No military option in Aceh

Statements by top Indonesian Military (TNI) officers last week signaled mounting pressure on President Abdurrahman Wahid to take a harder line against the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), with which he has been negotiating for a peaceful solution to the Aceh problem. If TNI has its way -- now a possibility given President Abdurrahman's increasingly precarious political position -- then we are looking at a possible military option to settle the Aceh conflict in the not too distant future.

On Wednesday, the chief of the Army Strategic Reserves Command (Kostrad), Lt. Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu, declared war against GAM, which he described as an "enemy of the state". Then on Thursday, TNI Chief of General Affairs Lt. Gen. Djamari Chaniago demanded that the government declare the legal status of GAM. "The first thing to do is to identify the movement as separatist. The mistake in not identifying the movement as such has led to the current situation," he said. Once GAM has been outlawed, it would pave the way for the military to deal with it accordingly, he said.

Both Ryamizard and Djamari said that TNI, which has already stationed 30,000 troops in Aceh, is ready to dispatch more to crush the rebels if the government gives the go-ahead.

All the tough talk by the two generals presumes that the current conflict in Aceh is largely of GAM's doing, and that current negotiations between the government and GAM have failed. Indeed, the killings have continued in breach of a cease-fire which the two sides signed under a "humanitarian pause" agreement in June. But judging by the victims of the recent killings, both GAM and the Indonesian security forces (police and military) must take responsibility for the deaths.

What these two generals forgot, or probably chose to forget, in demanding a free hand to crush GAM, is that the military option was tried throughout most of the 1990s, and that TNI, or the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) as it was then called, failed miserably. ABRI botched the job in Aceh so much, just as it did in East Timor, that it aggravated the problem.

Various military operations launched by ABRI against the Aceh rebels used methods which were simply unacceptable. What the military regarded as standard procedures were atrocities against not only rebels, but also innocent civilians. These violations of human rights by the military are well documented by various organizations, including the National Commission on Human Rights, which were sent to investigate the atrocities. Their reports should serve as reminders to one and all, particularly the new generation of TNI leaders, that a military operation is not an option, not even a last option, when it comes to dealing with Aceh.

Some of the existing problems in Aceh are legacies of past military operations. The operations drove more and more Acehnese into the camp seeking an independent state, either the hard way through an armed rebellion, or the peaceful way through a referendum of self determination. To many Acehnese who lost loved ones, or had their homes burned down during these military operations, TNI has become the number one public enemy. TNI's operations have strengthened GAM, both in resoluteness and in popular support among the people in the province.

What chance of success is there if TNI is allowed to launch another military operation today? Given TNI's recent failures in containing rebellion, in East Timor and in Aceh, history is not on its side. A military operation would likely make TNI even less popular among the people of Aceh. No military operation could be effective without the goodwill and support of the populace. TNI has even failed to deliver on its promise to punish those responsible for the atrocities of the past military operations, a gesture that would certainly have bought it some goodwill.

The peaceful negotiations currently being pursued by the government remains the only viable option for a true and lasting solution to the Aceh problem. Having made the concession to start negotiations with GAM, the government should explore all possible avenues to strike a deal with the group, including an offer of formal recognition of GAM as a regional political party which will fight for its cause with ballots and not bullets. Negotiations may be long and arduous, but they are certainly far less bloody and have a greater chance of success.

The military option proposed by TNI on the other hand would be a sure recipe for another disaster, probably even bigger than the one we saw in the 1990s. Rather than saving Aceh, it might even become the one that pushes the territory out of the republic.