No ready recipe to deal with terrorists

By Stefan Kornelius

MUNICH (DPA): Terror has a chilling power. It comes unexpectedly and respects no rules, it turns and twists according to mood or the tactics of the moment. Terror can visit anyone, and these days can turn up anywhere. Terror is the cheap weapon of the lawless, a blooming business for the extremists and desperados of this world.

Terrorism long ago shed its political mantle: state terrorism from above or political terror from below, violence to further revolutionary change of a ruling system -- those were its classic forms in the pre-1989 era.

Post-modern terror, on the other hand, can unleash its horror in all manner of shapes and forms. It bombs embassies and releases poison gas in subways. It robs and murders, kidnaps and humiliates defenseless tourists or the peaceful helpers of international organizations. Sometimes it takes on the cloak of political activism, other times it is driven by belief. But more often than not it is purely the result of greed for money or downright hatred, for example against the overbearing United States.

Whether in Colombia or Kashmir, in Sierra Leone or Yemen, terrorism is the best-loved weapon of separatists, extremists, fundamentalists and sometimes just plain old run-of-the-mill bandits determined to extract their bounty from terror and caprice. Above all, its anonymity is what makes this new terror so powerful.

The hostages on the Philippine island of Jolo are currently enduring one of the worst forms of post-modern terror because their abduction cannot easily be reconciled to possible motives, demands or criminal profiles. Who exactly are the hostage-takers? What do they want? How predictable are they? Are they open to negotiation? The kidnapping of innocent tourists in what was hitherto considered a quiet region of the world is an almost trivial act in the annals of the new terror. This also explains why the civilized world is at pains to find a solution to the problem.

Conflicting reports and confusing options: Until today the kidnappers have produced no serious demands. A catalog of political aims issued at the start of the abduction is now seen as meaningless. So do they just want the money, the laughably tiny sum of US$1.5 million? Much seems now to suggest that the hostages have fallen into the hands of unpredictable bandits who have trouble agreeing; men and women who react capriciously to pressures from outside, who have little interest in negotiations and can present no one person to whom the outside world can talk.

For its part, the Philippine government has done little to defuse the situation in its current picture of disunity. While the president and foreign minister promise the world that no violence will be used, their soldiers merrily engage in gun battles with the captors.

The kidnapping on Jolo has had a peculiar effect because previously terrorism had long functioned along the lines of globalization. The fate of 27 Philippine children in the hostage- takers' grip failed to move the world. But give them a healthy mix of prisoners from various nations and you can guarantee the world will sit up and take notice, and provide the terrorists with an aura of unasailability into the bargain. This latest kidnapping has now advanced to the forefront of international politics, presumably exactly what the terrorists intended. The laws of the new media world appear to dictate that the prospects for a successful conclusion to a crime are proportionate to the density of cameras covering it.

As global as it is trivial, the terror on Jolo has left a world which operates on rules and political sense utterly helpless. The German government has sent an envoy and doctors who are now in Manila whispering calming words to politicians. But they are alone and their influence is limited. There is no recipe for dealing with bandits of the Jolo ilk. So should the ransom be paid, their material demands fulfilled if only the hostages might be saved?

The idea is as tempting as it is dangerous. In this, the post- modern form of terror is no different from its classic forerunner: If a nation allows itself to be blackmailed and to bow to the will of lawless bandits, it encourages and becomes prey to new acts of terror. In effect, it insults its own laws.

The other extreme is equally dangerous: fighting terror with violence risks escalation and accepts in cold blood the death of hostages. Even if a liberation were to succeed and the perpetrators caught or killed, the state will have created martyrs and fed other terrorists' vociferous appetite for revenge. What remains is the tiny gap between: the right mixture of negotiation and pressure, the use of specialists or -- as on Jolo -- middlemen who can show the kidnappers a way out.

Admittedly, in the case of an Osama bin Laden or the Aum terror sect this strategy is worthless. Anyone who seeks to justify a crime on ideological or religious grounds will never be pacified with arguments based on common sense or the law.

Fanaticism is by and large oblivious to compromise. On the Philippines, though, the crude mixture of material and separatist motives at least raises a little hope for a bloodless end to the drama. But at the same time it seems all too obvious that hope is not a word in the vocabulary of this new breed of terrorists.