Number of victims a yardstick of military success

Number of victims a yardstick of military success

With the probability of military action against separatism in
Aceh, The Jakarta Post held on Friday a panel discussion on Aceh
with former Indonesian Military (TNI) general affairs chief Lt.
Gen. (ret) Suaidi Marasabessy, former minister of human rights
Hasballah M. Saad, sociologist Otto Syamsuddin Ishak -- the last
two being Acehnese -- and analyst Kusnanto Anggoro. The Post is
publishing the views of each speaker starting Monday, beginning
with Suaidi Marasabessy's view. Following is an excerpt.

A military operation is the most likely option to be taken by
the government after the apparent failure of the Cessation of
Hostilities Agreement (COHA) with the Free Aceh Movement. So what
is the difference between the planned military operation and the
Military Operation Zone (DOM) from 1989 to 1998 that so enraged
the Acehnese?

From the military aspect, I am of the opinion that the
military enjoyed it (DOM). It was arrogance. But we don't want
that now. The problems in Aceh did not begin with the military.
It was about uneven development. And when the problem came to the
surface, TNI -- thinking it was a superforce -- would take away
all the problems as if it was able to deal with them
simultaneously. A similar situation also occurred in other
restive areas, including East Timor.

Why do problems linger in Aceh? It's because all the
components of the nation thought it was the TNI's problem.
Unfortunately, TNI enjoyed the situation very much back then.
This will not be so in the future.

We must agree with the paradigm that security restoration is
just a small part of the integrated operation for Aceh if we are
really serious about tackling the problem completely. It's not an
easy job, and the media must also take part in prompting the
people and government instruments to play a role in settling the
Aceh problem.

I just spent four days in Banda Aceh, Takengon, Meulaboh and
Lhokseumawe, meeting with hundreds of religious leaders, youth
organization leaders and community members. I was surprised, they
all said they wanted a military operation to curb the separatist
movement. It was possible that there was some engineering by
local military officials, but the audience applauded when one or
two of them said that a military operation would be preferable.

I also witnessed the Acehnese people's mistrust of the central
government. Most of the people I met said that there had been
many visiting ministers, including the coordinating minister for
political and security affairs, to whom they had told their
problems and what they really needed. But they received no
response. The question now is not an inventory of the problem,
but the seriousness of the government in helping the people of
Aceh.

I also witnessed show of force by the TNI in a parade in
Lhokseumawe, where any military operation will be focused, and
met with the police Mobile Brigade members who will be in the
front line should a military operation take place.

Once a military operation commences, then there must be a
clear yardstick by which to measure its success. The benchmark of
a successful military operation should be a minimum number of
casualties. Few victims indicate the success of any military
operation. Judging from GAM's fighting strength, I believe there
will be no face-to-face combat between the TNI and GAM.

Conventional war, with the warring groups stationed on their
own bases, causes a minimum of collateral damage; unconventional
war is the opposite, and this is likely to happen in Aceh, where
GAM will slip into civilian settlements and use the civilians as
human shields.

Fortunately, TNI personnel deployed in Aceh have been
physically and mentally prepared to fight a good war with as few
victims as possible.

As many as 50,000 troops will pour into Aceh. This doesn't
mean that they will all go to the front line. Many of them will
guard strategic locations, such as the ExxonMobil plant.

There will be seven infantry battalions at the front line,
three of which will be combatant battalions. The other four
battalions will be in charge of protecting residential areas.
Members of the three combatant battalions are highly
professional.

It is believed that GAM will use guerrilla tactics and try to
prolong the war, while its leaders seek ways to get out of Aceh.
The TNI will not set a time frame for the war, but I think six
months will be enough. My calculation is based on efforts to
create a conducive condition in Aceh before the general election
(in 2004, so it could take a further two months. In such a plan,
availability of funds is vital. Soldiers operate "on their
stomachs"; in guerrilla warfare, if they have to rely on the
people (for food) it could be very dangerous.

We have estimated the strength of GAM. We have very accurate
information on their weaponry, their personnel and their hideouts
and their contingency plan for the possibility of COHA totally
failing.

The membership of GAM consists of three groups of people, each
with separate motivations: 1. Fundamentalist radicals, who have
ambitions to hold certain positions in the government. 2. Those
who hold a grudge against the TNI, which oppressed them during
the DOM period. This group of people is militant enough to
prepare for a military operation. 3. Thugs, criminals, ex-
convicts and military deserters. The third group includes
businesspeople forced to finance GAM activities.

While in the GAM organization alone there are three groups:
The armed wing, the political wing, including the Aceh Referendum
Information Center (SIRA), and the clandestine group. There is
nothing wrong with them (members of GAM) channeling their
aspirations through a political organization, which is acceptable
in a democratic country.

But I want to remind you that what has been happening in Aceh
and other provinces, including Maluku, was previously had no
military nuances.

Corruption was the core problem in Maluku and led to a bloody
civil war.

Therefore, all components of society, including the local
administration, should all have played significant roles in
supporting peace efforts in Aceh.

In contrast, Aceh Governor Abdullah Puteh and his staff failed
to disseminate information about COHA, arguing that there was no
funds for such a campaign. It is hard to believe that just
because the provincial budget had yet to be approved (as claimed
by Puteh), the governor did not promote COHA soon after it was
signed. Meanwhile, GAM disseminated propaganda about COHA based
on its own interpretation.

This is a very serious matter and is extraordinary. During my
four-day visit I was told that corruption, collusion and nepotism
were rampant in the administration. We (TNI) saw no reason for
the governor to be wary of promoting COHA; he never even
requested military escorts (for officials) in the campaign.

The governor has not played his role in supporting efforts to
settle the Aceh problem peacefully. This is exceptional!

So when we are asked about the performance of the Aceh
governor, we jokingly say, "Just replace him." The political
process for the replacement could be a little bit complicated.
There is the notion that if President Megawati Soekarnoputri
declares martial law in Aceh, the military chief -- in his
capacity as the provincial ruler -- would have the right and
authority to replace the governor.