On military's rejection of 'politicking'

On military's rejection of 'politicking'

Is the Indonesian Military (TNI) really against politics as it
has repeatedly said? It depends on the definition, says Kusnanto
Anggoro, a senior researcher at the Centre for Strategic and
International Studies and lecturer at the postgraduate studies
program of the University of Indonesia in Jakarta.

Question: The military has put on a number of displays of
unity recently despite evident rifts. How do you see this?

Answer: It is indeed more consolidated now because of external
pressure and ... (former chief of Army's Strategic Reserves
Command) Lt.Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah has temporarily ended
(rifts in TNI) by saying he would not accept being appointed the
Army Chief of Staff except with the approval of Wanjakti (TNI's
high ranking officers board).

Recent developments have also clearly conveyed the military's
rejection of being involved in practical politics, but of course
the question is its definition of this term.

"Practical politics" may refer to involvement in the daily
workings of the bureaucracy, but it is inevitable that TNI will
remain an actor in "the nation's politics." This relates not only
to (upholding) national unity, territorial integrity, the
Constitution and Pancasila state ideology, but also the relations
between state institutions, such as the legislature (DPR) and the
presidency. Hence it has resisted a decree to dissolve the DPR as
that would be against the Constitution.

So while TNI means it may not want to be involved in decision-
making, it still wants to be involved in formulating policies,
mainly those relating to amending the Constitution ...

TNI has been accused of politicking through its apparent
resistance to the President's plan to issue an edict to dissolve
the DPR, and to his wish to appoint Agus Wirahadikusumah as Army
Chief of Staff, given that the President is the Supreme
Commander.

Whether it has gone against the President's commands is
debatable: the edict was still at the level of consultation and
it remains the President's prerogative whom to appoint as Army
Chief of Staff. The problem is whether the President is ready to
face the costs if someone unacceptable to TNI were to be
appointed outside (the approval of) Wanjakti.

The costs would be disrespect and insubordination (from within
the TNI); while in Jakarta the role of the army, its Strategic
Reserves Command and the Jakarta military command, apart from the
military headquarters, are all crucial in safeguarding the
capital, should anything happen.

Respecting Wanjakti would be a trade-off between maintaining
(TNI's) organizational autonomy and political loyalty (towards
the President).

But, as President Abdurrahman Wahid's time to respond to the
second censure will be up by the end of May, he appears
desperate. If he approaches the officers of his choice, who
reportedly include Islam-oriented officers, would they succumb to
a promise of high-ranking positions?

They would be more reluctant to go against TNI. The bond in
TNI goes deeper than the instinct of practical politics. They
would not have that much support within TNI either. It would be
very difficult for Gus Dur (Abdurrahman) to impose (such a
measure).

A special session of the Assembly should not only install a
new President but must also deal with a transitional arrangement
of power.

Another problem (of the possibility of officers accepting
positions from the President without TNI approval) is that a
number of officers are still "working outside" TNI, such as in
provoking students (to call for Gus Dur's resignation). While
observers see this as an opportunity for TNI to perform in a more
assertive manner, this is not a strategy approved jointly by
TNI's command hierarchy and intelligence authorities.

There are private motivations involved, like revenge and
personal gain, while officers who feel Gus Dur is alienating them
too much are distancing themselves from him. So for Gus Dur both
are damaging (to his leadership).

Such things happen in any military organization, but
especially so without effective leadership.

TNI says it has no intention of taking power.

We should not believe that; I would say it is not able to
instead of not willing to. It would have even more to lose should
it fail, as it would lose further credibility and provoke
national and international reaction. We cannot expect TNI to
really change. That is our business -- whether we (civilians) are
tough enough to produce initiatives leading to, for instance, the
bringing of human rights violations to trial.

TNI could be provoked to take over; under Megawati
Soekarnoputri as President it would be more influential than it
is at present.

So what would be a way out? The Supreme Court has been asked
to issue a ruling saying that the DPR censures and the upcoming
special session is unconstitutional.

A decree of the MPR, rather than that of the legislature,
should be issued as a way out of the deadlock. While the Supreme
Court has been asked to issue such a ruling it has no such
authority.

Meanwhile the Assembly could do whatever it wished; a decree
concerning a transitional arrangement could, among others,
stipulate that policies should gain support from the parties
winning the election, so that the President would not have
absolute authority ... and could also cover the issue of transfer
of power in (the President's) mid term.

In involving the Assembly there is plenty of scope to overcome
the deadlock, especially in the absence of (completed) amendments
of the Constitution. Without such an arrangement this situation
would become tiresome for us ... Megawati could surely become
President but she (would still be facing) the same political
landscape ... (anr)