Nonnuclear states must get stronger to face nuclear nations

From: The Jakarta Post

Shinichi Ogawa, The Asahi Shimbun, Tokyo

The North Korean declaration of withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) could shake the very structure in place today to stem nuclear proliferation. There is a flaw inherent in the NPT itself, in that while this treaty categorizes the signatories into "nuclear-weapon states" and "non-nuclear- weapon states," it does not provide the latter with sufficient security assurances against nuclear threat.

Because of this flaw, the treaty carries an inducement to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In order to help non-nuclear states overcome any temptation to develop their own nuclear weapons, a regime must be implemented to prohibit nuclear states from arbitrarily using their nuclear weapons for threatening or attacking any non-nuclear state.

One specific means to do so is to draw up a "negative security assurance" agreement which stipulates that any of the five NPT nuclear states -- the U.S., Britain, France, China and Russia -- will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear NPT state, except in the case of an armed attack on an NPT nuclear state or its allies by such non-nuclear state allied to or associated with a nuclear-weapon state in carrying out the attack.

To date, the five NPT nuclear states have repeatedly declared their negative security assurances. However, these assurances have been nothing more than political declarations. If they are to have any real meaning, they must be spelled out in a legally binding agreement.

In fact, the five NPT nuclear states have provided legally- binding negative security assurances to the 33 non-nuclear signatories to the Tlatelolco Treaty, or the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Moreover, as is evident from negative security assurance statements issued in April 1995 by the five NPT nuclear states, the wording of recent such statements is becoming increasingly alike. The only exception to this is China, which assures unconditional negative security.

In short, the time is riper than ever now to implement a global system of negative security assurance.

However, nations such as India, Pakistan and Israel-nuclear powers that remain outside the NPT framework-cannot be urged to abide by a legally-binding negative security assurance. The reason is that making these nations party to a legally-binding agreement on negative security would be tantamount to legitimizing the possession of nuclear weapons outside the NPT regime.

The aforementioned limitation of negative security assurance can be complemented by the so-called "positive security assurance" which aims to provide assistance and countermeasures through the UN Security Council to the NPT non-nuclear weapon states that come under nuclear threat or attack.

The five NTP nuclear states are permanent members (P5) of the Security Council. This means that should any of the P5 use or threaten to use nuclear weapons, any UN action for positive security is highly unlikely because of the veto power of that offending nuclear-weapon state.

On the other hand, the system can be expected to work if the offender is none of the P5. But even in that event, a veto by a permanent Security Council member cannot be ruled out entirely. To counter such a situation, it would be necessary to establish beforehand some sort of rules against the use of nuclear weapons.

A clue can be found in an advisory opinion handed down by the International Court of Justice in July 1996. The court declared to the effect that except in an extreme circumstance of self- defense, in which the very survival of a state would be at stake, the threat or use of nuclear weapons "would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law."

If this segment of the advisory opinion can be written into law, it should be possible to prevent nuclear-weapon states from politically using their veto power over the threat or use of nuclear weapons.

North Korea's nuclear weapon development and subsequent declaration of withdrawal from the NPT has raised questions about the efficacy of this treaty. However, one must not overlook the fact that were North Korea not a signatory, the international community would have been helpless to deal with this problem through the Security Council.

Diplomatic efforts by Japan to establish a global security system against the threat or use of nuclear weapons will help reinforce the NPT and consequently enable the international community to apply greater pressure on North Korea. It is hoped that all non-nuclear-weapon states would muster their wisdom and work together for a common cause.

The writer is a senior research fellow at the First Research Department of the National Institute of Defense Studies.

JP/Nonnuclear states must get stronger to face nuclear nations