On military's rejection of 'politicking'

Is the Indonesian Military (TNI) really against politics as it has repeatedly said? It depends on the definition, says Kusnanto Anggoro, a senior researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies and lecturer at the postgraduate studies program of the University of Indonesia in Jakarta.

Question: The military has put on a number of displays of unity recently despite evident rifts. How do you see this?

Answer: It is indeed more consolidated now because of external pressure and ... (former chief of Army's Strategic Reserves Command) Lt.Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah has temporarily ended (rifts in TNI) by saying he would not accept being appointed the Army Chief of Staff except with the approval of Wanjakti (TNI's high ranking officers board).

Recent developments have also clearly conveyed the military's rejection of being involved in practical politics, but of course the question is its definition of this term.

"Practical politics" may refer to involvement in the daily workings of the bureaucracy, but it is inevitable that TNI will remain an actor in "the nation's politics." This relates not only to (upholding) national unity, territorial integrity, the Constitution and Pancasila state ideology, but also the relations between state institutions, such as the legislature (DPR) and the presidency. Hence it has resisted a decree to dissolve the DPR as that would be against the Constitution.

So while TNI means it may not want to be involved in decision- making, it still wants to be involved in formulating policies, mainly those relating to amending the Constitution ...

TNI has been accused of politicking through its apparent resistance to the President's plan to issue an edict to dissolve the DPR, and to his wish to appoint Agus Wirahadikusumah as Army Chief of Staff, given that the President is the Supreme Commander.

Whether it has gone against the President's commands is debatable: the edict was still at the level of consultation and it remains the President's prerogative whom to appoint as Army Chief of Staff. The problem is whether the President is ready to face the costs if someone unacceptable to TNI were to be appointed outside (the approval of) Wanjakti.

The costs would be disrespect and insubordination (from within the TNI); while in Jakarta the role of the army, its Strategic Reserves Command and the Jakarta military command, apart from the military headquarters, are all crucial in safeguarding the capital, should anything happen.

Respecting Wanjakti would be a trade-off between maintaining (TNI's) organizational autonomy and political loyalty (towards the President).

But, as President Abdurrahman Wahid's time to respond to the second censure will be up by the end of May, he appears desperate. If he approaches the officers of his choice, who reportedly include Islam-oriented officers, would they succumb to a promise of high-ranking positions?

They would be more reluctant to go against TNI. The bond in TNI goes deeper than the instinct of practical politics. They would not have that much support within TNI either. It would be very difficult for Gus Dur (Abdurrahman) to impose (such a measure).

A special session of the Assembly should not only install a new President but must also deal with a transitional arrangement of power.

Another problem (of the possibility of officers accepting positions from the President without TNI approval) is that a number of officers are still "working outside" TNI, such as in provoking students (to call for Gus Dur's resignation). While observers see this as an opportunity for TNI to perform in a more assertive manner, this is not a strategy approved jointly by TNI's command hierarchy and intelligence authorities.

There are private motivations involved, like revenge and personal gain, while officers who feel Gus Dur is alienating them too much are distancing themselves from him. So for Gus Dur both are damaging (to his leadership).

Such things happen in any military organization, but especially so without effective leadership.

TNI says it has no intention of taking power.

We should not believe that; I would say it is not able to instead of not willing to. It would have even more to lose should it fail, as it would lose further credibility and provoke national and international reaction. We cannot expect TNI to really change. That is our business -- whether we (civilians) are tough enough to produce initiatives leading to, for instance, the bringing of human rights violations to trial.

TNI could be provoked to take over; under Megawati Soekarnoputri as President it would be more influential than it is at present.

So what would be a way out? The Supreme Court has been asked to issue a ruling saying that the DPR censures and the upcoming special session is unconstitutional.

A decree of the MPR, rather than that of the legislature, should be issued as a way out of the deadlock. While the Supreme Court has been asked to issue such a ruling it has no such authority.

Meanwhile the Assembly could do whatever it wished; a decree concerning a transitional arrangement could, among others, stipulate that policies should gain support from the parties winning the election, so that the President would not have absolute authority ... and could also cover the issue of transfer of power in (the President's) mid term.

In involving the Assembly there is plenty of scope to overcome the deadlock, especially in the absence of (completed) amendments of the Constitution. Without such an arrangement this situation would become tiresome for us ... Megawati could surely become President but she (would still be facing) the same political landscape ... (anr)