No military option in Aceh
No military option in Aceh
Statements by top Indonesian Military (TNI) officers last week
signaled mounting pressure on President Abdurrahman Wahid to take
a harder line against the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), with which he
has been negotiating for a peaceful solution to the Aceh problem.
If TNI has its way -- now a possibility given President
Abdurrahman's increasingly precarious political position -- then
we are looking at a possible military option to settle the Aceh
conflict in the not too distant future.
On Wednesday, the chief of the Army Strategic Reserves Command
(Kostrad), Lt. Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu, declared war against GAM,
which he described as an "enemy of the state". Then on Thursday,
TNI Chief of General Affairs Lt. Gen. Djamari Chaniago demanded
that the government declare the legal status of GAM. "The first
thing to do is to identify the movement as separatist. The
mistake in not identifying the movement as such has led to the
current situation," he said. Once GAM has been outlawed, it would
pave the way for the military to deal with it accordingly, he
said.
Both Ryamizard and Djamari said that TNI, which has already
stationed 30,000 troops in Aceh, is ready to dispatch more to
crush the rebels if the government gives the go-ahead.
All the tough talk by the two generals presumes that the
current conflict in Aceh is largely of GAM's doing, and that
current negotiations between the government and GAM have failed.
Indeed, the killings have continued in breach of a cease-fire
which the two sides signed under a "humanitarian pause" agreement
in June. But judging by the victims of the recent killings, both
GAM and the Indonesian security forces (police and military) must
take responsibility for the deaths.
What these two generals forgot, or probably chose to forget,
in demanding a free hand to crush GAM, is that the military
option was tried throughout most of the 1990s, and that TNI, or
the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) as it was then called, failed
miserably. ABRI botched the job in Aceh so much, just as it did
in East Timor, that it aggravated the problem.
Various military operations launched by ABRI against the Aceh
rebels used methods which were simply unacceptable. What the
military regarded as standard procedures were atrocities against
not only rebels, but also innocent civilians. These violations of
human rights by the military are well documented by various
organizations, including the National Commission on Human Rights,
which were sent to investigate the atrocities. Their reports
should serve as reminders to one and all, particularly the new
generation of TNI leaders, that a military operation is not an
option, not even a last option, when it comes to dealing with
Aceh.
Some of the existing problems in Aceh are legacies of past
military operations. The operations drove more and more Acehnese
into the camp seeking an independent state, either the hard way
through an armed rebellion, or the peaceful way through a
referendum of self determination. To many Acehnese who lost loved
ones, or had their homes burned down during these military
operations, TNI has become the number one public enemy. TNI's
operations have strengthened GAM, both in resoluteness and in
popular support among the people in the province.
What chance of success is there if TNI is allowed to launch
another military operation today? Given TNI's recent failures in
containing rebellion, in East Timor and in Aceh, history is not
on its side. A military operation would likely make TNI even less
popular among the people of Aceh. No military operation could be
effective without the goodwill and support of the populace. TNI
has even failed to deliver on its promise to punish those
responsible for the atrocities of the past military operations, a
gesture that would certainly have bought it some goodwill.
The peaceful negotiations currently being pursued by the
government remains the only viable option for a true and lasting
solution to the Aceh problem. Having made the concession to start
negotiations with GAM, the government should explore all possible
avenues to strike a deal with the group, including an offer of
formal recognition of GAM as a regional political party which
will fight for its cause with ballots and not bullets.
Negotiations may be long and arduous, but they are certainly far
less bloody and have a greater chance of success.
The military option proposed by TNI on the other hand would be
a sure recipe for another disaster, probably even bigger than the
one we saw in the 1990s. Rather than saving Aceh, it might even
become the one that pushes the territory out of the republic.