New PPP leaders face tough challenges

New PPP leaders face tough challenges

By Bob S. Hadiwinata

BANDUNG (JP): One can easily agree with Amir Santoso, a
political scientist at the University of Indonesia, that whoever
intends to observe politics in Indonesia cannot be content with
what happens on the surface alone (The Jakarta Post, Sept. 5,
1994). This argument holds true for the current dissension over
the line-up of the PPP (United Development Party) leadership
board in the aftermath of the party congress held in Jakarta.

On the surface, it appears that the congress ran relatively
smoothly. Some observers, including Santoso, argued that the PPP
congress revealed tolerance and maturity among the party leaders.
Despite the walk-outs staged by two NU (Nahdlatul Ulama) figures
in the process of the formation of the PPP leadership board, the
congress successfully re-elected Ismail Hasan Metareum -- also
known as Buya -- as the chairman of PPP.

Yet, beyond the surface, the line up of the board raised
disappointment among the majority of the NU members when they
realizes that the "formatters" dominated by MI (Muslimin
Indonesia) figures failed to keep their promise to include more
NU members on the board if they could not agree upon the election
of Matori Abdul Djalil as the new PPP leader.

Amid the growing dissension within the "formatters", Ismail
Hasan and other MI members went on to form a leadership board
without involving prominent NU figures, especially the ulemas and
those who challenged Buya 's leadership. Realizing that their
interests had been neglected by Buya, many ulemas expressed their
disappointment. Syamsuri Baddawi, who was appointed as vice
chairman of PPP's consultative assembly, even threatened to
retire before serving his term. All in all, Buya 's non-
compromising stance seems to have caused NU leaders to lose
patience.

Abdurrahman Wahid, the Chairman of NU, for example argues that
in the next election, NU members could either shift their
support to PDI (Indonesian Democratic Party) or turn to be
golput (non-voters). And as NU leader, he will not encourage
his followers to be golput. More importantly, Alawy Mohammad, a
prominent Kyai (traditional Javanese Moslem leader) from Madura,
insists that if PDI could pursue more Islamic programs he would
ask his followers to vote for them in the next election.

If Buya failed to take proper action, the ulema's frustration
could pose a serious threat to PPP in the next election. Without
NU's support, it is quite clear that PPP will lose a considerable
number of votes in Central and East Java, which happens to be
NU's stronghold. Even worse, if all the frustrated NU members
shift their votes to PDI, it is likely that PPP will lose its
status as the second largest party in Indonesia.

Apart from the gloom surrounding the PPP leaders, Buya 's
non-compromising action has to do with his desire to strengthen
PPP's organizational capacity. This effort can only be completed
in the absence of any possible challenges from within the
leadership board. Therefore, it is understandable that Buya chose
not to involve his two main challenges, Matori Abdul Djalil and
Sri Bintang Pamungkas, in the new leadership board. By keeping
them away from the board Buya can set PPP's agenda without
risking his position.

What are the merits of this strategy ? In the democratic
world, original strength of a certain political party is crucial
since it has to be able to form a government at once whenever it
wins an election. Moreover, a purely program-oriented party
needs to supply itself with campaign material that can only be
provided by a solid party organization. Another important point
of organizational consideration has to do with the activity of
cadre parties as opposed to mass parties. A cadre party needs to
link itself with the message through solid organization. Given
the fact that PPP is not a mass party, it is important for the
party leaders to build a solid organizational base in order to
maintain political communication with the masses.

Yet, there is another question which is worth considering: in
the context of Indonesia's party system, does organizational
strength become a top priority of PPP ? Regarding the undisputed
position of the ruling party, Golkar, in current Indonesian
politics, it is quite absurd to expect that PPP could win an
election in the near future. Therefore, rather than setting-up a
solid organizational body for the formation of an instant
alternative government, PPP hopes to secure as many votes as
possible in the election, especially at the district and
provincial levels.

It appears that before creating a solid organizational body, a
PPP leader must develop networks with the masses, particularly
the young generation of "new voters." It will then be a major
setback if PPP leaders narrow the party's electoral basis in
order to strengthen its organizational capacity, whereas they
need to secure more votes.

Still there is another good reason for arguing that PPP
leaders will face a gloomy situation in the next election. As
mentioned earlier, PPP's membership structure falls into that of
a cadre party with no direct link to the masses. In order to
mobilize popular support, a cadre party relies on three basic
components: (1) influential persons: those whose name, prestige,
or connections can provide a backing for the candidate; (2)
experts who know how to handle the electors and how to organize a
campaign; (3) financiers who are ready to pay the party's bills.

In the context of the PPP, Buya 's strategy seems to omit
the party's two basic components: the influential persons (the
ulemas) and the experts (Sri Bintang Pamungkas and Matori Abdul
Djalil). By throwing Sri Bintang and Matori off the leadership
board, it is quite clear that Buya disregards the aspirations of
younger people. Similarly by turning his cheek against prominent
NU ulemas, Buya seems to ignore the significance of PPP's
traditional Javanese voters scattered around Central and East
Java.

It can therefore be concluded that Buya 's strategy of
organizational consideration will proceed at the expense of the
loss of substantial support from the younger generation and
traditional Javanese voters. In the final analysis, such an
unappealing situation could jeopardize PPP's current position as
the second largest party in Indonesia.

No one can really be sure whether PPP will exchange positions
with PDI in the next election. Yet, the signal by Alawy Muhammad
(which is possibly followed by other kyais) to shift his support
to PDI will certainly make life more difficult for PPP leaders
hoping to maintain the party's position as a second party in the
next election. However, it is important for the new PPP leaders
to take the cadre party theory into account. Had they thought
about the significance of the ulemas as well as the experts in
linking the party with the masses, it would have been easier for
them to face the PDI threat in the next election.

The writer is a graduate of Monash University, Australia, and
lecturer in political science at University of Parahyangan,
Bandung.

Window: No one can really be sure whether PPP will exchange positions
with PDI in the next election.