visible symbol of the hope that the conflict is now
truly over.

These gains are strengthened by the increasing normalization
of movement. Christians and Muslims are no longer restricted to
their own neighborhoods and no longer have to go to extraordinary
lengths to bypass "hostile" areas. Many are still hesitant in
exercising that freedom, but its psychological impact should not
be underestimated. The mutual feeling of entrapment and siege has
been lifted and the ability to see that the other side is no
better off has exploded at least some myths.

Yet the most important challenge now is the restoration of law
and order and an end to "self-policing." Yet there is little
evidence that the police in Ambon can assert itself and regain
the respect of both communities. Internally split since the first
year of the conflict, it has not been particularly successful in
dealing with its renegades and achieving internal consolidation.

There is a situation of vigilantism and impunity, which fed
the conflict and is now undermining reconciliation.

The dire performance of the police contrasts all the more
sharply with the military, which, faced with similar challenges
at the start of the conflict, has now virtually completed its
internal consolidation under Military Commander Brig. Gen.
Mustopo while progressively improving its security policy.

The special forces, Kopassus, has proven itself a well-
disciplined and highly professional force in Ambon, so much so
that it is the only element of the security forces upon whose
neutrality and professionalism both Christians and Muslims agree.

The inability of the police in traffic regulation, crime
prevention and restoring public order has also negatively
affected its coordination and cooperation with the military.

This has proven a stumbling block to creating a proactive and
responsive joint-security force to resolve outbreaks of violence,
and to creating concrete mechanisms for the recovery of weapons
from civilians; in particular the 800 standard ones from Tantui.

A good working relationship will be even more critical once
the extended deadline for the voluntary hand-over of arms has
expired. Subsequent sweeping will require cooperation and agreed
procedures, not least because sweeping in peace-building differs
markedly from sweeping in the context of war. The possibility of
resistance to disarmament cannot be ruled out, especially in
light of the police's inability to protect people.

Another challenge is the rehabilitation of former combatants.
It is crucial to ensure that the fighters who had status, respect
and power throughout the conflict, are not cast aside into
unemployment and potentially into crime, but are given all the
support for rehabilitation, education, training and employment.

Apart from providing them with a real post-conflict future,
this gives them a clear stake in peace-building, thereby reducing
the temptation to respond to acts of provocation and sabotage.

And last, but not least is the challenge posed by
provocateurs. Sources of provocation need to be dealt with
quickly and decisively. While this danger has been recognized in
the agreement, little action has so far been taken.

For example, radio SPMM not only continues its anti-Christian
rhetoric but has also been portraying the Muslim delegates to
Malino as traitors who have sold out their own community and
religion in return for "payment" from the government.

The FKM may raise the RMS (Republic of South Maluku) flag
again on April 25. Proactive measures to counter such attempts
are vital as is the availability of clear, reliable and credible
information for the population.

The way these challenges are dealt with is crucial to securing
the gains already achieved. Despite sporadic violence, the
situation in Ambon has started to improve. Both communities are
trying to make Malino work. There has been some movement on the
repatriation of refugees, the rebuilding of the infrastructure,
and voluntary disarmament, as well as economic, social and mental
rehabilitation.

The independent investigating team looking into the causes of
the conflict will also soon start its work. This will hopefully
allow for addressing the underlying issues, dynamics and
grievances.

Only through full implementation of all 11 points of Malino
and a restoration of law and order and security, will the trust
between the two communities be re-established, and the necessary
resilience for dealing with sporadic violence and sabotage
attempts be created.

Dr Kirsten E. Schulze, who has just returned from one of her
visits to Maluku, is writing a book on conflict and
democratization in Indonesia.