Nigeria's transition to civilian rule

LONDON: According to Nigeria's Provisional Ruling Council (PRC), the transition to civilian rule will be completed as scheduled on Oct. 1, 1998. A smooth handover will be essential for establishing political stability and achieving sustainable economic growth.

With a population of 100 million, oil reserves of at least 20 billion barrels, and an army that has intervened in regional conflicts, Nigeria is a rare example of a developing country that has maintained its geostrategic importance. At the same time, it is increasingly clear that the transition to civilian rule will, at best, be half-hearted and that the military will continue to be the dominant political player.

Nigeria has experienced only ten years of civilian rule since gaining independence from the UK in 1960. Gen. Sani Abacha -- who became head of state in November 1993 -- is the country's seventh military ruler, and has actively participated in at least three past coups.

Abacha's credentials for restoring a civilian government are at best questionable. As minister of defense in the former government, he helped to precipitate a political crisis by insisting on the annulment of the June 1993 presidential contest -- widely regarded as the fairest poll in Nigeria's history.

Abacha's critics portray his administration as a ruthless and unrepresentative military clique seeking to legitimize its hold on Africa's largest oil economy. The government is accused of undermining the integrity of democratic institutions and eroding the rule of law both in Nigeria and across West Africa.

Foreign powers seem uncertain about what policies to pursue towards Nigeria. Abacha prompted outrage when, in June 1995, a military tribunal controversially convicted a well respected former head of state, Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, of treason, and another court ordered the execution of the minority-rights activist, Ken Saro-Wiwa, in November 1995.

The international community's response, however, was limited: the U.S. refused to grant visas to military officers and senior government officials; the European Union (EU) introduced a partial arms embargo; and the Commonwealth suspended Nigeria's membership.

Despite the criticism of Abacha's style of governance, there are no obvious alternatives. Nigeria's civilian political elite proved incapable of operating a stable democratic system during its two periods in office in 1960-1966 and 1979-1983. The First and Second Republics were both overthrown with popular support following accusations that they had heightened ethnic tensions and engaged in large-scale corruption.

The response of Nigeria's politicians to the 1993 crisis and the current transition program is equally discouraging. Chief Moshood Abiola, who was poised to win the June 1993 poll, has been in detention on treason charges since June 1994. In return for abandoning Abiola, his running-mate, Babas Gana Kingibe, was rewarded with the Foreign Affairs, Interior and Steel portfolios in Abacha's cabinet. Tom Ikimi, the leader of the only other party registered under the former dispensation, is now one of Abacha's most trusted advisers and has replaced Kingibe as Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Politicians have rushed to join the five parties that are presently allowed to compete for power: the United Nigeria Congress Party (UNCP); the Democratic Party of Nigeria (DPN); the Committee for National Consensus; the National Center Party of Nigeria; and the Grass Roots Democratic Movement. While all of the parties were carefully selected by the military authorities, the UNCP, and to a lesser extent the DPN, have benefited from a close association with senior government officials. A powerful lobby has urged Abacha to remain as Head of State, and to stand for the presidency on Aug. 1, 1998 as the consensus candidate of all parties.

The civilian political elite's credibility has been further undermined by its willingness to participate in a process that does not have formal guidelines. The National Constitutional Conference prepared a draft document in 1995, but this has never been published. Consequently, it is unclear whether the head of state will also lead the government, whether a serving military officer will be able to stand for the presidency, or if the position will even be subject to a direct election.

The vulnerability of the transition process is underscored by claims made by the ruling authorities on Dec. 21, 1997 that they had uncovered a coup plot involving senior military officers, including the PRC Vice-Chairman, Lt. Gen. Oladipo Diya. Although there is evidence to support the administration's allegations, the security agencies are thought to have entrapped Diya and his co-conspirators, seeking either to test their loyalty or to make top posts available for patronage purposes.

Government accusations that the UK and the U.S. had backed the coup plot threaten further to cloud relations between Nigeria and its most established trading partners. Such allegations are seen by many as proof that the military is trying to create a political environment in which it will be able to exercise its influence after the October handover.

The Army's integrity is being undermined by the same corrosive elements that have damaged Nigeria's civil society. Any new challenges to the military could expose divisions within the one institution that has remained intact since 1960. A contested coup would be destabilizing, and could result in violence spreading beyond the country's borders. Rumors that the alleged coup plotters are facing a secret trial and possible execution will not help matters.

State institutions are also under pressure from a number of forces. In the north, the authorities have introduced strict security measures to combat the growth of radical Islamic groups, which have exploited popular discontent over rising poverty and diminishing opportunities.

Communities in the southern oil-producing areas have followed Saro-Wiwa's example and launched a challenge to the legitimacy of the remote central government. They argue that the authorities have done little to develop a region that generates 90 percent of the country's foreign-exchange reserves.

The government currently appears capable of controlling such opposition, but is unlikely to resolve the problem through repression alone. Furthermore, the resentment has revealed the extent of the vacuum at the center of Nigerian politics.

Nigeria's military deployments in Liberia and Sierra Leone have kept politically ambitious officers occupied, and have highlighted the army's continuing power. The operations have also served as a warning to junior officers who might have been tempted to copy their Sierra Leonean counterparts, while drawing attention to the potential chaos that a contested coup in Nigeria might cause.

Intervention has also allowed Abacha to shift the focus of the regional agenda away from economic matters to security issues. Nigeria went to great lengths to oust Sierra Leone's military leadership, but it did nothing to save the civilian governments in Gambia and Niger that were overthrown on July 23-24, 1994 and Jan. 27, 1996 respectively. Instead, it offered support to the incoming military regimes and assisted with their transformation to constitutional respectability.

In Benin and elsewhere, Nigeria has used its influence to increase its circle of friends. However, West Africa's medium- sized powers -- Cameron, Ctte d'Ivoire and Ghana -- fear that regional dependency on a country as potentially unstable as Nigeria could have grave long-term implications.

In order to deflect criticism from the Commonwealth, the UK and the U.S., Abacha has sought new partners in Europe and Asia. His attention has focused particularly on France, which since the end of the Cold War has worked hard to increase its influence in Africa's largest anglophone country. In addition, Spain is now the second biggest importer of Nigerian oil.

Most EU member-states tend to ignore the weak measures that the association agreed in 1995. Even Germany, Holland and the UK, Abacha's strongest European critics, have not strictly adhered to the EU regulations.

Nigeria has also purchased 1,500 military vehicles from India in May 1997 and began a US$526 million railway rehabilitation project with China in June 1997.

Given the divisions and level of corruption in Nigeria, the challenge of establishing a representative democracy is immense. To some extent, Western governments have resisted imposing tougher sanctions because they fear that they will have unpredictable consequences. While a comprehensive oil embargo might unseat the administration, it is unclear how it would help Nigeria to create an acceptable political system.

Abacha has proved to be an uncompromising leader with an instinct for political survival. He has cultivated the support of traditional rulers, and has made a series of populist gestures. For example, he has instigated action both against individuals involved in failed banks and those responsible for replacing in April 1996 Nigeria's spiritual head of Islam, the Sultan of Sokoto, Ibrahim Dasuki.

While Abacha has proved adept at crisis management, and at using decrees and special tribunals to strengthen his position, he has not indicated that he is capable of tackling corruption, reducing ethnic tensions or repairing the country's collapsing infrastructure.

His supporters argue that these problems will be solved only after Nigeria returns to constitutional rule. But the apparent absence of a self-confident civilian political class seems to make Abacha's continued rule, in some form, inevitable.