New world order or new world disorder?

Francesco M. Greco and Fabio Scarpello, Jakarta

In the last 60 years the international system upon which the world order was based has changed drastically. In the last decade the certainties and hierarchies established during the cold war, have been wiped out by powerful historical events that took place on two dates that -- by either magic or curse -- mirror each other: 11/9 ( or Nov. 9 1989 and the fall of the Berlin wall) and then the 9/11 (2001 terrorist attacks in the United States). Nothing has been the same since and worries have set in.

While the International community is busy debating the best way to guarantee world safety, it is important to revise how we got here.

The first main turning point happened at the end of 1945, when Europe, structurally and morally destroyed by two world wars, lost its centrality on the world stage and from the "subject" of world history it became the "object". For the next 50 years, the old continent, while it maintained central strategic importance, lost autonomy and its territory became the main playing field between two new superpowers: the United States and the then Soviet Union.

Western European countries were aligned with U.S. foreign and defense policies, while Eastern European countries were subjugated to Soviet "friendly" regimes. This set of international hierarchies added to the nuclear arm race that characterized this period worked as a deterrent and guaranteed a relative stability; the closest the two main players came to a military conflict was "through intermediary countries" (Middle East, Vietnam, Afghanistan etc).

However, disagreement did happen inside both blocks. Within the Eastern block in some cases these -- like Budapest (1956) and Prague (1968) -- ended up in bloodshed; within the Western block they were characterized by the more critical and independent stance taken by France. Noteworthy are the rifts following the Suez crises in 1956, and those in the 1960s in regard to the Vietnam War and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This last led to the exit of France from the NATO integrated defense system.

But disagreement did not distract from what was then considered the common enemy, namely the Soviet Union. Every time the Soviet threat seemed more real -- for example during the Cuban missile crises (1962) and during late 1970 with the deployment of SS20 Soviet missiles across the Eastern block -- the Western block re-compacted itself.

Then we have a second main turning point. Gorbachev's rise to power in the Soviet Union and its Perestroika movement, eventually led to the fall of the Berlin wall on Nov. 9. The world watched with incredulity to what was the end of the Cold War.

Politically the end of the Soviet threat meant also the end of the two blocks as such. The Eastern countries slowly -- and at times painfully -- started finding their ways to independence, while the Western countries did not feel any longer obliged to offer automatic compliancy with the U.S. foreign policy.

From then on, the new found European voice has stood up to the U.S. in military matters (Balkans' wars 1991-1999) as well as in a series of non-strategic issues (Kyoto protocol and the International Criminal Court) in commercial issues, and in regard to the different importance given to "hard security" (use of military force) and "soft security" (use of political and economic channels) as a means to guarantee national safety.

This switch in attitude will create its deepest rift a few years down the line, during the second Iraqi war (2003) when France and Germany, backed by Russia, openly opposed the U.S.-led coalition.

However the reality of the post-Berlin wall is a new world hierarchy, with the U.S. erected as the world's only superpower and no clear indication as to who follow (European Union? Russia? China?).

Also, international organizations such as NATO, the United Nations, EU and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) started reassessing their roles and competences. These processes were sped up by the third main turning point: Sept. 11 2001.

So from 1989 -- with an increased pace after Sept. 11 -- we have noticed that: NATO has twice shed skin, finding its new role in what used to be defined as "out of area intervention". The UN, while remaining the only source of international legitimacy, has had to face its operative limits. The EU while taking onboard many former communist countries has become more and more involved in the international scene and, the ASEAN -- at a summit in Bali (2003) -- established a Security Community (ASC), which for the first time engages Southeast Asian countries in facing non traditional security threats.

However the main change in the international order caused by Sept. 11 is the switch in the U.S. global strategic and ideological approach to foreign policy. The change is exemplified in the U.S. war on terror that has changed the rules of the game: "Out" is the multilateralism that had characterized previous U.S. administrations (Wilson, Roosevelt, Bush senior . and Clinton) and "in" is a unilateralism aimed at establishing a new "international system" where the U.S.' "greater duties" and "greater rights" are acknowledged.

To pursue its war on terror the U.S. has followed a dual strategy: Military (or traditional) and non military. The non military strategy has involved a closer cooperation with international police forces, a reliance on a more focused and intense use of intelligence, on freezing bank accounts and on arresting suspects.

The military strategy has been aimed at fighting presumed terrorist countries (Afghanistan and Iraq) or intimidating terrorist-supporting countries (Iran, North Korea, Syria and Sudan). Militarily, the new paradigm introduced is that of the "preventive war", that goes well beyond that of "pre-emptive strike". This latter implies a strike as a reaction to an imminent and certain aggression, like for example the Israeli attack to Arab Sates in 1967.

The former is aimed to neutralize an enemy that in an uncertain future date will attack, like for example the Japanese at Pearl Harbor in 1941.

The preventive war has introduced a degree of relativism, anxiety and fear in the International system. It has also given rise to a precedent that could lead to a more and more frequent use of the military option.

It is clear that it is a viable option against non traditional threats, but it is also clear that it creates deep international division and presents difficulties in defining an exit strategy at the end of the operation. Also, questions such as: what is the real entity of a threat -- and who has the authority to assess this threat -- are very difficult to answer.

And that is were we are now. While we are aware that the old bi-polar system has been overrun by the end of communism and then by the rise of international terrorism (and the fear of the use of weapons of mass destruction) we are not sure were we are heading. We know that the boat of history has set sail in search of a new order, but we are neither sure where or when it will touch terra ferma.

Francesco M. Greco is Italy's envoy in Indonesia; Fabio Scarpello is a journalist.