Old habits die hard

Washington and Moscow are discovering it is harder to change intelligence agencies than to create and sustain them. Once in motion, these organizations are difficult to steer or stop, as the latest manifestations of backward thinking in both capitals suggest.

Russia's federal security service, successor to the KGB, has been pushing for a new anti-crime law that would revive the chilling spirit of Feliks Dzerzhinsky three years after the towering statue of the KGB founder was removed from its honored place in Moscow.

The Russian Parliament seems ready to approve the measure, which would give security service agents a free hand to tap phones, open mail, break into homes and businesses and spy on other government agencies, all on the slightest suspicion of criminal conduct or subversive activity.

The service would have to notify prosecutors no more than 24 hours after the action was taken, and would not be subject to sanction.

This is a strange way to build a democracy and civil society, particularly in a country ravaged by decades of totalitarian intimidation. But it is not surprising when the political leadership fails to dismantle or reform the agency most responsible for terrorizing citizens.

After several aborted efforts to refashion the KGB and make it operate by democratic rules, the Russian government has settled for changing the name. Combating crime may require concerted government action in Russia, but it does not make strangulation of civil liberties any more defensible than in Stalin's day.

Old habits still in fashion at the CIA may be less threatening to democracy, but they bespeak a remarkable mis-estimation of what ails the agency, and how to repair it.

Officials in the troubled operations directorate, home of the Aldrich Ames fiasco and other intelligence failures, seem to think they can fix the organization's problems with better Congressional and public relations instead of a complete overhaul of their shop.

To rally Congressional support, they have in mind techniques similar to those employed in the espionage business to draw people into useful relationships. A recent computer message to staff members asked for names of members of Congress with whom they had "personal ties," "school or family ties" or a "working relationship," so the directorate could capitalize on the connections.

Using clandestine operators to help lobby Congress can create the sinister appearance of spies trying to manipulate lawmakers, a disservice to both. It also lamely suggests that what is wrong with the insular operations directorate can easily be remedied if only all those involved realize they went to Yale.

While President Clinton and President Yeltsin deal with other business, they cannot let their intelligence agencies drift or pursue parochial interests. They are capable of too much damage.

-- The New York Times