No room for political utopia

By Hermawan Sulistyo

JAKARTA (JP): There is a clear difference between political reality and political hope. A political reality is a non- opinionated model, or an abstract construction of political affairs, while a political hope is the construction of a value- judged situation according to one's preference, regardless of whether it is feasible or not.

A sociologist would call the first das Sein, or what is seen in actuality, and the latter das Sollen, or what should be. Political analysis is certainly based on the first and not the latter.

By mixing the these two approaches, Dr. Ikrar Nusa Bhakti's article "Focusing on leadership change" (The Jakarta Post, Dec. 31) misses many points in my article, "VP's role to increase in future" (The Jakarta Post, Dec. 19).

My main argument, that Indonesia's next vice president will assume a greater role in running the government, is based on the condition of a "political ceteris paribus", that nothing would happen to President Soeharto's health except a natural decline due to his age, especially in the near future, from now to March.

Based on such a condition, I proposed two new scenarios for the country's two top leadership positions, in addition to an old scenario touted by many observers over the last decade.

The old scenario provides a model that President Soeharto would step down from his office during his tenure. The vice president (VP) then would take his role as the head of state as well as the chief executive of the administration. Without a critical downturn in Soeharto's health, it is very unlikely that this scenario would actually take place.

My two scenarios are more feasible. In the first, Soeharto would assume the presidency and run his office as before. But, I clearly stated that it was very unlikely that he could endure a physically demanding five-year term at a normal pace of activities at his age.

Thus, my second scenario is more suitable to the situation: that he would reduce his normal activities to physically affordable activities and delegate much of his duties to the VP. The model for the country's decision-making process then would be similar to that of Thailand's constitutional monarchy, not to a Singaporean style which many observers believe is more appropriate.

Here, I propose a model for the decision-making process and not the system of governance. I do not imply that Indonesia would become a monarchy such as Thailand or change to a system of governance with a prime minister such as in Singapore.

In realpolitik, the essence of the decision-making process is much more important than the political system or format. This also has nothing to do with someone's preference over the process or system.

My scenario has nothing to do with my political conviction on what is better, or even the best, for Indonesia's future. I am only constructing a model of political realities, regardless of whether I personally like it or not.

With such an approach, Ikrar labels my proposal as "adopted from a realist and pragmatic perspective". He then proposes what he calls an "idealistic perspective", which he admits that I would call an "unrealistic utopia, or unpragmatic perspective".

A utopian model is a construction of hopes and dreams, making it less useful. With its apparent weaknesses, Ikrar's utopian perspective, however, is still useful in some ways.

He, for instance, argues that the only way to remedy today's economic and political crisis is to elect a new president in the general session of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) in March.

He believes that the change of leadership would restore trust from the international community, or at least in the region. His optimism even reaches beyond the succession when he states that "the Armed Forces, particularly the Army's commanders, will cooperate with political scientists to manage Indonesian political reforms".

Again, his argument is not only unrealistic, or even utopian, but poses some difficulties to follow. First, as he admits, there are only about 15 percent of the members in the general assembly (MPR) that would possibly nominate a presidential candidate other than Soeharto.

Despite rumors about the president's health, a determined decision by Golkar to nominate Soeharto would unlikely be contested. Thus, there is no use in discussing Ikrar's proposal unless Soeharto's health becomes critical to the point that he himself needs to withdraw from the nomination.

Second, there is no guarantee at all that if there is a change in the presidency, the new president would be able to successfully manage the economic and political crisis.

Indeed, the level of his or her economic and political trust would largely depend on Soeharto's performance, but it also should be noted that such a trust would partly be composed of a judgment of the regime as a political entity.

A new president, whoever he or she is, would have to prove that he or she could manage smooth governmental reforms with minimum risks. Thus, there should be an alternative scenario of reforms adopted by the new president.

Until now, at least, I have never heard or read about such alternative reforms other than a perfection of today's system, such as to make the system more transparent and cleaner, without many structural changes.

Thus, I deeply believe that the role of the president will still be central. The VP's role, then, is increasing as compared to his "traditional roles" in previous administrations. One of the most crucial qualifications in choosing a VP is his or her ability "to cooperate" with the elected president.

Ikrar's fear that an increasing role taken by the VP would make a dual leadership which "may create a constitutional crisis in Indonesia" is irrational and illogical. There are too many examples of such a division of roles between the president and the VP. Let us take the United States as a comparison.

It is widely known that Vice President Al Gore is the strongest Democratic Party candidate for the next presidential election. Today, in his second term beside President Clinton, Al Gore is increasing his role through a more intense "internship". And yet there is no "constitutional crisis" such as Ikrar imagines. Al Gore is widening his role from only serving in ceremonial occasions to include more important sectors.

Singapore has provided a better known example for us. When Lee Kuan Yew felt that he was ready to start a smooth political succession, he prepared his two ministers as "crown princes". The two were Goh Chok Tong and Brig. Gen. B. G. Lee, his son. During their "internship", the old Lee incrementally delegated his duties.

When the time finally came, Lee chose Goh as his successor only because B.G. Lee had cancer. He withdrew and created a position as "senior minister" for himself to supervise Goh. Not many observers by that time believed that the new prime minister would be able to continue Lee's success in leading Singapore. But time has proven that Goh learned much from his "internship", enough to dismiss any doubts on his ability to lead the island- country.

Thus, if the U.S. and Singapore have managed to incrementally delegate some of the president's authorities to the VP, why could not Indonesia successfully follow a similar track?

I should add that this model, however, lacks some aspects. Both examples show that the delegation of authority would still demand an active president in day-to-day affairs. Again, President Soeharto's health might not enable him to do this.

Soeharto has hinted that he would probably assume a role as the moral guardian of the political system through lengser keprabon, madheg pandito.

A "moral guardian" position is a neutral term and has nothing to do with the content of "morality" as measured by religious or social norms in his deeds or actions.

A guardian as such would lead the course of the nation's politics. This is why I prefer to use the Thai model of decision- making as an analogy rather than Singapore's. A political moral guardian would only deliver wisdom and not policies.

Finally, there is indeed no question that succession of national leadership is a must. The question remains: when and who will be involved?

Ikrar's hopes that the MPR would be willing to take the chance in the next plenary session is still to be seen. Meanwhile, with all of the above reasons, I would suggest that those who need a clearer political landscape in the near future take my scenario more seriously.

The writer is a researcher with the Indonesian Institute of Sciences.