No changes yet in China's policy after Deng's death

No changes yet in China's policy after Deng's death

By Rizal Sukma

JAKARTA (JP): It has been more than two months since China's
paramount leader Deng Xiaoping passed away. However, there has
not been any sign suggesting that the country's political
situation will turn chaotic as speculated by many analysts and
Chinese watchers.

It seems that the current China leadership led by Secretary-
General Jiang Zemin, despite speculations about a possible power
struggle outbreak, continues to show signs of unity. It also
appears to have been functioning normally without any significant
change in national priorities or domestic policies.

Indeed, recent developments in China after the death of Deng
suggest that Chinese leadership remains committed to the four
modernization programs (Si Xiandaihua) laid down by Deng two
decades ago.

Despite the fact that political differences among China's
political elite has not led to an open power struggle does not
escape such a possibility. It is still too early to claim that
Chinese leaders have solved the question of succession in the
post-Deng era. The possibility of a quest for power and influence
among contending leaders continues to be one of the most
formidable issues in Chinese domestic politics. A major concern
for China's neighbors is that if a power struggle was ever to
erupt, how would it effect China's foreign policy?

It can be speculated that in the near future, China's foreign
policy would not be affected by domestic developments. China's
leaders have repeatedly asserted that the death of Deng would not
bring about any significant change in China's foreign policy,
especially in its policy towards Asia-Pacific in general and
Southeast Asia in particular. China's leaders have stressed that
Beijing would continue to pursue its current policy of regional
cooperation in order to create a favorable external condition for
its domestic economic development.

Despite such assurances, however, there are strong reasons for
Southeast Asian countries not to take the future developments of
China's foreign policy for granted, especially in the face of
uncertainty about the future of China's domestic politics. That
uncertainty, which primarily stems from a period of transition
which characterizes China's domestic politics at present, could
bring about unexpected consequences to China's stand, attitude
and position with regard to some fundamental issues in its policy
towards Southeast Asia.

It can be speculated that during such a period of transition,
foreign policy could be used for political purposes domestically.
If China's leaders are locked in a power struggle, it is likely
that the contest would center around the quest for legitimacy.
Unlike leaders from the revolutionary generation, such as the
late Deng Xiaoping or Chen Yun, current Chinese leadership cannot
rely on historical sources of legitimacy in their attempt to
justify their right to rule. They can only rally around
contemporary themes, such as the need to continue economic
development programs.

However, the fact that almost all Chinese leaders -- moderate
and conservative -- have pledged their commitment to development
makes this theme less attractive as an instrument in
strengthening legitimacy of a particular group. It serves as a
common basis of legitimacy for the entire Chinese leadership, not
just for a particular leader or group of leaders.

Significant changes in China's foreign policy would come about
only if the current Chinese leadership rallies around political
themes such as nationalism and patriotism in the attempt to
cultivate their legitimacy. Indeed, if a power struggle outbreak
cannot be prevented, it is likely that contending leaders would
try to project themselves as true nationalists or patriots. In
other words, nationalism and patriotism might become two
important parameters by which the legitimacy and authority of a
leader would be judged.

If this unpleasant scenario becomes a reality, one of the main
foreign policy areas that might be affected is that of China's
policy towards the South China Sea. This is related to the fact
that territorial issues, such as the question of sovereignty in
the South China Sea, would increasingly become more significant
for competing elites in the struggle for leadership.

At one extreme, territorial issues that could serve as a
vehicle for competing leaders who want to project a nationalistic
image, by taking a tough policy stance, could easily be charged
as being less nationalistic. Meanwhile, in a situation
characterized by the lack of sources of legitimacy, nationalism
and patriotism constitute two primary sources for claiming and
justifying the right to rule.

However, it is important to emphasize that the possibility of
such a scenario materializing would depend on China's national
priority. In this regard, post-Deng leadership in Beijing
realizes that trends in economic transformations cannot be
reversed. As mentioned earlier, the success of economic reform
has become the most fundamental basis of legitimacy in China's
politics.

The ability of central government to maintain that success
would depend also on its ability to maintain a peaceful external
environment through an accommodating foreign policy. Here,
China's leaders realize that a tougher stance in its policy
towards territorial disputes would not be in China's best
national interest. Even though nationalism becomes one important
source of legitimacy, the most likely option for China's elite at
present is that of status quo. In other words, it is unlikely
that China's policy towards territorial disputes would deviate
fundamentally from current trends.

Ironically, it is the status quo in China's policy towards
South China Sea territorial disputes that presents a major
security challenge for ASEAN. Since the end of the Cold War,
territorial disputes in the South China Sea have been seen as the
most difficult challenge for ASEAN. A number of regional
initiatives taken by Indonesia have not produced any significant
breakthroughs.

Therefore, there is no doubt that Southeast Asian countries
would like to see some changes in China's foreign policy. In this
regard, it is important to convince Beijing that its policy in
the South China Sea would be seen as a stick by which China's
regional intentions could be measured. For its part, through its
role in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN has provided China
the best opportunity to become a trustworthy partner with
regional countries.

The writer is a researcher at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta.