Now up to TNI to restore its battered image

Now up to TNI to restore its battered image

Imanuddin, Staff Writer, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta,
iman@thejakartapost.com

The Indonesian Military (TNI) will be 57 today. A human being
at this age is more than mature, mellowed with good or bad
lessons in life.

For the TNI it is a different story; it is a dynamic
institution whose development and performance must have been
influenced by the corresponding era of its existence, in which
the most important thing is the attitude of its leaders.

Many good stories of the institution's performance and service
to the country and its more than 200 million people abound. But
there are also deleterious stories of wrongdoings and mistakes
committed by its personnel.

The journey of the TNI prior to independence on Aug. 17, 1945
and afterwards, has virtually become legend. No one disputes our
troops' struggle for a free, independent Indonesia. Poorly armed
and equipped, the mostly bare-footed troops managed to squash the
allied troops supporting the Dutch colonialists and send them
packing from Indonesia.

The troops' devoted service to the country continued with
their firm determination and loyalty in handling rebellions in
West Sumatra, known as PRRI, and in North Sulawesi, known as
Permesta in 1958 and 1959.

They gained more honor when in the third quarter of 1965, a
group of TNI troops overcame a coup attempt, blamed on the now
defunct Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Despite all the
controversies regarding the truth behind the PKI's alleged
involvement in the coup attempt, the troops' maneuver to take
control of the situation at least prevented the TNI from further
disintegration.

Years later in 1981, the country's special forces troops
outmaneuvered a group of terrorists who had hijacked an
Indonesian aircraft, parked at Thailand's Don Muang Airport. The
TNI is also credited with involvement in UN-sponsored
peacekeeping activities in various conflict areas worldwide.

However the TNI's long line of service has been ruined by a
series of cases of human rights violations allegedly committed by
TNI troops in many conflict areas.

Critics have long suspected that the military have no genuine
intention to put out communal and separatist conflicts in Aceh,
Maluku and Papua. Some have even charged that the military adds
fuel to the fires.

The troops have been accused of seeking short-term gains
through selling arms to warring factions to long-term benefits
such as showing that the military is still high in demand because
the country is unsafe. The speculation has credence as the
conflicts in Poso, Aceh and Irian Jaya have deteriorated as more
troops have been deployed to the areas.

Others have implied that the conflicts amount to lucrative
"projects" managed by parties who do not want to see a successful
struggle for reform and democracy in the country.

The military's bad image has been worsened by the involvement
of the TNI's special forces troops in the abduction and
disappearance of youth and student activists prior to the
downfall of president Soeharto.

The formal end of Soeharto's 32-year militaristic regime on
May 21, 1998 rekindled hopes for political reform that would
allow civil society to flourish. The military was also prompted
to reform itself. The most important move was probably its
declaration to drop the dual function doctrine that allowed its
involvement in both its defense and political roles -- although
later the public was told that this would take time.

The military liquidated its social and political affairs posts
in 1998 and created a territorial affairs post, which was also
scrapped in November last year.

But the TNI's brave and historic decision was made during the
Annual Session of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) last
August when the TNI announced its readiness to release its grip
in the House of Representatives and the MPR simultaneously in
2004, instead of a gradual withdrawal from both legislative
bodies by 2009.

This phenomenal decision has however been troubled by
continuing unstable security marked by bombings and other acts of
terror, and lately the mysterious cases of non-bombing explosions
and massive fires. Those cases have been the triggering factor
for the relocation of many foreign companies to other countries.

A stable political and security condition is undoubtedly
needed as the key prerequisite for the recovery of the country's
economy, with the main elements including the return of
investment (in this case foreign injections), which could help
boost the pace the economic recovery massively.

Unfortunately the police, with the back up of the TNI, have
proven incapable of solving the incidents, which have hit the
country hard since the downfall of Soeharto.

Numerous cases of terror, bombing and security disturbances
have remained unsolved and uncovered.

If the security apparatus cannot handle such problems and
conditions, who can the people look up to, to end the spiraling
security problems? And who would be responsible for such
conditions?

In the past, the blame was always directed at the PKI. Now,
it's the Muslim radicals or the international al-Qaeda network
who are the scapegoats.

The big question is whether the so-called Muslim radicals are
really capable of organizing such mass unrest or a series of
bombings on their own. Are they capable of acquiring the bombing
materials and equipment without being detected or identified?

Or do they have the capability to incite a rampage, while they
are so far considered small in number to the general population?

The security apparatus still needs to come up with answers to
questions regarding public security; thorough investigations to
uncover the truth behind all the cases of terror and bombings
have yet to yield publicly available results.

But plain observation into the modes of the operation of acts
of terror and bombing, or other cases of security disturbance,
reflects actions by skilled groups of people; so skilled that the
police could not solve the cases. Some observers have even
speculated that they must have been done by elements in the TNI.

Whether the TNI would be willing to wipe out all the suspicion
and allegations of its involvement in the terror and security
disturbances, and therefore restore its image, completely rests
on the TNI itself.