'No autonomy but declaration of war in strife torn Aceh'

Question: What is your assessment of the plan to apply the autonomy policy next January?

Answer: I am concerned, as are many people, about the lack of detailed regulations for autonomy. As far as I know, there is no legal infrastructure that will enable a smooth implementation of the autonomy law. Even the regulations which have been issued have yet to be disseminated. That's an assessment from a formal perspective.

We are also witnessing a slowing down of the push for autonomy due to changes in the team in charge of regional autonomy regulations. We know there was Ryaas Rasyid's team, but this team was later dissolved.

This invites questions as to how we can keep up with the demands for a strong legal infrastructure for autonomy. We are now questioning whether the autonomy law will be enough (for such an undertaking), whether it adequately gives direction for the implementation. I would say not. Any inadequacy (in the legal infrastructure) would lead to chaos. That's a legal assessment.

From a regional administrative point of view, (one thing of concern) is the need for an integrated approach to empower regional administration. This requires some sort of entrepreneurship because more than just a legal infrastructure is needed by regions in order to be autonomous and be able to respond to demands independently. Furthermore, the 'players' in this case, the administrations, must also be prepared.

Of course, there will be differences in the regions' levels of preparedness. We need to ask regions what steps they have taken, then we can establish a map of potential obstacles of the autonomy policy, which will differ from one region to another. One region, for example, has a budget of Rp 95 billion with a genuine regional income of only Rp 5.4 billion. There will be questions about how that region will pay for routine expenses such as civil servants' pay and maintenance of public facilities. Not all regions can answer these questions.

Some regions which are rich in natural resources are really enthusiastic about the autonomy policy, but that does not mean they will be completely ready to allocate the existing resources for their budget. This is where mapping becomes very important, and we cannot do it by playing around. We cannot merely assume that everything is ready.

Regional autonomy is a sign of strengthening civil society. With it, initiatives will grow. Let's say that local income cannot be expected to cover a region's budget. What could happen next is levies would be imposed on locals. This would call for a community with strong solidarity, with initiatives that can independently (deal with the levies).

All this time, people's activities have been dominated by the state and we have been led to think that no development activities can be carried out without the central government's allocation of funding. If this perception remains, I cannot envision what kind of regional autonomy we will have ahead of us.

We also need a cultural approach to facilitate local people's initiatives. They should be injected with a need for achievement in addition to the necessary infrastructures, including social infrastructure.

Q: Tell us more about social infrastructure...

A: It includes forums where members of society can democratically discuss their options even at the lowest level of community. This will encourage participation. How can we facilitate an activism in the absence of space for dialogs and new ideas?

For years we have been used to bearing the top-down concepts forced on us. Regional autonomy requires participation; we should expect the emergence of town meetings that enable a bottom-up process, a grouping of participative economic and cultural activities.

We cannot design all these in such a short time; we need stimulation, community empowerment through public dialog. I don't mean talk shows, but workshops that produce their own plan of action.

This is a new culture. All this time, when we said a 'meeting', we meant a gathering where heads of villages, regencies or districts gave speeches. If that is what is meant by regional autonomy, this project will soon unravel. This is why we must ensure the establishment of certain preliminary steps despite the fact that we need to apply the policy soon.

The central government should facilitate an institution, without which the autonomy drive will fail. This is something that has been applied by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with international funding. But this is not the responsibility of foreign funding; instead, it is the government's duty to design the schemes.

The problem is our government is now preoccupied with national scandals and does not have the time to think about the steps necessary for autonomy policy implementation.

Q: This cultural change will take a long time to occur, right?

A: Yes. We need a pattern of behavior which can be facilitated with planning. But our government needs a change of paradigm, from one where development programs were dominated by ministries into one where members of the community take an active part.

This means the government will have to be willing to take the part of a facilitator rather than executor. I am pessimistic, however, because of how the bureaucracy remains unwilling to change.

For instance, my NGO (Nurani Dunia or the Conscience of the World) recently suggested the establishment of a national committee for refugees, with the purpose of empowering the public in handling the problems of internally displaced people in ways that are integrated at regional and national levels.

But this suggestion was turned down just like that by bureaucrats at ministries at the national level, (ignoring) that we only wanted to cultivate a civil society able to handle the problems.

Granted, the government wants to take care of everything, by all means, and we must cooperate because much has been given by the government. But my impression was (the bureaucrats) were afraid we would take over their authority.

This means that something needs to be changed -- if they still want to take everything and refuse to give room to members of the public, then we will find difficulties in implementing autonomy.

Q: If there are so many problems looming for autonomy in 'normal' areas, what will the problems be in conflict areas such as Aceh and Maluku?

A: Obviously there will be many, given how the government doesn't even function in those areas. (It would be even more difficult) to expect the public to cooperate and carry out functions that all this time have been implemented in a top-down manner. How can we expect the public to respond (to the autonomy drive) if they are busy fighting one another?

I really doubt regional autonomy will proceed smoothly. I think some regions should be exempted.

Q: In Aceh, the push for independence, or at least major autonomy, is increasing, while armed conflict has yet to recede.

A: The conflict in Aceh is taking place between the security forces and the government and people who have been antigovernment all along. If this continues, we will see a vacuum of governance. It will be very difficult to carry out the autonomy policy under such circumstances.

Q: Are you saying we should wait for the conflict to be resolved before commencing with the autonomy drive?

A: I believe so, or maybe we can opt for an autonomy that will accommodate the discontented public through welfare. It seems that there's a deadlock because one group of people demands separation while another group is adamant that (the region) stay a part of Indonesia.

No dialog will take place in this situation. In a deadlock, what emerges is the language of violence and people resorting to any measures in order to achieve what has been their set price.

It would have been different if the demand was for better welfare or a portion of territory, no matter how much. But if the demand is for independence, then I guess we can only wait for a declaration of war.

I do not know how long it will take before the government can apply the autonomy policy in Aceh because the conflict has been ongoing. We can't even predict when the fighting will stop.

Furthermore, I can't predict how long it will take for Aceh to recover economically, socially and to rebuild their trust (of one group) in another group, which is believed to have murdered their members. It will take a very long time. (Saiful Hamiwanto).