Nuclear deterrent key to Russia's defense

LONDON: The appointment of Marshal Igor Sergeyev as Russian Defense Minister in May 1997 heralded a quiet but dramatic shift in the military establishment's balance of power away from the 'fighting generals' and towards the technocrats. By the beginning of 1998, it was clear that not only the context, but also the direction, of Russian military reform had changed.

Sergeyev, who had spent most of his career in the Strategic Rocket Forces (RVSN), is a quintessential military technocrat. Although wearing the same uniform as the ground-force and paratroop commanders who previously monopolized senior posts, his experiences and interests are very different.

His predecessors' attitudes were shaped by the experience of the World War II, the conflict in Afghanistan and, more recently, the desperate efforts to hold military units together in the face of hunger, wage arrears and humiliation in Chechnya. Sergeyev, by contrast, hails from a still-privileged and elitist force that has never been operationally deployed.

The General Staff, once source of forward-planning and doctrine, has increasingly been relegated to the role of the Defense Minister's administrative arm. Policy is now driven by Sergeyev and Andrei Kokoshin, the head of the State Military Inspectorate, a body formed in August 1997 to develop and monitor a reform strategy.

An academic specializing in arms-control issues and the holder of Russia's first (and only) civilian Deputy Defense Minister post from 1992-1997, Kokoshin's views and interests mirror those of Sergeyev. Both men are insulated from the plight of the majority of Russia's officers and soldiers, and are concerned primarily with the technical, rather than 'human', aspects of reform.

They see Russia's immediate needs as essentially to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent. Beyond this objective, they concede a possible need for forces able to prevent or end local conflicts, but argue that this role could be played by Russia's large paramilitary Interior and Border Troop units.

Sergeyev's predecessor as defense minister, Igor Rodionov, warned several times in 1996-1997 that funding problems and bad management were making Russia's nuclear forces dangerously 'unmanageable'. This view was unexpectedly corroborated by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which claimed in 1997 that antiquated central missile-command systems had accidentally gone to full 'combat' mode several times since 1991.

Sergeyev rejected these allegations at the time, and, as defense minister, makes no secret of his conviction that nuclear forces are the main -- and increasingly the only -- basis for Russia's claim to world-power status.

He and Kokoshin contend that these forces are uniquely cost- effective, an argument attractive to a government committed to reducing the defense budget by 30-35 percent. Rodionov was ultimately dismissed because he believed that genuine and sensible military reform -- including restructuring, re-equipping and re-training redundant officers -- had to cost money before it could save money.

However, the Finance Ministry expects increased savings, the Interior Ministry and Federal Border Service are content to retain a paramilitary role, and the still-powerful defense industries hope for an end to the effective freeze on high- technology research and development (R&D).

Sergeyev supports further Russian-US arms agreements, regarding them as opportunities to modernize Russia's strategic assets and place them at the center of a new military-reform program. The opposition-dominated Duma may yet ratify the 1993 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II in late 1998, but Sergeyev has added his voice to those arguing for a START III to supersede it, with both sides reducing their arsenals to 2,000- 2,500 warheads by the year 2007.

By 2001, the military is to be reorganized into four services -- Air, Ground, Missile-Space Forces and the Navy -- as a prelude to a further reshuffle in 2001-2005. Most conventional forces will be brought under a single Operational Command, which will be junior to the Missile-Space Command. Planning and doctrine will reassert the primacy of strategic forces, and from this will flow future procurement decisions. Central to these will be phasing out antiquated nuclear systems in favor of more accurate and survivable new-generation weapons.

While the immediate priority is to extend the service-life of aging intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) such as the SS- 18, the medium-term goal is for them to be supplemented and then replaced by mobile SS-24 and SS-25 systems. At sea, only the Typhoon- and Delta-IV-class nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines can be considered fully reliable.

Remaining Deltas, most of which are no longer operational, are to be retired; Typhoons are to be refitted with SS-N-24/26 missiles. Eventually, entire classes of new-generation systems are to be developed, including a strategic bomber -- to be in service by 2005 -- capable of carrying 'stealthy' long-range cruise missiles, and mobile and silo-based SS-X-27 missiles.

These are ambitious plans, and Sergeyev will find it difficult to complete even a part of them without significant extra funding. The overhaul of strategic forces is based on the questionable assumption that substantial development spending can be deferred until 1999-2000, by which time Sergeyev and Kokoshin hope that Russia will be on firmer financial ground. However, the defense industry operates on 7-10-year production cycles. For Sergeyev to meet his target date of 2005, at least some resources are needed now for R&D.

Furthermore, Sergeyev appears unable to appreciate that the RVSN itself has suffered from years of funding crises. Officers routinely stay on duty for 13-15 consecutive days a month, instead of the seven days that regulations specify. Facilities and equipment are in need of repair and replacement. Of the Air Force's 68 long-range Tu-95 bombers, more than 40 require major work, and the operating lives of some missile-control systems have been extended three times.

There will thus need to be considerable investment simply in renewing the human and material infrastructure before modernization can be considered. Sergeyev alludes to 'efficiency savings', but these will probably prove illusory.

His reputation as a careful manager at the RVSN probably reflects less his own abilities than the fact that the force enjoyed priority access to funds. Although the RVSN is allocated only 6 percent of the nominal defense budget, it receives around 8-10 percent of the funds actually disbursed by the Finance Ministry.

Sergeyev and Kokoshin's military-reform plans are based on upgrading hardware and bolstering nuclear deterrence, rather than addressing 'human' problems such as morale, training and salaries. These plans are unlikely to offer Russia the 'defense on the cheap' that the Kremlin appears to expect. The strategy presents three distinct dangers:

* A 'hollow' army:

Without investment in personnel, Russia's hoped-for new, 'leaner' army will comprise the worst, rather than the best, of the present generation. Plans to form small and effective 'Mobile Forces' on the basis of the Airborne Troops have been on hold since 1992. As conventional forces decay, military options will become increasingly limited. Russia will be forced to depend ever more heavily on the Internal Troop units that fared so badly in Chechnya.

* A falling nuclear threshold:

Russia will lack strategic options between low-intensity operations and full nuclear response. The 'nuclear threshold' is thus being lowered, further diluting the country's stated commitment to no-first-use of nuclear weapons -- an undertaking that will probably be formally abandoned in 1998. This ushers in a new era of 'flexible response', but without much flexibility.

* Military discontent:

Russia's angry and dissatisfied soldiers have hitherto expressed their feelings indirectly, turning to crime, becoming ill-disciplined or casting protest votes in elections. In part this is because the General Staff and the Defense Ministry -- if not always the minister himself -- were viewed as allies. Rodionov famously refused to draw his wages until his men had been paid. By contrast, Sergeyev is increasingly seen as part of the problem, not least by army commanders who resent the elevation of a 'rocketeer'. New forces such as the 'Movement to Support the Army' -- founded by General Lev Rokhlin in 1997 -- are explicitly seeking to politicize soldiers and, although unlikely to succeed in the short term, are symptomatic of the growing gulf between Russia's troops and their minister. Sergeyev and Kokoshin are taking several gambles:

* that conventional forces can safely be allowed to degrade for a decade, without any real threat to public or political order;

* that strategic deterrence and a minimal conventional force will, in the interim, be sufficient to ensure Russia's security; and

* that this short- to medium-term degradation in conventional forces will guarantee Russia up-to-date weapons in the long term.

All three assumptions are debatable. Instability and insurgency, not external forces, pose the immediate threat to Russian security. Savings stemming from cuts in conventional forces are unlikely to be invested in major strategic modernization and R&D.

Sergeyev is scheduled to retire in 1998, and it is not clear whether he has a like-minded successor in the wings. The next 12 months will thus be crucial to determining whether Russia continues with its potentially dangerous reform plans.