On the brink of war?

On the brink of war?

Ever since disruption of the operations of the Joint Security
Council in the middle of last month, it has been obvious that
President Megawati's government has lost its trust in the
Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA), only four months after
the document was signed. The last-ditch "peace" talks that were
held over the weekend in Tokyo as a result of very high-level
international pressure clearly showed that the government of
Indonesia is not very keen to pursue dialog. The Indonesian
delegation went there with clear demands not contained in the
COHA. It has been more a case of "take it or leave it!"

The government, however, has presented a number of strong
reasons to support its stance. Members of the Free Aceh Movement
(GAM) are accused of not complying with the agreement facilitated
by the Geneva-based Henry Dunant Centre. Instead of promoting the
content of the agreement among the population during the first
few months, they have continued to promote the idea of
independence. Instead of proving their commitment to peace, they
are using the opportunity of being able to move around Aceh to
enhance their military strength. They have even abused the
agreement by taxing local people on the grounds that they are
entitled to do so as the counterpart of the government of the
Republic of Indonesia.

On the other hand, the local government has been doing almost
nothing to popularize the agreement directly with the people of
Aceh, and, instead of reaching out and trying to win the hearts
and minds of the people, it has been acting as if nothing has
happened and has continued to abuse its authority for its own
narrow interests, with impunity. It has acted as though the COHA
was solely the business of the central government, not the local
government's too.

These matters seem to have been ignored by the government. It
has even disregarded the articles of the COHA, which stipulate
that both parties to the conflict should refrain from increasing
their military strength and relocate their troops to defensive
positions, and that the government should reformulate the mandate
and mission of the discredited Brimob (Mobile Brigade) of the
National Police.

Instead, the government revealed its plan to launch what it
has referred to as "integrated operations", combining
humanitarian, law and order restoration and security operations.
While the humanitarian as well as the law and order operations
have not been clearly spelled out, the security part of the
operations are a good deal more obvious to the public. The number
of troops and police in the resource-rich province has been
increased from 38,000 to more than 45,000 in recent weeks. The
House of Representatives has not objected.

With such strength, as well as the claimed professionalism of
the military and police personnel, it is reasonable to say that
the 5,000 troops of GAM would not last long in a conventional
war. But nobody believes that GAM troops will engage in
conventional war. It will probably be a repetition of what
happened during the military operation zone (DOM) in Aceh from
1989 through 1998. The result is a matter of history: More than
10,000 civilians killed; GAM increased its strength; the number
of GAM sympathizers among the Acehnese increased and the province
remained torn by strife.

We should never forget that GAM, which proclaimed its
existence in 1976, is only a small part of the multifaceted
problem of Aceh. The restiveness of the province originated a
long time before the movement existed. At the risk of being
repetitive, it is worth noting again and again that since the
early 1950s there has been a common feeling of betrayal at the
hands of the Republic of Indonesia. After all, the people of
Aceh, from the very first years of the Republic, contributed to
the nation's independence and the ensuing years of "development".

The so-called integrated operation, which is supposed to be
limited to around six months, does not address the real problem
of Aceh. What we need is consistency in the long term and
systematic planning. This entails the role of a "civil society to
express, without hindrance, its democratic rights", as stipulated
in the COHA. Let us not allow the political agenda of next year's
general election to set the terms for Aceh.