No changes yet in China's policy after Deng's death

By Rizal Sukma

JAKARTA (JP): It has been more than two months since China's paramount leader Deng Xiaoping passed away. However, there has not been any sign suggesting that the country's political situation will turn chaotic as speculated by many analysts and Chinese watchers.

It seems that the current China leadership led by Secretary- General Jiang Zemin, despite speculations about a possible power struggle outbreak, continues to show signs of unity. It also appears to have been functioning normally without any significant change in national priorities or domestic policies.

Indeed, recent developments in China after the death of Deng suggest that Chinese leadership remains committed to the four modernization programs (Si Xiandaihua) laid down by Deng two decades ago.

Despite the fact that political differences among China's political elite has not led to an open power struggle does not escape such a possibility. It is still too early to claim that Chinese leaders have solved the question of succession in the post-Deng era. The possibility of a quest for power and influence among contending leaders continues to be one of the most formidable issues in Chinese domestic politics. A major concern for China's neighbors is that if a power struggle was ever to erupt, how would it effect China's foreign policy?

It can be speculated that in the near future, China's foreign policy would not be affected by domestic developments. China's leaders have repeatedly asserted that the death of Deng would not bring about any significant change in China's foreign policy, especially in its policy towards Asia-Pacific in general and Southeast Asia in particular. China's leaders have stressed that Beijing would continue to pursue its current policy of regional cooperation in order to create a favorable external condition for its domestic economic development.

Despite such assurances, however, there are strong reasons for Southeast Asian countries not to take the future developments of China's foreign policy for granted, especially in the face of uncertainty about the future of China's domestic politics. That uncertainty, which primarily stems from a period of transition which characterizes China's domestic politics at present, could bring about unexpected consequences to China's stand, attitude and position with regard to some fundamental issues in its policy towards Southeast Asia.

It can be speculated that during such a period of transition, foreign policy could be used for political purposes domestically. If China's leaders are locked in a power struggle, it is likely that the contest would center around the quest for legitimacy. Unlike leaders from the revolutionary generation, such as the late Deng Xiaoping or Chen Yun, current Chinese leadership cannot rely on historical sources of legitimacy in their attempt to justify their right to rule. They can only rally around contemporary themes, such as the need to continue economic development programs.

However, the fact that almost all Chinese leaders -- moderate and conservative -- have pledged their commitment to development makes this theme less attractive as an instrument in strengthening legitimacy of a particular group. It serves as a common basis of legitimacy for the entire Chinese leadership, not just for a particular leader or group of leaders.

Significant changes in China's foreign policy would come about only if the current Chinese leadership rallies around political themes such as nationalism and patriotism in the attempt to cultivate their legitimacy. Indeed, if a power struggle outbreak cannot be prevented, it is likely that contending leaders would try to project themselves as true nationalists or patriots. In other words, nationalism and patriotism might become two important parameters by which the legitimacy and authority of a leader would be judged.

If this unpleasant scenario becomes a reality, one of the main foreign policy areas that might be affected is that of China's policy towards the South China Sea. This is related to the fact that territorial issues, such as the question of sovereignty in the South China Sea, would increasingly become more significant for competing elites in the struggle for leadership.

At one extreme, territorial issues that could serve as a vehicle for competing leaders who want to project a nationalistic image, by taking a tough policy stance, could easily be charged as being less nationalistic. Meanwhile, in a situation characterized by the lack of sources of legitimacy, nationalism and patriotism constitute two primary sources for claiming and justifying the right to rule.

However, it is important to emphasize that the possibility of such a scenario materializing would depend on China's national priority. In this regard, post-Deng leadership in Beijing realizes that trends in economic transformations cannot be reversed. As mentioned earlier, the success of economic reform has become the most fundamental basis of legitimacy in China's politics.

The ability of central government to maintain that success would depend also on its ability to maintain a peaceful external environment through an accommodating foreign policy. Here, China's leaders realize that a tougher stance in its policy towards territorial disputes would not be in China's best national interest. Even though nationalism becomes one important source of legitimacy, the most likely option for China's elite at present is that of status quo. In other words, it is unlikely that China's policy towards territorial disputes would deviate fundamentally from current trends.

Ironically, it is the status quo in China's policy towards South China Sea territorial disputes that presents a major security challenge for ASEAN. Since the end of the Cold War, territorial disputes in the South China Sea have been seen as the most difficult challenge for ASEAN. A number of regional initiatives taken by Indonesia have not produced any significant breakthroughs.

Therefore, there is no doubt that Southeast Asian countries would like to see some changes in China's foreign policy. In this regard, it is important to convince Beijing that its policy in the South China Sea would be seen as a stick by which China's regional intentions could be measured. For its part, through its role in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN has provided China the best opportunity to become a trustworthy partner with regional countries.

The writer is a researcher at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta.