New wave of Islamic intellectuals

New wave of Islamic intellectuals

Islam dan Negara: Transformasi Pemikiran dan Praktik Politik
Islam di Indonesia (Islam and the State: The Transformation of
Islamic Thought and Political Practices in Indonesia);
By Bahtiar Effendy;
Yayasan Paramadina, Jakarta, October 1998;
xvii and 374 pp;
Rp 35,000.

JAKARTA (JP): In Indonesia, the political relationship between
Islam and the state since the end of Dutch colonialism has been
problematic. The problem rests on how to develop synergy between
the practices and political thoughts of Islam and the state.
Tension has frequently arisen in connection with the dominant
position of Islam as the majority religion.

Tension repeatedly arose during founding president Sukarno's
administration and continued through the rule of Soeharto.
Islamic-oriented political parties were viewed as potential
rivals and considered capable of destroying the nationalist-based
state.

The regime's anxiety over Islam led to efforts to tame
Islamic-oriented political parties. As a result, Islamic
political activists not only failed to establish Islam as the
state ideology and religion, but also were relegated to the role
of a minority group accused of challenging the state ideology of
Pancasila. Physically, bureaucratically and even symbolically,
political Islam has been conquered by the authorities.

Tension escalated because Islamic political activists also
viewed the state with suspicion. How could such an environment
occur? This question is examined by Bahtiar Effendy by
identifying all the relevant factors and seeking all possible
solutions in an effort to change a suspicious situation into a
harmonious and mutually beneficial one. He focuses his analysis
on the development of a new wave of Islamic intellectuals in the
1980s.

Bahtiar believes the tension between Islam and the state
occurred as a result of the formal and legalistic practices of
political Islam during the revolution period of the mid-1940s,
the liberal period of the mid-1950s and the New Order period of
the late-1960s. During the above periods, the idealism of
political Islam reached its peak with the demand to establish
Islam as the state ideology and religion, complete with all the
sociopolitical consequences.

Historically, the demand did not appear in a vacuum. The
"meeting" between political Islamic activists and Western
colonialism, which was considered negative because it nullified
the opportunity for Indonesian Muslims to receive proper
educations and channel their political aspirations, was an
opportunity for Islamic activists to raise political Islam as an
ideology against Westernism.

Several political thinkers and activists, who were concerned
with keeping Indonesia united, rejected the idea. Also, a sector
of the Indonesian Muslim community did not support the idea.

What occurred next, during the first 25 years of the New Order
era, was that the idea of political Islam became the target of
ideological and political suspicion. This situation has attracted
the interests of Islamic intellectuals and activists since the
1970s.

Bahtiar divides this generation into three different
intellectual groupings. The first is the theological and
religious reform group, the second is the political and
bureaucracy reform group and the third is the social
transformation group.

The first group does not see politics with formalistic,
legalistic or scriptural orientation (p. 131). This is in
accordance with what Sukarno did in the 1930s to find the essence
of Islam, not literally or textually. The group is represented in
figures like Djohan Effendi, Ahmad Wahid and Nurcholish Madjid.

The second group puts Islam not in the frontal position
against the state. It does not place Pancasila as opposing Islam;
on the other hand, they complement each other (p. 153). Dahlan
Ranuwihardjo, Sulastomo and Ma'ri Muhammad are among the earlier
generations of this group.

The third, the social transformation group, is a practical and
populist movement. It is people-oriented and aims to build a
strong society. This group prefers to overcome concrete and
serious matters facing Indonesians (p. 166). Those in this group
include Adi Sasono and Dawam Rahardjo.

What the three groups tried to achieve was a transformation of
the political Islam's point of view from formalism and legalism
to substantialism. Through this effort, Bahtiar concludes that
the current political Islam has found a new format, which covers
all theological grounds, purposes and approaches, and is
considered comparable to the construction of a united Indonesia.

The new format does not need a legalistic or formalistic
relationship between Islam and the state, as long as the state's
value system is not against Islamic teaching.

Bahtiar's analysis clearly shows Indonesian Muslims undergoing
a significant shift from formalism and legalism to
substantialism. As Kuntowijoyo once said: "it's high time for
rational and functional politics and to work for mutual interests
-- welfare, justice and democracy".

One important note is that the shift in orientation does not
mean that formalism in Islam has disappeared. There still are
indications of the development of a formal political Islam.

-- Islah Gusmian