Ombudsman requires legal muscle

Ombudsman requires legal muscle

By Dewi Anggraeni

MELBOURNE (JP): There are frequent reminders that
personalities are the most important element when instituting an
organization in Indonesia. The recent establishment of the
National Ombudsman Commission is one example.

The public is expected to be impressed and reassured that
henceforth their interests will be well served because of the
array of names leading the commission, well known for their
intellectual abilities as well as their proven courage to
question the powers that be.

Few would doubt the ability of the head Ombudsman Anton
Sujata, a former Deputy Attorney General for Crimes of
Corruptions, to recognize an act of corruption or collusion when
he sees one.

Nor would many people question the expertise of his deputy
Sunaryati Hartono, professor of law, in putting the act in the
context of the laws of the nation.

As for the members of the Commission, one look at the name of
Teten Masduki of the Indonesian Corruption Watch would be enough
to erase any remaining disquiet and satisfy any doubting-Thomas
that the Commission consists of fearless people.

The legal basis for the Commission's power to probe, however,
is only a presidential decree. Seeing that an ombudsman is an
independent official appointed to investigate citizen complaints
against abuses by government officials and agencies, the
commission needs a more powerful legal basis than a decree, which
can be revoked with little difficulty.

The public needs to know, if they lodge a complaint against a
particular government official or agency, that the commission
will have the power to probe, and check its veracity with the
alleged offending party?

When the commission completes an investigation and presents
its report to the department or agency in question, will the
government support the findings of the report? When appropriate,
will the House or the Attorney General act on those findings?

Is the Commission really independent from the executive of the
government? Can a president or a vice-president who for some
reason becomes displeased by a report, fire a commission member,
or even the whole commission?

In countries where the function of ombudsmen has long been
institutionalized, its independence and the legal basis
guaranteeing that independence is very solid.

In Australia for instance, apart from the Commonwealth
ombudsmen, each state has an Office of Ombudsman, established by
an Act of Parliament.

In Victoria, the Ombudsman's legal muscle is derived from
Ombudsman Act 1973, reinforced by Police Complaints Act 1958,
Freedom of Information Act 1982, and Telecommunication Act 1988.

Interestingly in Australia hardly anyone knows the identities
of their ombudsmen, not because these are kept secret, but
because such knowledge is not considered important by the people.

An ombudsman in Australia does not have to be a well known
intellectual, public official or someone who has proven his or her
fearlessness in fighting corruption in high places.

The job requirements, apart from knowledge about the
government system, are to be independent and impartial. The
Ombudsman is automatically protected by law from any threats of
dismissal from a disgruntled head of state, or any other state
official.

The Office of Ombudsman in Australia has the power to
investigate, summon and interrogate witnesses; then make
recommendations to the government department or authorities when
irregularities have been proven.

If the recommendations are not implemented within
a nominated length of time, reports will be tabled to Parliament
for action.

While the Office of Ombudsman does not have the power to
prosecute, its recommendations are usually acted upon and
implemented.

Its weapons are the annual reports it publishes, that are
available to the general public.

All government departments and officials wish to avoid being
depicted in the report as dirty blots in a smooth running
government.

This is not to say that Australia's ombudsmen have a
straightforward job.

Many complaints, while basically addressed to a particular
department, involve and implicate many other departments, making the
investigations complex and time consuming.

Fortunately for them, they can carry out their
responsibilities without having to worry on whose toes they might
next trod.

The relative anonymity of Australia's ombudsmen contrasts
sharply with the celebrity status of their newly appointed
Indonesian counterparts.

Maybe the stature of Indonesia's ombudsmen is needed to make
up for the relatively limited legal power provided to them.

The writer is a journalist based in Melbourne.