No solution in sight to Algeria's endemic violence

LONDON: The credibility of Algeria's military regime has reached its lowest point since it canceled the 1992 general election -- which the now banned Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) was expected to win.

In municipal and provincial polls held on Oct. 23, 1997, the Rassemblement National Dimocratique (RND) -- a government- sponsored party formed in February 1997 -- won respectively 56 percent and 52 percent of the vote, and the former ruling party, the Front du Libiration National (FLN), came second with 22 percent and 20 percent.

The elections were the final part of an institutional process aimed at increasing the regime's legitimacy and consolidating its powers. However, extensive electoral malpractice led to the alienation of opposition parties -- which span the breadth of Algeria's political spectrum -- and forced their supporters to take to the streets in protest.

A government crackdown ended almost three weeks of demonstrations. Nevertheless, the protests provided a unique example of unity and cooperation between the opposition parties, as well as highlighting the extent of their growing frustration with the authorities.

While senior military officials searched for ways to end the demonstrations, and rumors spread that some government factions had supported the protesters to embarrass President Liamine Zeroual, another potentially more threatening problem emerged.

For the first time, the regime's military-security services were accused by the foreign media -- particularly UK and French newspapers -- of complicity in civilian massacres perpetrated in August and September 1997.

In three attacks on the outskirts of Algiers, the Army seemed to take no action to prevent hundreds of people being killed. The reports also claimed that the leadership had backed attacks on foreigners in France and had supported bombings in Paris in 1995.

In November 1997, sweeping allegations about the regime's involvement in these attacks were made by a former secret agent -- who is now presumed to be a serving officer in Algeria's military-security establishment. Similar claims have been made in the past by the FIS and other opposition groups, such as the Front des Forces Socialistes (FFS). Furthermore, the leadership's tolerance of violent activities has even been suspected by members of the diplomatic community in Algiers.

The recent massacres shattered government claims that the violence is under control. To defend its position, the regime issued statements criticizing foreign interference in its domestic affairs. The leadership's image is now so tarnished that Zeroual has reportedly decided to establish a communications agency to improve the public's and international community's perception of the regime.

Since 1992, the military authorities have pursued a two- pronged strategy to strengthen their hold on power. First, they have conducted a relentless campaign to suppress the FIS, its supporters and other more radical splinter groups.

At the same time, the regime has initiated a media programme aimed at destroying the reputation of the FIS. Second, the leadership has attempted to develop a semblance of democracy by rebuilding elected institutions which government parties will dominate.

Reconstructing these democratic bodies allowed former army general Zeroual to win 61 percent of the vote in the November 1995 presidential elections. Voters hoped that a strong individual with a clean reputation would find a peaceful solution to the country's civil war and that he might be prepared to confront more hardline military officers.

By the end of 1995, the leadership appeared to have consolidated its position. Fears that the FIS would gain power had virtually disappeared, and Western support for the government seemed assured. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed in 1995 to grant the regime a US$1.5 billion three-year extended fund facility in order to restructure its debt.

The consolidation of power continued with a constitutional referendum in November 1996 that enlarged the president's powers and reduced the National Assembly's political influence. Amid widespread accusations of vote-rigging, the referendum was followed by legislative elections on June 5, 1997, with the RND emerging as the main political party with 38 percent of the vote. The RND then went on to win more than half of the local and provincial seats in the October polls.

Since the summer massacres, renewed attention has focused on the regime's vulnerability. One of the key challengers to its authority is the Groupe Islamique Armie (GIA). Minimal independent information about the organization is available -- even its strength is subject to much debate -- and the regime itself has released contradictory reports.

Although the government has claimed that 'terrorists' have been almost eliminated, it has also stated that the Army cannot prevent terrorist groups from carrying out acts of violence. Furthermore, the authorities admit that the GIA's infrastructure is more complex, and the organization is far better entrenched, than they had previously assumed.

The regime's military-security units are believed to have extensively infiltrated the GIA. To what extent this penetration has led to a manipulation of the civil war is difficult to ascertain. Suspicions about the regime's complicity in Algeria's civil war have been exacerbated by: -- the leadership's silence about the conflict; -- its failure to prosecute any members of the GIA; -- and the method in which information has been controlled inside Algeria.

It is assumed that violence is manipulated in order to: -- destroy some Islamist groups; -- justify the military's hold on power; and -- settle disputes within the leadership.

While attacks are still reported throughout the country -- especially in areas around Oran in western Algeria -- most of the violence is concentrated in the Mitidja plain south of Algiers.

It appears that the army is not prepared to prevent fatalities in this region, but it is willing to conduct offensives against extremists in the surrounding mountain territory. Moreover, villagers in these areas have been given weapons in order to establish self-defense groups. As a result, the level of violence has increased, with these militia reportedly participating in reprisal attacks against the families of members of extremist Islamist groups.

Although the army has failed to protect civilians near Algiers, it is effective in protecting oil and gas installations in the southern desert. Both the state energy company, Sonatrach, and its foreign investors, continue to be largely sheltered from the violence.

Algeria's return to at least a semblance of democracy conflicts with the nature of the regime. Having introduced a constitution removing most of the National Assembly's powers, it might have been expected that the military authorities would have prevented malpractice in the legislative and local elections.

Instead, the leadership's desire for victory increased during the polls, to the point where it claimed that pro-government parties had won more than 80 percent of the vote in the October elections.

Zeroual's promises of democracy and an end to the violence have lost him credibility both at home and abroad. In addition, opposition resentment has been heightened by the rapid deterioration of economic and social conditions in Algeria. Although the IMF's financial arrangement helped the government to remain in power, it has aggravated poverty levels and eroded the country's middle class.

The regime's internal problems have intensified in recent months. Government factions are engaged in a constant struggle for power, but their disputes are usually resolved by consensus, thereby ensuring the leadership's survival. Over the past few months, however, internal differences have reached critical levels. Many observers thus believe that media allegations are part of an internal campaign to settle factional differences.

The latest power struggle can be traced back to summer 1997. While the massacres were taking place, two competing factions were fighting over the state of the negotiations that led the Armei Islamique du Salut (AIS) -- the armed wing of the FIS -- to declare a cease-fire in October 1997. The AIS is believed to be Algeria's largest armed group. It is based in the east and west of the country and is known to conduct attacks against military targets.

Zeroual's presidential adviser, Mohammed Betchine, and the Head of the Counter-Intelligence Agency, Mohammed 'Smain' Lamari, are thought to have disagreed over who should make the deal with the AIS and on what terms. Moreover, then commander of Algeria's First Military Region -- covering Algiers and the sites of the worst massacres -- Said Bey, was believed to be opposed to the agreement. As a result, rumors of dissension within the Army intensified.

The AIS cease-fire initially raised expectations that the regime might be prepared to accept a solution allowing a weakened FIS to return to the political arena. It is clear, however, that no consensus has been reached on whether senior military officers will follow the truce with political negotiations. The tendency inside the regime is to regard the cease-fire as no more than a surrender.

A peaceful solution involving the FIS will become more difficult to achieve as the conflict continues, and the FIS discovers that it has no influence over the GIA. Indeed, any agreement with the FIS could even strengthen the GIA. Divisions within the regime, particularly inside the military, are becoming more marked, and are preventing movement towards a settlement. Under these circumstances, increasing violence and mounting internal political rivalry are inevitable.