New PPP leaders face tough challenges
By Bob S. Hadiwinata
BANDUNG (JP): One can easily agree with Amir Santoso, a political scientist at the University of Indonesia, that whoever intends to observe politics in Indonesia cannot be content with what happens on the surface alone (The Jakarta Post, Sept. 5, 1994). This argument holds true for the current dissension over the line-up of the PPP (United Development Party) leadership board in the aftermath of the party congress held in Jakarta.
On the surface, it appears that the congress ran relatively smoothly. Some observers, including Santoso, argued that the PPP congress revealed tolerance and maturity among the party leaders. Despite the walk-outs staged by two NU (Nahdlatul Ulama) figures in the process of the formation of the PPP leadership board, the congress successfully re-elected Ismail Hasan Metareum -- also known as Buya -- as the chairman of PPP.
Yet, beyond the surface, the line up of the board raised disappointment among the majority of the NU members when they realizes that the "formatters" dominated by MI (Muslimin Indonesia) figures failed to keep their promise to include more NU members on the board if they could not agree upon the election of Matori Abdul Djalil as the new PPP leader.
Amid the growing dissension within the "formatters", Ismail Hasan and other MI members went on to form a leadership board without involving prominent NU figures, especially the ulemas and those who challenged Buya 's leadership. Realizing that their interests had been neglected by Buya, many ulemas expressed their disappointment. Syamsuri Baddawi, who was appointed as vice chairman of PPP's consultative assembly, even threatened to retire before serving his term. All in all, Buya 's non- compromising stance seems to have caused NU leaders to lose patience.
Abdurrahman Wahid, the Chairman of NU, for example argues that in the next election, NU members could either shift their support to PDI (Indonesian Democratic Party) or turn to be golput (non-voters). And as NU leader, he will not encourage his followers to be golput. More importantly, Alawy Mohammad, a prominent Kyai (traditional Javanese Moslem leader) from Madura, insists that if PDI could pursue more Islamic programs he would ask his followers to vote for them in the next election.
If Buya failed to take proper action, the ulema's frustration could pose a serious threat to PPP in the next election. Without NU's support, it is quite clear that PPP will lose a considerable number of votes in Central and East Java, which happens to be NU's stronghold. Even worse, if all the frustrated NU members shift their votes to PDI, it is likely that PPP will lose its status as the second largest party in Indonesia.
Apart from the gloom surrounding the PPP leaders, Buya 's non-compromising action has to do with his desire to strengthen PPP's organizational capacity. This effort can only be completed in the absence of any possible challenges from within the leadership board. Therefore, it is understandable that Buya chose not to involve his two main challenges, Matori Abdul Djalil and Sri Bintang Pamungkas, in the new leadership board. By keeping them away from the board Buya can set PPP's agenda without risking his position.
What are the merits of this strategy ? In the democratic world, original strength of a certain political party is crucial since it has to be able to form a government at once whenever it wins an election. Moreover, a purely program-oriented party needs to supply itself with campaign material that can only be provided by a solid party organization. Another important point of organizational consideration has to do with the activity of cadre parties as opposed to mass parties. A cadre party needs to link itself with the message through solid organization. Given the fact that PPP is not a mass party, it is important for the party leaders to build a solid organizational base in order to maintain political communication with the masses.
Yet, there is another question which is worth considering: in the context of Indonesia's party system, does organizational strength become a top priority of PPP ? Regarding the undisputed position of the ruling party, Golkar, in current Indonesian politics, it is quite absurd to expect that PPP could win an election in the near future. Therefore, rather than setting-up a solid organizational body for the formation of an instant alternative government, PPP hopes to secure as many votes as possible in the election, especially at the district and provincial levels.
It appears that before creating a solid organizational body, a PPP leader must develop networks with the masses, particularly the young generation of "new voters." It will then be a major setback if PPP leaders narrow the party's electoral basis in order to strengthen its organizational capacity, whereas they need to secure more votes.
Still there is another good reason for arguing that PPP leaders will face a gloomy situation in the next election. As mentioned earlier, PPP's membership structure falls into that of a cadre party with no direct link to the masses. In order to mobilize popular support, a cadre party relies on three basic components: (1) influential persons: those whose name, prestige, or connections can provide a backing for the candidate; (2) experts who know how to handle the electors and how to organize a campaign; (3) financiers who are ready to pay the party's bills.
In the context of the PPP, Buya 's strategy seems to omit the party's two basic components: the influential persons (the ulemas) and the experts (Sri Bintang Pamungkas and Matori Abdul Djalil). By throwing Sri Bintang and Matori off the leadership board, it is quite clear that Buya disregards the aspirations of younger people. Similarly by turning his cheek against prominent NU ulemas, Buya seems to ignore the significance of PPP's traditional Javanese voters scattered around Central and East Java.
It can therefore be concluded that Buya 's strategy of organizational consideration will proceed at the expense of the loss of substantial support from the younger generation and traditional Javanese voters. In the final analysis, such an unappealing situation could jeopardize PPP's current position as the second largest party in Indonesia.
No one can really be sure whether PPP will exchange positions with PDI in the next election. Yet, the signal by Alawy Muhammad (which is possibly followed by other kyais) to shift his support to PDI will certainly make life more difficult for PPP leaders hoping to maintain the party's position as a second party in the next election. However, it is important for the new PPP leaders to take the cadre party theory into account. Had they thought about the significance of the ulemas as well as the experts in linking the party with the masses, it would have been easier for them to face the PDI threat in the next election.
The writer is a graduate of Monash University, Australia, and lecturer in political science at University of Parahyangan, Bandung.
Window: No one can really be sure whether PPP will exchange positions with PDI in the next election.