Mon, 19 May 2003

On the brink of war?

Ever since disruption of the operations of the Joint Security Council in the middle of last month, it has been obvious that President Megawati's government has lost its trust in the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA), only four months after the document was signed. The last-ditch "peace" talks that were held over the weekend in Tokyo as a result of very high-level international pressure clearly showed that the government of Indonesia is not very keen to pursue dialog. The Indonesian delegation went there with clear demands not contained in the COHA. It has been more a case of "take it or leave it!"

The government, however, has presented a number of strong reasons to support its stance. Members of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) are accused of not complying with the agreement facilitated by the Geneva-based Henry Dunant Centre. Instead of promoting the content of the agreement among the population during the first few months, they have continued to promote the idea of independence. Instead of proving their commitment to peace, they are using the opportunity of being able to move around Aceh to enhance their military strength. They have even abused the agreement by taxing local people on the grounds that they are entitled to do so as the counterpart of the government of the Republic of Indonesia.

On the other hand, the local government has been doing almost nothing to popularize the agreement directly with the people of Aceh, and, instead of reaching out and trying to win the hearts and minds of the people, it has been acting as if nothing has happened and has continued to abuse its authority for its own narrow interests, with impunity. It has acted as though the COHA was solely the business of the central government, not the local government's too.

These matters seem to have been ignored by the government. It has even disregarded the articles of the COHA, which stipulate that both parties to the conflict should refrain from increasing their military strength and relocate their troops to defensive positions, and that the government should reformulate the mandate and mission of the discredited Brimob (Mobile Brigade) of the National Police.

Instead, the government revealed its plan to launch what it has referred to as "integrated operations", combining humanitarian, law and order restoration and security operations. While the humanitarian as well as the law and order operations have not been clearly spelled out, the security part of the operations are a good deal more obvious to the public. The number of troops and police in the resource-rich province has been increased from 38,000 to more than 45,000 in recent weeks. The House of Representatives has not objected.

With such strength, as well as the claimed professionalism of the military and police personnel, it is reasonable to say that the 5,000 troops of GAM would not last long in a conventional war. But nobody believes that GAM troops will engage in conventional war. It will probably be a repetition of what happened during the military operation zone (DOM) in Aceh from 1989 through 1998. The result is a matter of history: More than 10,000 civilians killed; GAM increased its strength; the number of GAM sympathizers among the Acehnese increased and the province remained torn by strife.

We should never forget that GAM, which proclaimed its existence in 1976, is only a small part of the multifaceted problem of Aceh. The restiveness of the province originated a long time before the movement existed. At the risk of being repetitive, it is worth noting again and again that since the early 1950s there has been a common feeling of betrayal at the hands of the Republic of Indonesia. After all, the people of Aceh, from the very first years of the Republic, contributed to the nation's independence and the ensuing years of "development".

The so-called integrated operation, which is supposed to be limited to around six months, does not address the real problem of Aceh. What we need is consistency in the long term and systematic planning. This entails the role of a "civil society to express, without hindrance, its democratic rights", as stipulated in the COHA. Let us not allow the political agenda of next year's general election to set the terms for Aceh.